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Abstract 
 
This  thesis  examines  selective  attention  in  young  adults  with  Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Existing literature regarding this issue is mixed; some 
research  suggesting  an  overly-focused  attentional  style  (Rincover  &  Ducharme, 
1987) while others highlight an abnormally broad attentional lens (Burack, 1994).  
The  research  presented  here  has,  for  the  first  time,  examined  selective 
attention  in  individuals  with  ASD  using  a  theoretically-led  approach  based  on 
Lavie’s Load Theory of attention and cognitive control (Lavie et al., 2004). Load 
theory  states  that  the  perceptual  load  (amount  of  potentially  task  relevant 
information)  of  a  task  affects  selective  attention.  This  theory  may  explain  the 
equivocal findings in the current data on selective attention and ASD.  
Using behavioural measures, the pattern of selective attention under various 
levels  of load  was explored in  individuals with ASD and matched  controls. The 
results provide evidence of increased perceptual capacity in ASD. This means that, at 
any one time, individuals with ASD may be able to process more information from 
the  visual  environment.  This  increase  in  capacity  was  evident  on  tasks  of  both 
unconscious and conscious perception.  
In light of the social deficits observed in the condition, the work in this thesis 
also explored selective attention in the presence of social distractor stimuli. Results 
indicated that faces are less salient for individuals with ASD and, unlike for typical 
adults, are not processed in an automatic and mandatory fashion. These results bring 
together findings on selective attention with work on social processing in an attempt 
to find basic abnormalities which might be fundamental in explaining the disorder. 
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Chapter 1: Autism Spectrum Disorder 
 
 
In the 1940s, Leo Kanner (1943) and Hans Asperger (1944) independently 
described  a  condition  that  they  had  observed  where  individuals  show  social 
impairments,  repetitive  behaviours  and  narrow  obsessive  interests.  While  subtle 
differences were present in their definitions, both embraced the idea of an autistic 
condition that could account for this symptom profile. Confirmation that this was 
indeed a syndrome rather than a number of co-morbid conditions was provided by 
Wing  and  Gould  (1979).  Their  epidemiological  study  of  children  living  in 
Camberwell, London demonstrated that all the children with social impairments also 
showed repetitive stereotyped behaviour and most of them had deficits in language 
and communication. This formed the basis for the triad of impairments that, to this 
day, has been consistently used to define autism (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). Each of these deficits will now be discussed. 
 
Social Impairment 
The difficulty with social interaction that is seen in autism typically revolves 
around  creating  and  sustaining  meaningful  social  relationships.  Individuals  with 
autism often fail to make friends and have problems engaging in reciprocal social 
interaction. They may avoid social contact altogether or may endeavour to interact 
with others in an inappropriate manner. It seems that autistic individuals have an 
inability to understand social norms and are incapable of interpreting the social cues 
that are vital for successful interaction.   13
 
Communication Deficit 
The second defining feature of the condition is a delay or, in severe cases, an 
absence of communicative ability. Language onset is generally late in development 
and there are often marked abnormalities in the speech intonation, rate and rhythm. 
Speech also often contains a degree of echolalia and stereotyped phrases that are 
repeated  frequently.  Non-verbal  communication  abilities  are  also  affected.  When 
displayed at all, eye contact and gesture are often poorly modulated. There is also a 
distinct  lack  of  communication  as  a  social  tool.  Language  is  used  for  purely 
functional reasons to produce a desired outcome rather than to connect with other 
individuals.   
 
Repetitive and Rigid Behaviour 
This third dimension to the triad describes the tendency to rigidly adhere to 
routines,  to  show  stereotypical  movements,  such  as  hand  flapping,  and  to  have 
narrow  obsessions  and  areas  of  interest.  An  individual  with  autism  might,  for 
example,  follow  a  daily  routine  meticulously  –  never  deviating  from  a  route  to 
school/work, eating the same food in the same order or running through the same set 
of behaviours each time they leave the house. A passionate obsession about a narrow 
field of interest, such as train timetables, dates on a calendar or television aerials is 
also characteristic of this third area of the triad. 
While this triad is sufficient for the diagnosis of autism, there are a number of 
other features that are often noted within the condition. One such feature is that of 
abnormal attentional abilities which have been widely reported (see Burack et al.,   14
1997 for a review). It is upon this observation that the work of this thesis is based 
and therefore this issue will be fully discussed in a subsequent chapter.  
 
 Asperger Syndrome and Autism Spectrum Disorder 
While closely related, it has been asserted that the two conditions that Kanner 
and  Asperger  described  were  not  identical.  Asperger’s  clinical  population  had  a 
higher  language  ability  than  those  described  by  Kanner  and  were  generally  less 
severely impaired. Although there is still a debate about the presence of Asperger 
Syndrome  as  a  distinct  condition,  the  term  is  currently  used  to  define  high-
functioning individuals who display social impairments and repetitive behaviour but 
who have no language delay (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  
It  is  now  also  accepted  that  the  severity  of  autism  can  vary  and  some 
researchers such as Simon Baron-Cohen believe that it is one continuous spectrum of 
attributes that ranges through the population from typical individuals up to severely 
autistic individuals (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997). The term Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD) is now commonly used to refer to all individuals that exhibit a level 
of autistic traits above the cut off for the condition as prescribed in DSM-IV.  
 
Prevalence 
Epidemiological  studies  of  the  condition  since  the  year  2000  report  a 
prevalence of between 7.2 and 40.5 cases of ASD per 10,000 individuals. However, a 
recent study carried out in the UK estimates the true value to be somewhat higher: 
with ASD affecting around 1% of child population (Baird et al., 2006). There is an   15
uneven distribution between the sexes; with a male to female ratio of approximately 
4:1(Fombonne, 2003; Fombonne, 2009).  
 
Biological Theories of ASD 
A great deal of research has attempted to identify the cause of this condition. 
The  theories  and  observations  can  be  divided  broadly  into  biological  and 
psychological research. These two areas will be discussed in turn. 
Much research has pointed towards an underlying biological deficit that may 
be involved in ASD. This view is based on observations such as the fact that up to 
one third of individuals with autism go on to develop epilepsy before they reach 
adulthood  (Gillberg  &  Coleman,  1992;  Steffenburg,  1990).  Likewise,  genetic 
conditions  such  as  fragile  X  syndrome,  tuberous  sclerosis,  phenylketonuria,  Rett 
syndrome and neurofibromotosis occur at higher levels than in the general population    
(Blomquist et al., 1985; Cohen et al., 1991; Gillberg, 1983; Gillberg et al., 1984a; 
Gillberg et al., 1984b; Gillberg et al., 1985; Gillberg & Wahlstrom, 1985; Reiss et 
al., 1986).  
  Neurological research has highlighted a number of brain regions that may be 
associated with the condition. The parietal lobes (Courchesne et al., 1993), prefrontal 
cortex (Prior & Hoffman, 1990), medial temporal lobe structures (Salmond et al., 
2005) and the cerebellum (Courchesne, 1997) have primarily been implicated. 
   16
Neuroanatomical Abnormalities 
Cerebellar Dysfunction 
  Using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) Courchesne and colleagues found 
cerebellar hypoplasia in individuals with autism – and that the extent of the condition 
was not correlated with the severity of learning deficit (Courchesne et al., 1988). 
While  this  data  and  corroborating  findings  in  post-mortem  studies  (Kemper  & 
Bauman,  1993)  led  to  a  cerebellar-based  theory  of  autism,  the  MRI  data  has 
subsequently been difficult to replicate and PET studies have found no evidence of 
cerebellar hydroplasia (Heh et al., 1989). To date, the most consistent microscopic 
findings are the absence or reduction in number of the purkinje cells in the cerebral 
hemispheres (Hossein Fatemi et al., 2002) . 
 
Medial temporal lobe damage 
  A  body  of  evidence  has  also  suggested  that  the  medial  temporal  lobe 
structures are affected in autism. It was observed that temporal lobe damage resulting 
from herpes simplex encephalitis has been seen to cause severely autistic behaviour 
in  previously  typical  adults  (Gillberg,  1991).  Similarly,  autistic  traits  –  both 
communicative  and  social  –  were  seen  in  a  boy  with  a  left  temporal 
oligodendroglioma (tumour)  (Hoon, Jr. & Reiss, 1992) and, as mentioned above, the 
prevalence  of  temporal  lobe  epilepsy  (Gillberg  &  Coleman,  1992)  and  tuberous 
sclerosis of temporal lobes (Bolton & Griffiths, 1997) within the autistic population 
is  much  higher  than  within  the  general  population.  Autopsy  studies  have  added 
further  weight  to  this  theory  by  demonstrating  the  presence  of  subtle   17
neuropathological changes  in  the  hippocampus,  amygdala,  septum  and  mamillary 
bodies (Kemper & Bauman, 1993).  
 
Parietal Lobe Abnormalities  
   MRI studies have shown that there are parietal abnormalities in over 30% of 
individuals with autism (Courchesne et al., 1993) and using Single-Photon Emission 
Computed Tomography (SPECT), reduced blood flow within the parietal region has 
also  been  detected  (George  et  al.,  1992).  Furthermore,  when  performing 
neuropsychological tests of parietal functioning, individuals with autism score poorly 
irrespective of intelligence level (Haas et al., 1996).  
 
Prefrontal Cortex 
Results regarding the theory that prefrontal cortex deficiencies are evident in 
autism  have  been  mixed. A handful of  PET and MRI studies  have indicated the 
presence of damage in this region (Gaffney et al., 1989; Hashimoto et al., 1989; 
Siegel, Jr. et al., 1992) but these findings have not been widely replicated. SPECT 
studies have highlighted a reduction in blood flow (George et al., 1992) which, it has 
been suggested, is the result of a delay in frontal cortex maturation in individuals 
with autism (Zilbovicius et al., 1995). More recent studies demonstrate that children 
with ASD have abnormally large frontal lobes (Carper & Courchesne, 2000; 2005) 
which may reflect a lack of synaptogenesis in early life (Belmonte et al., 2004).   
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Macrocephaly 
  Kanner mentioned in his original definition of the condition that five of the 
eleven  children  studied  had  unexpectedly  large  heads  (Kanner,  1943).  This 
observation has been raised a number of times since then. Bailey et al.(1995) showed 
that  42%  of  autistic  twins  below  the  age  of  16  year  in  their  study  had  a  head 
circumference above the 97
th percentile,  while Bolton et al. (1994) found that this 
was the case in 22% of 87 children and adults with autism. Imaging and post mortem 
studies have shown that this is due to increased brain volume (Bauman, 1996; Piven 
et al., 1995). The differing figures seem to be a reflection of the discrepancies within 
the  definition  of  macrocephaly  (>97
th  or  >98
th  percentile)  and  the  incidence  of 
microcephaly in low-functioning individuals with autism that is likely to be due to 
co-morbid medical disorders. Fombonne and colleagues examined 126 children in an 
attempt to clarify the levels of macrocephaly seen in autism. They found that one out 
of every six autistic subjects had macrocephaly (Fombonne et al., 1999). In an even 
larger collaborative study, 338 individuals with autism were studied (Lainhart et al., 
2006). While the distribution of head circumference was seen to be normal within 
this sample, the mean circumference and rate of macrocephaly were raised in autism. 
In  a  recent  longitudinal  study,  Webb  and  colleagues  examined  the  rate  of  head 
circumference growth (extracted from medical records) of a group of boys with ASD 
and a group with developmental delay over the first three years of life (Webb et al., 
2007). They found that there was a significantly higher rate of growth in the ASD 
group  –  more  specifically,  a  statistically  significant  increase  in  occipitofrontal 
circumference between 7 and 10 months, relative to norms. It is currently unclear 
how  this  physical  abnormality  is  related  to  the  behavioural  and  neuroanatomical 
profile of autism.   19
Biochemical Abnormalities  
Dopamine 
  Damasio and Maurer (1978) compared their neuropsychological patients to 
individuals with autism and noted that deficits in the structure or functioning of the 
mesolimbic cortex and its related structures produced a  similar symptom profile. 
Given that the target area of the ascending mesencephalic dopamine projection may 
therefore be implicated, it may be the case that a neurochemical abnormality which 
disrupts dopaminergic systems is responsible for the dysfunction. While there is no 
direct evidence  for  dopaminergic  dysfunction  in  autism,  the  hypothesis  has  been 
supported up by a number of experimental studies. Abnormal dopamine metabolism 
has been suggested in autism, as seen by the high levels of the dopamine metabolite 
homovanillic  acid  in  cerebrospinal  fluid  and  urine  (Gillberg  &  Coleman,  1992). 
Furthermore,  an  increased  blink  rate  in  autism  (an  indication  of  dopamine 
hyperactivity)  has  been  reported  (Goldberg  et  al.,  1987)  and  the  dopamine 
antagonist,  haloperidol,  is  used  with  some  success  in  the  treatment  of  autism 
(Anderson et al., 1984).    
 
Serotonin   
The neurotransmitter serotonin has also been implicated in autism. Increased 
platelet serotonin (hyperserotonemia) has been consistently found in about one third 
of individuals with autism (Cook & Leventhal, 1996). Most individuals with autism 
who  are  given  serotonin  transporter  inhibitors  such  as  the  antidepressant 
clomipramine, or selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) such as fluoxetine, 
show a reduction in ritualistic behaviours and aggression. Furthermore, reduction of   20
the  central  nervous  system  serotonin,  caused  by  induced  tryptophan  depletion, 
caused  a  worsening  of  stereotyped  behaviour  (McDougle  et  al.,  1996). 
Hyperserotonemia has been found to be familial – with a correlation between levels 
of parental and proband serotonin (Kuperman et al., 1985). It has also been noted that 
individuals  with  autism  who  had  a  sibling  with  autism  showed  higher  platelet 
serotonin  levels  than  other  individuals  with  autism  (Piven  et  al.,  1991). 
Hyperserotonemia may therefore be a useful marker of autism that has a higher risk 
of sibling recurrence.  
 
Foetal Testosterone  
  Baron-Cohen  and  colleagues  have  put  forward  an  alternative  biological 
theory concerning autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004). They suggest that higher than 
normal  levels  of  pre-natal  testosterone  are  responsible  for  the  autistic  condition. 
After noting that the classic autistic behaviours seem to be an extreme of the male 
brain (see later discussion on systemising and empathising), Baron-Cohen examined 
the levels of foetal testosterone in autistic individuals. This was done by following up 
a  group  of  100  children  whose  foetal  testosterone  had  been  measured  through 
amniocentesis (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004). The amount of eye contact at 12 months 
of age was seen to vary quadratically with amniotic testosterone level, suggesting 
that  foetal  testosterone  may  affect  social  development.  At  48  months,  amniotic 
testosterone levels were seen to be negatively correlated with the quality of social 
interaction  and  positively  correlated  with  restricted  interests  –even  when  sex 
differences were accounted for. Subsequently, an additional 400 children were added 
to  the  study  and  were  followed  up  at  age  five  and  beyond  using  the  Childhood 
Asperger  Syndrome  Test  (CAST),  the  Empathising  Quotient  (EQ)  and  the   21
Systemising Quotient (SQ). The results indicated that the number of autistic traits 
shown in children was related to foetal testosterone levels (Auyeung et al., 2008). It 
remains to be seen, however, whether variations in foetal testosterone relate to the 
severity of symptoms within individuals with ASD. As yet, only variations within the 
normal population have been examined.  
 
Genetics of Autism 
  In the 1960s, 20 years after Kanner’s original description, Rutter (1968) noted 
that approximately 2-3% of families in the early case studies had more than one 
autistic child. He highlighted that  this was 50-100 times  greater than that which 
would be predicted by population prevalence. Reinforced by the first demonstration 
that there was a higher concordance rate for autism among monozygotic (MZ) twins 
than among dizygotic (DZ) twins (Folstein & Rutter, 1977), the idea of a genetic 
component  to  autism  began  to  emerge.  Twin  studies  have  produced  a  wealth  of 
information  regarding  the  heritability  of  autism  (Bailey  et  al.,  1995;  Folstein  & 
Rutter, 1977; Steffenburg et al., 1989). The results from the most recent of these 
three epidemiological twin studies (Bailey et al., 1995) indicated a MZ concordance 
rate of 60% and a DZ concordance rate of 0% for pure autism. When the analysis 
was  broadened  to  include  the  wider  ASD  phenotype,  the  MZ  concordance  rate 
increased to 92% and the DZ rate to 10%. Using these figures and the recurrence 
risk, the heritability estimate was calculated to be more than 90%. While this result is 
striking, it may also be based on the fact that there was very little environmental 
variation within the populations that were studied. It is accepted, however, that there 
must be some sort of genetic influence on the condition. The nature of this influence 
is  yet  to  be  explicitly  defined.  Pickles  et  al.  (1995)  reject  single  locus  and   22
heterogeneity models and suggest a multilocus model with between two and ten loci 
and three epistatic (interacting) loci. A multi-gene model such as this is consistent 
with the observation that family members of an autistic proband may exhibit mild 
autistic-like phenotypes or  Asperger syndrome. While  the exact genes implicated 
differ between studies, the most consistent signals are on chromosome 7q  and 15q 
(Gillberg,  1998;  Scherer  et  al.,  2003;  Schroer  et  al.,  1998).  Given  the  uneven 
male:female sex ratio (4:1) in autism, the X chromosome has also been the focus of 
much research. Two genome-wide scans have recently found evidence of linkage to 
the X-chromosome but the findings are inconsistent (Liu et al., 2001; Shao et al., 
2002). Furthermore, evidence of father-to-son transmission, examination of extended 
pedigrees and the broader phenotype suggest that X-linkage would only explain a 
small percentage of the genetic variance (Hallmayer et al., 1996).  
 
As  is  evident  from  the  information  above,  there  are  many  suggestions 
regarding an organic basis for autism but there is no consistent and direct evidence 
for a particular area of neurobiological damage or dysfunction or a specific gene that 
may  underlie  the  condition.  It  is  possible  that  we  are  not  yet  able  to  accurately 
identify the crucial neurobiological substrate or it may be that autism is a complex 
condition resulting from a number of diverse aetiologies (Goodman, 1989).  
 
Psychological Approaches  
  In response to the presence of a distinct behavioural profile and the absence 
of an accepted biological aetiology for autism, a great deal of research has been done 
to investigate whether a primary psychological deficit could be responsible. Three 
major  theories  have  dominated  the  literature;  Theory  of  Mind  (ToM),  Executive   23
Dysfunction (ED) and Weak Central Coherence (WCC), and these will be discussed 
in turn before mentioning a more recent theory regarding autism as the extreme male 
brain. 
 
Theory of Mind 
Premack  and  Woodruff  (1978)  introduced  the  phrase  ‘theory  of  mind’  to 
describe the capacity to ascribe mental states to oneself and others. It encompasses 
the ability to make appropriate inferences about the feelings, beliefs, desires and 
knowledge of others and therefore both understand and predict their actions. It has 
been argued that the possession of ToM is a major factor involved in meaningful 
social  behaviour  (Baron-Cohen  et  al.,  1985)  and  the  ToM  hypothesis  of  autism 
proposes that an absence of ToM in individuals with autism is a fundamental deficit 
within the condition (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Frith, 1989; Leslie & Frith, 1987; 
Leslie  &  Happe,  1989).  Wulff’s  observation  that  children  with  autism  show  an 
absence of early pretend-play fuelled this theory (Wulff, 1985). Leslie (Leslie & 
Frith, 1987) argued that make-believe play that does not interfere with real world 
knowledge  depends  on  two  levels  of  representation:  primary  representation  of 
objects  and  events,  and  metarepresentations  that  define  people’s  propositional 
attitudes  to  those  objects  and  events  (i.e.  ToM).  He  went  on  to  suggest  that 
individuals with autism have difficulty forming metarepresentations and therefore 
would not be able to successfully perform tasks that require ToM (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1985; Frith, 1989; Leslie & Frith, 1987; Leslie & Happe, 1989). 
  ToM  is  classically  tested  by  using  a  false  belief  task.  This  is  where 
participants are asked to predict the behaviour of another individual who holds a 
false  belief.  Baron-Cohen  et  al.(1985)  devised  the  Sally-Anne  task  to  assess   24
understanding of false belief. In this task, the experimenter tells the child about a 
doll, Sally, who puts her marble into a basket and then leaves the room. While Sally 
is out of the room, a second doll, Anne, moves the marble into a box. The story is 
acted out with dolls and props to help the child follow the events and a series of 
control questions are asked to check that the child has followed the events. The child 
is then asked to say where Sally will look for the marble when she comes back into 
the room. If the child understands that Sally has a false belief that differs from the 
real state of the world then s/he will indicate Sally will look in the original location 
(the basket).  Such a  response neatly demonstrates that the child understands that 
Sally’s mental state (the belief that the marble is in the basket) differs from their own 
(the belief that the marble is in the box). Wimmer & Perner (1983) showed that 
typically developing children of three to four years old tend to fail the test. From 
about four to five years old, children begin to pass this test and indicate that Sally 
will  look  in  the  original  location.  By  the  age  of  six  years  old,  the  children 
consistently understood that another person can hold a false belief about the world. 
  Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) tested twenty children with autism with a verbal 
mental age of over four years on the Sally-Anne task. 80% of the children failed the 
task – something that could not simply be attributed to general mental handicap as 
86% of a control group of children with Down’s Syndrome passed the test, even 
though they had a lower mean verbal mental age than the group with autism. The 
deficit therefore seemed to be specific to autism and not developmental delay. This 
finding has been subsequently replicated a number of times, and has also been found 
when using alternative ToM tasks such as ‘The Smarties Test’ (Perner et al., 1989).  
  As is evident from Baron-Cohen et al’s results above, some children 
with ASD do manage to pass the ToM test. It was shown, however, that the majority   25
of  these  children fail to pass more sophisticated versions  of the false belief  task 
(Baron-Cohen, 1989). This study used a more difficult test of second order false 
belief understanding created by Perner and Wimmer (1985) that involves second-
order belief (understanding what one person thinks about another person’s belief). 
The  extra  level  of embedding  increases  the complexity  of  the  task and  typically 
developing children  generally  pass  the test  only after  the age  of 7 years. Baron-
Cohen demonstrated that children with autism with a mental age above seven years 
failed this second order task – even many of those who had managed to pass the first 
order task (Baron-Cohen, 1989). Happé further examined the subgroup of children 
with ASD that seemed to be able to pass false belief tasks. She created the Strange 
Stories  Test,  a  more  naturalistic  test  of  ToM.  Within  this  task,  participants  are 
presented with stories about situations where people do not say literally what they 
mean (e.g. telling someone that their new dress is nice when you believe it is ugly). 
Using this more contextually embedded paradigm, Happé required the children to 
determine whether a statement made by a character in the story was true or false, and 
to comment on why the character said the statement. The results showed that even 
children with autism who passed both first and second order false-belief tasks were 
impaired on the Strange Stories Test (Happe, 1994).  
The  question  is,  therefore,  whether  the  ToM  hypothesis  can  explain  the 
behavioural profile of autism. The theory definitely seems consistent with the social 
deficits  observed.  Young  children  with  autism  are  seen  to  treat  other  people  as 
objects (Baron-Cohen, 1990), and often show an interest in other children but cannot 
appropriately  interact  with  them  (Lord,  1993).  They  also  appear  to  successfully 
understand  simple  emotions  which  do  not  require  the  decoding  of  mental  states 
(happiness,  sadness)  but  fail  to  appreciate  complex  emotions  that  are  based  on   26
attitudes and beliefs of others (surprise, embarrassment, pride) (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1993;  Prior  &  Hoffman,  1990).  Furthermore,  Tager-Flusberg  (2003)  has 
demonstrated  that  ToM  scores  were  significantly  related  to  both  scores  on  the 
socialisation domain of the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales and to social- and 
communication-symptom  severity  (as  measured  by  the  Autism  Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule).  
Researchers  in  favour  of  the  ToM  hypothesis  of  autism  assert  that  the 
communication  deficits  and  repetitive  behaviours  can  be  explained  by  ToM 
impairment.  Tager-Flusberg  (1981;  1985;  1992)  provides  evidence  that, 
phonological, semantic and syntactic development do not seem to be impaired but 
that there are impairments in the acquisition and use of mental state terms within 
autism. Furthermore, interpretation of the pragmatic aspects of language seems to be 
lacking  in  autism.  The  language  of  an  individual  with  autism  is  often  lengthy, 
inappropriate, and functional – all without regard for the nature of the listener. There 
is a striking absence of language use as a social tool purely to connect with others. 
Non-verbal  communication  deficits  also  fit  the  pattern  of  an  absence  of  ToM. 
Instrumental gestures such as pointing to something wanted, a sign to tell others to be 
quiet or leave the room are seen in autism but pointing in order to direct the attention 
of others is absent (Attwood et al., 1988).  
With respect to repetitive behaviours, the ToM hypothesis states that these 
are a coping strategy used in an attempt to reduce the anxiety that stems from the 
inability to understand the social world.  
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Problems with ToM Hypothesis 
  While the ToM hypothesis provided a unified cognitive explanation for the 
deficits seen within ASD, further studies have revealed a number of issues with this 
theory. Firstly, the existence of a minority of individuals with ASD who are able to 
pass  certain  false  belief  tasks  has  undermined  the  universality  of  the  deficit  and 
hence has cast doubt on the hypothesis that a problem with ToM is the core deficit 
that  underlies  the  condition.  Happé  noted,  however,  that  this  need  not  totally 
undermine the ToM hypothesis as there have been no cases of children with ASD 
passing  first  order false  belief  tasks  at  the appropriate mental  age:  on  average a 
verbal mental age of nine years is needed (Happe, 1995). Such a deficit may also not 
be specific to ASD. Research has demonstrated that children older than four years 
with different disorders (e.g. non-signing deaf individuals) fail false belief tasks – 
suggesting that a ToM deficit may not be a defining characteristic of ASD (Peterson, 
Wellman & Liu, 2005).  
Secondly, there seem to be at least two major problems with the false belief 
tasks. Firstly, it may be the case that passing false belief tasks may not solely be 
based on ToM, but might also require cognitive skills such as the ability to remember 
the sequence  of the story, inhibit knowledge regarding the actual location of the 
object and correctly interpret the verbal task instructions and questioning (Birch & 
Bloom, 2003; Bloom & German, 2000). Both young typically developing children 
and children with ASD may find these task demands challenging due to deficits in 
executive  functioning  and/or  reduced  linguistic  abilities  (American  Psychiatric 
Association,  1994;  Astington  &  Baird,  2005;  Joseph  &  Tager-Flusberg,  2004; 
Ozonoff et al., 1991; Ozonoff et al., 2004; Tager-Flusberg, 1981).    28
In  recent  years,  a  non-verbal  version  of  the  false-belief  task  has  been 
developed for use with infants (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). They showed that 15-
month old typically developing infants were surprised when they saw an actor, who 
had not seen a toy being moved, searched in the correct location. This suggests that 
these infants had attributed a false belief  to the actor  and clearly contradicts the 
previous view that children below the age of 3 years cannot represent others’ mental 
states (Perner, 1995; Saxe et al., 2004). Following these findings, Southgate, Senju 
and  Csibra  (2007)  designed  a  similar  non-verbal  task  that  used  eye-tracking 
equipment  to  measure  anticipatory  looking,  and  hence  determine  whether  young 
children  possess  ToM,  and  confirmed  that  two-year-old  children  can  correctly 
interpret an actor’s false belief and subsequent behaviour. They then used this task 
with a group of children with ASD and showed that the clinical group were impaired 
on even this non-verbal task of false-belief attribution.  
While this may have gone some way to remove confounding factors inherent 
due to task demands, the second problem concerns the observation that it is possible 
to correctly answer the questions on the false belief task without appreciating the 
mental states involved. Ability on false belief tasks does not seem to correlate with 
the level of social interaction and communication in children with ASD (Ozonoff & 
Miller, 1995) and individuals with ASD who do pass the false belief tasks can still 
exhibit problems in related tasks such as attribution of mental states to geometric 
shapes (Abell et al., 2000) or to people (based on photographs of the eyes) (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  
While false belief tests should not be ruled out completely it is clear that there 
are still a number of issues to be resolved if the ToM hypothesis is to be accepted as 
a likely explanation for autism.     29
 
Executive Dysfunction   
  The second major theory to be discussed here concerns executive function; 
the term used to describe goal-directed and future oriented processes that are thought 
to  be  controlled  by  the  frontal  lobes  (Duncan,  1986).  These  behaviours  include 
attention,  flexibility,  planning,  generation,  inhibition  of  pre-potent  responses  and 
working  memory.  All  these  involve  the  need  to  disengage  from  the  external 
environment  and  employ  mental  models  and  representations  to  guide  subsequent 
actions  (Dennis, 1991). The ED  hypothesis suggests that due to  neuroanatomical 
dysfunction,  difficulties  with  higher-order  cognitive  functions  will  be  seen  in 
individuals with ASD (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Verte et al., 2005) and that this 
deficit accounts for the behavioural features seen in autism (Russell, 1997; Turner, 
1999a; Turner, 1999b).  
The impetus for this line of research came from a study by Damasio and 
Maurer (1978) who demonstrated the similarities between the behavioural profile of 
autism  and  the  symptoms  of  patients  with  neurological  damage  to  frontal  lobe 
structures. Both populations appeared inflexible, perseverative, overly focussed on 
details and unable to inhibit overlearned responses. The repetitive behaviours and 
rigidity  –  one  of  the  diagnostic  triad  for  autism  –  may  therefore  be  caused  by 
executive dysfunction. As discussed above, there is evidence for neuroanatomical 
abnormalities in the frontal lobes on individuals with ASD (Carper & Courchesne, 
2000; 2005) and reduced functional connectivity between frontal and parietal regions 
has also been highlighted in ASD during a task of executive functioning (Just et al., 
2007).   30
  Executive  function  in  autism  has  most  commonly  been  tested  using  the 
Wisconsin  Card  Sorting  Task  (WCST)  (Grant  &  Berg,  1948)  which  relies  on 
cognitive shifting ability. In this task, participants sort cards and are given feedback 
based on a rule that they have not been told. The feedback allows the rule to be 
ascertained but, without the participant’s knowledge, the rule is changed every time 
ten cards have been sorted. Participants are scored based on how many perseverative 
responses they make. That is, the number of cards they sort based on a previously 
correct category despite being given negative feedback when the rule changed. The 
majority of studies have found that individuals with autism perform worse on the 
WCST,  displaying  increased  perseveration  and  difficulties  in  shifting  between 
sorting  strategies  (Bennetto  et  al.,  1996;  Ozonoff  &  McEvoy,  1994;  Prior  & 
Hoffman, 1990). Similar results are found when using Tower of Hanoi (Bennetto et 
al., 1996; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994) or Tower of London tasks (Shallice, 1982) that 
involve  planning  and  working  memory.  Individuals  with  autism  show  poor  task 
performance relative to control individuals.  
  Unlike  the  ToM  hypothesis  which  focussed  on  the  behavioural  profile  of 
autism,  ED  attempts  to  locate  the  neurobiological  substrate.  It  can,  however,  be 
linked to the symptom profile seen in the condition. The lack of flexibility resulting 
from ED could underlie the inability to engage appropriately in reciprocal social 
interaction and the problem with inhibiting prepotent responses could account for 
inappropriate behaviour. Russell and colleagues (1997) suggest that ED could be 
responsible for the mentalising and ToM deficits – an inability to disengage from the 
immediate  context  and  switch  over  to  internally  driven  behaviour  (Hughes  & 
Russell,  1993).  There  also  appear  to  be  significant  correlations  between  social-
cognitive  and  executive  function  abilities  (Grattan  &  Eslinger,  1989;  1992).   31
Specifically, Ozonoff found that executive function scores were highly correlated 
with  mentalising  ability  in  individuals  with  autism  (Ozonoff  et  al.,  1991)  and 
executive function has been shown to be an accurate predictor of long term prognosis 
in autism (Berger et al., 1993). More recently, Hill and Bird (2006) showed that 
impaired  performance  on  a  set  of  executive  function  tasks  (requiring  planning, 
abstract  problem  solving  and  multitasking)  was  correlated  with  autistic 
symptomatology.  
The suggestion from neuroimaging research that mentalising capability may 
be controlled by the prefrontal  cortex (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994;  Fletcher et al., 
1995) could also link the social deficits to ED due to the proximity of the neural 
structures involved. Regarding the communication deficits in autism, the nature of 
speech seen in individuals with the condition is consistent with ED. The repetitive 
language and overall poverty of speech can be attributed to deficits in generating 
sequences  of  behaviour  and a failure  of inhibition  that  leads  to  the  stereotypical 
perseverations. Adding weight to this argument is the demonstration that patients 
with  frontal  lobe  damage  appear  to  have  similar  communication  impairments  to 
individuals with autism. Problems are seen with metaphors, social inferencing and 
talking about the intentions of others (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happe, 1991). The 
problems individuals with autism have concerning the pragmatics of language are 
not, however, replicated in patients with frontal lobe damage (Bishop, 1993) and it is 
unclear how ED could account for such difficulties. 
  Repetitive behaviours, the final component of the diagnostic triad, can easily 
be accounted for by ED. A failure to generate or activate appropriate actions and an 
inability to inhibit the repetition of previously employed action plans is consistent 
with the rigid and repetitive nature of autism (Turner, 1997).    32
 
Problems with the ED Hypothesis 
  The main issue that undermines the validity of the ED hypothesis of autism is 
the  presence  of  executive  function  deficits  in  a  number  of  other  conditions  and 
disorders.  ED  is  seen  in  Parkinson’s  disease  (Owen  et  al.,  1995)  obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD) (Head et al., 1989), schizophrenia (Axelrod et al., 1994), 
attention  deficit  hyperactivity  disorder  (ADHD)  (Chelune  et  al.,  1986),  Tourette 
Syndrome (Gladstone et al., 1993) and Fragile X Syndrome (Mazzocco et al., 1997). 
The presence of ED in so many different conditions undermines the idea of a specific 
and causal relationship between ED and autism. It may be the case that ED is purely 
the result of a damaged brain – irrespective of the nature of that damage. On the 
other hand, Pennington and colleagues have argued that there are a number of ways 
in  which  different  conditions  can  share  the  same  underlying  cognitive  deficits 
(Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). They suggest that the different behavioural profiles 
of  the  conditions  mentioned  above  reflect  differing  patterns  of  ED  onset. 
Alternatively, it may be the case that the term ‘executive dysfunction’ is too broad 
and should be split into smaller, more specific, components. It is a possibility that 
different disorders are underpinned by deficits within difference executive function 
components.  
  Using  this  approach,  Hughes,  Russell  and  Robbins  (Hughes  et  al.,  1994) 
looked specifically at set-shifting ability in autism and  revealed that there was a 
flexibility  deficit.  Inhibition  was  examined  by  Ozonoff  and  Strayer  (Ozonoff  & 
Strayer, 1997) and results indicated that both motoric and cognitive inhibition was 
unaffected in autism. This particular pattern of executive functioning does seem to be 
distinct from other conditions that also show ED. For example, unlike autism, there   33
appears to be a deficit in inhibition within ADHD (Aman et al., 1998), OCD (Enright 
& Beech, 1993) and schizophrenia (Beech et al., 1989). Using this multi-component 
approach may therefore begin to highlight a specific deficit in executive function 
within autism that could be responsible for the condition.    
 
Weak Central Coherence 
The  third  major  theory  of  autism  is  that  weak  central  coherence  (WCC) 
underlies  the  condition  (Frith,  1989).  WCC  refers  to  a  difficulty  integrating 
component parts of a visual scene to create a coherent whole. Frith suggested that 
within autism there is a deficit in the cognitive system that is responsible for this 
process of extracting overall meaning, causing individuals with autism to process 
constituent parts of an item as separate entities rather than seeing the item in its 
entirety. The evidence that led to this theory comes not from observed deficits but 
from the superior performance that individuals with autism demonstrate on various 
tasks. One of the distinctive characteristics of autism is the uneven cognitive profile 
that  is  seen  when  administering  IQ  measures.  While  typical  individuals  show 
equivalent performance across all subtests, individuals with autism consistently show 
below average performance in the verbal tasks and above average performance in 
non-verbal measures such as block design and pattern construction (Shah & Frith, 
1983; 1993). An even more striking advantage is seen on The Embedded Figures 
Task  (EFT)  (Witkin  et al.,  1971).  This  involves  the  detection  of  a  shape  that  is 
hidden within a picture, e.g. a triangle that is hidden in the line-drawing of a baby’s 
pram. Both children and adults with autism seem to detect the target faster than their 
typically  developing  counterparts  (Jolliffe  &  Baron-Cohen,  1997;  Shah  &  Frith, 
1983).     34
  It has been proposed that this theory of WCC can also explain the social and 
language deficits within the condition. Frith (1989) argued that in order to determine 
the mental states of others one needs to integrate information from many different 
sources: emotional expression in the eyes, tone of the voice etc. An inability to do 
this would undermine the development of theory of mind and subsequently affect 
social interaction. The same logic has been used to argue that language deficits in 
ASD  could  be  due  to  WCC.  In  order  to  understand  the  meaning  of  speech,  the 
context of a sentence must be taken into account. A difficulty in integrating the many 
aspects that allow context to be evaluated would lead to the literal interpretation and 
pragmatic difficulties that are often seen in ASD (Happe, 1991).  
  In more recent years, Happé has re-examined the idea of WCC as a deficit. 
She has suggested that central coherence is a cognitive style that varies (weak to 
strong) across the typical population; where individuals with autism show a cognitive 
style that is shifted towards the weak end of this continuous spectrum (Happe, 1999). 
This weak coherence style could manifest itself behaviourally as attention to detail, 
obsessive interests and resistance to change.   
 
Problems with WCC 
  A number of studies have produced results that contradict the theory of WCC 
in  ASD.  Ozonoff  ,  Strayer,  McMahon  and  Filoux  (Ozonoff  et  al.,  1994)  used  a 
Navon task (hierarchical stimuli where small letters are arranged to form a large 
letter) to investigate WCC (see figure 1.1). They instructed participants to identify 
either the local or the global target and found that both typically developing children 
and children with autism showed a global advantage and a global interference effect. 
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Figure 1.1     Example of the stimuli used within the Navon Task 
 
 
 
In an attempt to explore these findings, Plaisted, Swettenham and Rees (1999) used 
two versions of the Navon task. One version, similar to that employed by Ozonoff et 
al, was a selective attention task, involved detecting a target which could appear at 
the local (small letter) or global (big letter) level. The other, a divided attention task 
required  participants to focus  on the local  or global level depending on  the task 
instructions. In the divided attention task, results were in line with WCC; the children 
with ASD demonstrated a local advantage whereas typically developing children did 
not. Conversely, in the task of selective attention, both groups of children showed the 
typical global advantage and global interference effect. These results are consistent 
with those found by Ozonoff et al. (1994) and may undermine the validity of WCC 
as  a  theory  that  underlies  ASD.  Mottron  and  colleagues  (Mottron  et  al.,  1999; 
Mottron et al., 2003) also find evidence that global and configural processing is not 
altered in ASD, and suggest that the idea of local bias and global impairment within 
WCC may need to be re-examined. This is echoed by López and Leekam (2003) who 
conclude that children with ASD do not show the general difficulty in connecting 
context  information  and  item  information  that  would  be  predicted  by  the  WCC 
theory. Mottron and Burack (2001) have proposed a model of perceptual functioning 
in ASD that offers an alternative to the WCC framework. The Enhanced Perceptual   36
Functioning (EPF) model suggests that the superior performance seen by individuals 
with ASD on tasks outlined above is due to enhanced perception. Within the term 
‘perception’ the authors include processes ranging from feature detection to pattern 
recognition and suggest that there is a superiority of perceptual flow of information 
in ASD. This leads to both positive symptoms, such as enhanced memory of the 
surface properties of visual patterns, and also detrimental effects such as a difficulty 
in controlling perceptual processes – which then disrupt the development of other 
abilities (Mottron et al., 2006). This idea of superior ability on low-level perceptual 
operations contrasts with the deficit in global processing that was proposed within 
the WCC model. 
 
Systemizing, Empathizing and the Extreme Male Brain  
Baron-Cohen  puts  forward  a  slightly  different  theory  to  account  for  this 
apparent  difference  in  cognitive  style  between  individuals  with  autism  and  the 
typically  developing  population.  He  defines  two  concepts,  systemizing  and 
empathizing, which form the two opposing extremes of a continuum of processing 
styles (Baron-Cohen, 2002). Both are mechanisms that are used to respond to change 
in the environment. Empathizing is the process used to respond to agentive change: 
where an object change is believed to be self-propelled and therefore the object is 
seen by the brain as an agent with a goal. This involves the attribution of mental 
states (mentalizing) in order to make sense of the change. Systemizing is the process 
used to respond to non-agentive change: a structured change (i.e. non-random) that is 
not self propelled. For example, a light switch causing the light to go off. When 
systemizing, we use the many observations of real-world occurrences to derive laws 
that can predict an event (Baron-Cohen, 2006). This works best for more predictable   37
(lawful) changes with narrow variance and is therefore less useful when dealing with 
complex social behaviours. Baron-Cohen asserts that an individual’s processing style 
is dependent on the balance between these two mechanisms; with men generally 
placed further towards the systemizing end of the spectrum and women towards the 
empathizing  end.  Within  the  general  population  he  highlights  the  presence  of  8 
ascending levels of the systemizing mechanism (SM). Females mostly exhibit level 2 
and males mostly exhibit level 3; both demonstrating a fairly even balance between 
systemizing and empathizing. Baron-Cohen suggests that above this level, hyper-
systemizing leads to autistic traits such as superior attention to details and resistance 
to change. Individuals with a SM at level four or five include those who excel at 
mathematics and science and those with Asperger’s Syndrome. Levels six, seven and 
eight  are  seen  in  people  with  high  functioning,  medium  functioning  and  low 
functioning autism respectively. He suggests that hyper-systemizing in autism leads 
to an inability to deal with systems that are less than 100% lawful – something that 
would cause the distinctive cognitive profile of ASD: reduced IQ and language delay 
but talent in systemizable areas.  
 
Summary  
It is clear from the discussion above that ASD is multi-faceted and complex – 
with many potential aspects that may underlie the condition. Researchers are now 
beginning to move away from a grand unified theory of autism in favour of more 
specific hypotheses that address certain aspects of the autistic phenotype. Francesca 
Happé and colleagues have noted that despite decades of research, there is still very 
little unity between the core areas of impairment. In fact, the early epidemiological 
study which established the triad in the first place is the only full examination of the   38
issue (Wing & Gould, 1979). Happé et al. question the assumption that the three 
impairments must be explained together (Happe et al., 2006).  Citing the evidence 
that, within the general population, the three autistic traits do not cluster together or 
show more than a modest correlation (Ronald et al., 2006a; Ronald et al., 2006b), 
they assert that the social deficits, communicative difficulties and rigid behaviours 
can be fractionated and should be studied separately. Furthermore, they note that 
studies have demonstrated different developmental trajectories for each of the triad 
components: with social and communicative deficits emerging earlier than repetitive 
behaviours (Charman & Swettenham, 2001).  
  It  is  evident  from  the  literature  outlined  here,  that  attempts  to  apply  one 
hypothesis to all three core deficits have been largely unsuccessful. The cognitive 
theories that currently exist tend to focus on one component of the triad as a primary 
deficit and then extend the rationale to include the other aspects of the symptom 
profile. (E.g. ToM theory views social behaviour as the primary deficit whereas ED 
focuses on rigidity and repetitive behaviours). As yet, there is no unified cognitive 
account that posits a primary deficit which can account for the complete triad.  
  At a genetic level, this fractionation also seems to be the case. Using a sample 
of 3,000 twin pairs, Happé and colleagues demonstrated that each aspect of the triad 
appears to be highly heritable (Ronald et al., 2006a; Ronald et al., 2006b) and that 
genes that seem to contribute to variation in social ability are independent from those 
that contribute to variation in communicative skills (Ronald et al., 2005).  
  With all this in mind, there may be a case for abandoning both the search for 
a unified cognitive theory of autism and the search for ‘autism genes’ that underlie 
the whole condition (Happe et al., 2006). Instead, the future of autism research may 
lie in the examination of aspects of ASD which, while it may mean giving up on the   39
idea of one overall ‘cure’, could also remove much of the heterogeneity within ASD; 
something that is a constant, and often prohibitive, difficulty with research in this 
field.  
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Chapter 2: Selective Attention and Perceptual Load 
 
In order to interact meaningfully with the world around us, it is vital that we 
have the ability to focus on particular aspects of the environment while ignoring 
others. Defined as ‘selective attention’, this ability is crucial given that the brain has 
limited sensory and information-processing systems which are constantly bombarded 
with  an  excess  of  information  (Broadbent,  1958).  “Without  selective  interest, 
experience  is an utter chaos. Interest alone  gives accent and emphasis, light  and 
shade,  background  and  foreground  -  intelligible  perspective,  in  a  word”  (James, 
1890). 
Anecdotally, this “chaos” is often observed within ASD where individuals 
with  the  condition  are  seen  to  fixate  inappropriately  on  seemingly  irrelevant 
information in the environment and are unable to make sense of the world around 
them (Bryson et al., 1990; Hayes, 1987). The original definition of autism by Kanner 
made reference to attentional deficits associated with the condition (Kanner, 1943) 
and while a great deal of research has looked into attentional abnormalities, there is 
relatively little work that has focused specifically on selective attention and ASD 
(see Allen & Courchesne, 2001; Burack et al., 1997 for a review). Based on recent 
advances  within  the  field  of  attention  research,  this  thesis  seeks  to  investigate 
selective  attention  in  ASD.  Relevant  aspects  of  mainstream  selective  attention 
research  will  first  be  discussed  before  considering  the  issue  of  attentional 
abnormalities within ASD. 
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Selective Attention 
 
Much of the research on attention has focussed on the ability to prioritise the 
processing  of  one  aspect  of  the  environment  over  another.  As  James  (1890) 
remarked, “Millions of items of the outward order are presented to my senses which 
never properly enter my experience. Why? Because they have no interest for me. My 
experience is what I agree to attend to.” Initially, selective attention was studied 
within the auditory modality following observations that, despite a barrage of noise, 
people  at  a  party  could  successfully  focus  on  the  conversation  that  they  were 
involved in without being distracted by other guests. Cherry (1953) used dichotic 
listening tasks to replicate this effect experimentally. He used headphones to play 
different auditory streams to each ear and asked participants to concentrate on the 
input to one ear only and repeat it back to him. Cherry then investigated what aspects 
of the message in the unattended channel listeners were aware of, and what affected 
how  successfully  one  input  could  be  shadowed.  He  found  that  only  physical 
properties (pitch, volume etc) of the unattended stream appeared to be processed. 
Listeners  were  unaware  of  semantic content,  individual  words  or  even  when  the 
language changed (from English to reversed speech). Furthermore, supplying the two 
streams from different locations (i.e. to each ear) or using physically different voices 
(male vs. female) was sufficient to elicit effective shadowing of one channel only. 
Broadbent (1958) took these results and those from a number of other studies and put 
forward the first detailed theory of attention. He concluded that selection occurs after 
only basic physical properties of stimuli have been processed (see figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1     Filter theory of early selection (Broadbent, 1958) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  his  early  selection  model,  Broadbent  claimed  that  stimuli  are  first 
processed in a parallel fashion to extract physical attributes such as pitch, location 
and volume. The subsequent mechanisms for semantic identification, he argued, have 
a much smaller capacity and therefore incoming sensory information has to pass 
through a bottleneck before passing onwards for further processing. This bottleneck 
filters the stimuli in an all-or-nothing fashion (on the basis of physical attributes) to 
prevent more than one input from reaching the later processing stages at the same 
time. This idea fitted well with the conclusions drawn by Cherry (1953) regarding 
the very limited awareness of the unattended message.  
There were, however, a number of observations that undermined Broadbent’s 
model. Cherry described “The Cocktail Party Effect” where individuals who were 
seemingly focussed on a conversation would immediately detect their name being 
called on the other side of the room. Moray (1959) demonstrated this experimentally 
using  dichotic  listening  tasks  to  highlight  that  listeners  showed  own  name 
recognition  in  the  unattended  channel.  Furthermore,  in  an  experiment  where 
participants were asked to “tap when you hear tap” in the attended channel, listeners 
were unable to tap when their name was presented simultaneously in the unattended 
channel  (Corteen  &  Wood,  1972).  Thirdly,  Corteen  &  Dunn  (1974)  used  fear 
conditioning  to  show  that  a  galvanic  skin  response  was  elicited  even  when  the 
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relevant words were presented to the unattended side. Critically, words related to the 
fear-conditioned words elicited a reaction which implies some semantic processing 
of the unattended message.  
In light of these factors, Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) proposed an alternative 
late-selection model based on the premise that all stimuli are fully analysed and then 
the  most  relevant  stimuli  are  selected for  awareness,  memory  and  response.  The 
limited capacity processing stages begin only after full semantic analysis has been 
performed (see figure 2.2). 
    
 
 Figure 2.2     Late-selection theory of attention (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If this late-selection model is accurate then it follows that in dichotic listening 
experiments requiring participants to detect a target word in either ear, you would see 
no difference in detection rates between the attended and unattended stimulus. This, 
however, was not the case. It was shown that the shadowed message had a detection 
rate of 87% compared to 8% for the unattended message. (Treisman & Geffen, 1967, 
as cited in Treisman, 1969) 
Having undermined the late-selection model, Treisman put forward her Filter 
Attenuation Model (Treisman, 1964) which served as a compromise between the two 
conflicting selection theories. She asserted that rejected stimuli are not completely 
filtered out at the sensory register, but rather are attenuated. These reduced stimuli do 
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not  themselves  reach  the  threshold  for  recognition  but  do  activate  detector  units 
which are then accumulated. If the detector then identifies an item that is related to a 
recently  activated  unit  (priming),  then  even  partial  activation  may  result  in 
recognition of the “rejected” stimulus.  
 
Figure 2.3     Filter Attenuation Theory of Attention (Treisman, 1964) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While  the  early  theories  outlined  above  were  all  grounded  in  hearing 
research,  the  focus  has  now  moved  towards  selective  attention  within  the  visual 
domain. From the 1960s, researchers used visual filtering tasks to investigate visual 
attention. Sperling (1960) demonstrated that when participants are shown briefly a 
set of letters, they are unable to recall all of them. This was interpreted as evidence 
for  limited  capacity.  Using  similar  methodology,  Von  Wright  (1970)  showed 
participants a set of characters and asked them to recall a subset based on various 
criteria. It was shown that performance was best when the subset was defined by 
colour, size, location or brightness rather than identification (letter vs. number or 
vowel vs. consonant).  
Neisser (1976) and Rock and Gutman (1981) added further weight to the 
early selection argument by demonstrating that there was very little memory for the 
unattended visual stimuli. Rock and Gutman presented a pair of drawings (one red, 
one green) that were superimposed upon each other and asked subjects to give their 
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opinions  on  the  red  figure.  In  a  subsequent  test,  the  number  of  green  figures 
recognised was only just above chance level. 
While such evidence seems compelling, there was also a body of work that 
suggested  that  while  the  unattended  visual  information  could  not  be  consciously 
remembered, this may not truly be evidence that it was not processed. Tipper (1985) 
used images based on Rock and Gutman’s superimposed images and manipulated the 
relationship between the unattended image in one trial and the attended image in the 
next trial. He showed that the reaction times were slower when the ignored object 
was  related  to  the  subsequent  attended  object  (negative  priming).  This  provided 
evidence  of  late  selection  and  indicated  that  there  may  well  be  full  semantic 
processing of unattended visual stimuli. This is consistent with a number of studies 
based on the classic Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935) where, when naming the text colour 
of a word, an incompatible colour name (i.e. “RED” printed in green ink) elicits a 
slower response time than for a neutral word (i.e. “BED” printed in green ink). The 
difficulty of ‘turning off’ the semantic processing mechanism, even for an irrelevant 
word, is therefore observed.  
In the 80s, Treisman and Gelade (1980) put forward a theory that differed 
from both the early and late selection models. Using visual search experiments they 
demonstrated that “feature search” (where the target and non target differ in a single 
salient property) was more efficient than “conjunction search” (where the target is 
defined  by  two  criteria,  e.g.  colour  and  orientation).  The  former,  it  seemed  was 
carried out in a parallel fashion while the latter appeared serial. (A more detailed 
account  of  visual  search  research  is  provided  subsequently  when  discussing 
attentional abnormalities within ASD.) Based on these results, Treisman and Gelade 
(1980)  created  the  “feature  integration  theory”.  The  model  asserts  that  simple   46
individual features such as colour are represented in separate feature maps in a ‘pre-
attentional’ stage and then attention is the process by which these maps are joined to 
facilitate identification of a given object.  
Treisman’s theory was very well received but was soon undermined by a 
number of studies. For example, research by Johnston & McClelland (1974) and 
LaBerge (1983) seemed to imply that letters and indeed words behave as single units 
– something that goes against the Feature Integration Theory. The debate regarding 
the locus of selection and potential mechanisms continued.   
An important new proposal was put forward by Lavie (1995) that may have 
helped to resolve the dispute. Lavie (1995) noted that during the 50s, 60s and early 
70s, studies had found support for the early selection theories, whereas from the late 
70s onwards selective attention studies seemed to find support for the late-selection 
approach. This, it was argued, may have been because different methodologies were 
used  in  the  later  experiments.  Early  studies,  such  as  the  dichotic  listening 
experiments, used a ‘filtering paradigm’ which relied on bombarding subjects with a 
great  deal  of  information  to  examine  what  stimuli  are  processed  and  which  are 
ignored.  Later  studies,  such  as  priming  experiments,  used  the  ‘selective  set 
paradigm’ which involves presenting only a limited amount of visual information.  
Lavie suggested that the locus of selection is dependent on the perceptual load of the 
task in question – where perceptual load is defined as the amount of potentially task 
relevant information available in the external environment (Lavie, 1995). She used 
the Eriksen paradigm (accepted as a diagnostic tool to detect early or late selection) 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) to observe the extent of distractor interference in tasks 
with varying levels of perceptual load.    47
Participants sat in front of a computer and were presented with a central ring 
of letters on the screen. On every trial, a target letter - either an X or N - was present 
in the ring. Participants had to identify the target by pressing the corresponding key. 
Outside the ring of letters a slightly larger distractor letter was presented in one of 
two possible conditions: neutral or incompatible. A neutral distractor was a letter that 
had no association with the targets (i.e. T or L) whereas an incompatible distractor 
was the alternative target (i.e. N when the target in the ring was X). It was expected 
that  if  the  distractors  were  being  processed  then  incompatible  trials  would  elicit 
slower response times than neutral trials due to the interference. Perceptual load of 
the task was manipulated by altering the number of non-target elements in the central 
ring (‘set size’) (see figure 2.4). At each set size the extent of distractor processing – 
and therefore the locus of selection – could be determined by comparing the reaction 
times for neutral and incompatible trials.  
 
Figure 2.4    Examples of experimental stimuli used to investigate selective attention 
and perceptual load 
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Lavie noted that when the perceptual load of a task is low, and does not exceed 
the perceptual capacity, then distractors are processed (late selection). Conversely, 
when the perceptual load of a task is high, interference from irrelevant distractors is 
eliminated, indicating that they are not processed (early selection) (Lavie, 1995). It 
should  be  noted  at  this  point  that  perceptual  load  is  not  synonymous  with  task-
difficulty. Increasing the difficulty of a task by, for example, reducing the size or 
contrast of the targets may slow down performance but does not reduce distractor 
interference (Lavie & de Fockert, 2003).  The perceptual load theory of selective 
attention is based on the assertion that it is not possible to assign any less than the 
total capacity that is available at a given time (Lavie & Tsal, 1994) so distractors are 
automatically  processed  when  the  central  task  does  not  exhaust  all  processing 
capacity.  
A number of subsequent studies carried out both by Lavie et al. and other groups 
have  corroborated  these  results.  Neuroimaging  studies  have  shown  that  the 
perceptual  load  of a task modulates the  neural activity  associated with irrelevant 
distractors.  In  one  study,  motion  distractors  were  used  and  it  was  noted  that 
responses in motion-selective cortices (MT, V1/V2) were only evoked in low-load 
conditions (Rees et al., 1997). In a further study by Rees et al. (Rees et al., 1999) it 
was  seen  that  distractor  words  did  not  elicit  neural  responses  in  the  high-load 
condition  where  participants  were  focusing  on  the  central  picture  task.  The 
perceptual load theory has also been investigated within subsets of the population. It 
has been demonstrated that for individuals aged between 65-79 years, the effect of 
distractors is eliminated at lower set sizes than for young adults (Maylor & Lavie, 
1998). Huang Pollock, Carr and Nigg (2002) showed that this is also seen in children 
- where early selection is seen at lower set sizes. They conclude that this is evidence   49
of a reduced attentional capacity in these two population groups. If this perceptual 
load paradigm can indeed be used to investigate selective attention and perceptual 
capacity,  then  it  may  have  a  valuable  application  within  research  into  atypical 
populations  such  as  Autism  Spectrum  Disorder  (ASD)  where  altered  attentional 
abilities have often been highlighted (Burack et al., 1997).  
 
Autism and Attention 
Since the condition was first identified, there have been anecdotal reports of 
attentional  abnormalities  within  ASD.  Parents  and  clinicians  have  noted  that 
individuals  with  ASD  appear  to  fixate  inappropriately  on  apparently  irrelevant 
stimuli and perseverate on highly specific areas of personal interest. Gold and Gold 
(1974)  stated that “the clinical syndrome of early  infantile autism results  from a 
malfunction in basic alerting and attentional mechanisms”. The nature of a proposed 
attentional deficit has been based on various different attentional components and the 
research  can  be  divided  loosely  on  this  basis.  Within  this  chapter,  literature 
concerning arousal, sustained attention, orienting and attention shifting in ASD will 
be outlined, before focussing on the more relevant issue of selectivity and filtering 
ability.  It  should  be  noted  that  a  number  of  studies  on  attention  and  ASD  have 
included a social component. The issue of social attention, however, will be dealt 
with separately in chapter six and therefore the discussion that follows here will only 
include experiments that used socially neutral stimuli.  
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Arousal 
A number of early studies looked at arousal in ASD in an attempt to explain 
the behavioural profile seen within the condition. Hutt and colleagues noted high 
levels of desynchronised electroencephalography (EEG) recordings in children with 
ASD and consequently stated that the autistic child is in a chronic state of over-
arousal (Hutt et al., 1964; Hutt et al., 1965),  arguing that the repetitive behaviours 
and  social  withdrawal  so  often  seen  within  the  condition  are  attempts  to  reduce 
arousal.  This  rejection  of  sensory  stimuli  in  order  to  cope  with  the  overload  of 
information that they face is a concept echoed by a number of other studies (Cohen 
& Johnson, 1977; Kootz & Cohen, 1981, van Engeland, 1984 as cited in Burack 
1997). This theory was somewhat reinforced by Hermelin and O’Connor’s (1970) 
demonstration  that  continuous  monotonous  stimuli  cause  arousal  rather  than 
habituation in children with autism, and Raymaekers et al’s study (Raymaekers et al., 
2004) that used a go/no go paradigm with varying rates of stimulus presentation to 
show that the ASD group had particular difficulty with the fast presentation rate 
condition  –  a  finding  they  cite  as  evidence  for  over  arousal  in  the  condition. 
However, as is the case with most of the proposed attentional abnormalities in ASD, 
there  is  also  contradictory  research  that  suggests  an  alternative  deficit  in  arousal 
mechanisms. Rimland (1964) claims that individuals with ASD in fact suffer from 
under-arousal,  based  on  observation  that  children  with  ASD  actively  prefer 
conditions that involve greater stimulation (Graveling & Brooke, 1978).  Ornitz & 
Ritvo  (1968)  modified  these  two  conflicting  arousal  hypotheses  to  suggest  that 
autism is “characterised by fluctuations between states of over and under-arousal 
resulting in a failure to modulate sensory intake adequately”. The idea of an inability 
to effectively modulate arousal has also been supported by Kinsbourne (1987) who   51
argues that within the same child there can be both extremes; producing both over- 
and under-responsiveness.   
In recent times the arousal theory has mostly been abandoned following the 
failure to obtain any significant supporting evidence (Burack et al., 1997; Goldstein 
et al., 2001). However, the idea of abnormal arousal levels may yet have relevance as 
a  secondary  outcome  of  an  attentional  deficit.  Belmonte  has  presented 
electrophysiological data that suggest individuals with ASD compensate for impaired 
attention  by  applying  a  coarser  mechanism  of  sensory  gating.  This  results  in  a 
generalised level of arousal that heightens  the response to all stimuli  (Belmonte, 
2000).  
 
Sustained Attention 
  Closely related to the concept of arousal is that of sustained attention, 
defined as “the capacity to maintain attentional focus on a task over an extended 
period of time” (Bowler, 2007). The pattern of restrictive interests and obsessions 
seen in ASD suggests that there may well be enhanced capabilities for sustaining 
attention (Burack et al., 1997). The ability to sustain attention is most commonly 
measured using continuous performance tests (CPT) (see Rosvold, mirsky, sarason et 
al, 1956) which involve the rapid and repeated presentation of stimuli, within which 
the target stimuli are embedded.  
  Despite the theoretical basis for predicting otherwise, the studies on sustained 
attention  in  high-functioning  individuals  with  ASD  have  failed  to  show  any 
difference in performance levels when compared to control individuals (Buchsbaum 
et al., 1992; Casey et al., 1993; Goldstein et al., 2001; Pascualvaca et al., 1998; 
Siegel, Jr. et al., 1992). It has been suggested, however, that in some of these studies   52
the way in which the groups were matched resulted in the ASD group having a 
considerably lower IQ than the control group (Burack et al., 1997). This may have 
masked any group differences that were present and led to an underestimation of 
sustained attention abilities in ASD. Furthermore, the low IQ individuals with ASD 
in Casey et al’s study (1993), in line with the typical individuals, performed at a level 
close to ceiling.  
  Garretson,  Fein  and  Waterhouse  (1990)  examined  sustained  attention  in 
lower-functioning individuals with ASD and found that performance was at typical 
levels. The only difference between the groups was seen in a version of the paradigm 
that included a social reward component. The efficacy of social reinforcement was 
seen to decline at a faster rate for the individuals with ASD. This finding suggests 
that  sustained  attention  may  be  linked  to  motivation  –  and  therefore  while  no 
behavioural differences have been found in experimental situations, it may be the 
case that when faced with the subject of a particular interest, individuals with ASD 
may  have  enhanced  capacity  for  sustained  attention.  Belmonte  et  al.  (2003)  has 
demonstrated  that  even  when  behavioural  performance  is  equivalent,  the  brain 
regions  activated  in  individuals  with  ASD  during  a  task  of  sustained  attention 
(ventral occipital and striate regions) are different from those of typical individuals 
(superior  parietal,  middle  temporal,  dorsolateral,  prefrontal,  premoter  and  medial 
frontal cortices).  
 
Orienting, Disengaging and Attention Shifting 
  One of the most basic ways of assigning attention to a stimulus is to align 
sensory receptors to the relevant location. This process of orienting can be further 
divided  into  exogenous  (reflexive),  stimulus-driven,  involuntary  orienting  and   53
endogenous  (controlled),  information-based,  voluntary  orienting.  Orienting 
behaviours can also either be overt: consisting of body, head and eye movements, or 
covert: involving the alignment of the mind’s eye/ear.  There are three main stages in 
the  orienting  process:  disengaging,  shifting  and  re-engaging  (Posner  &  Petersen, 
1990).  A number of studies have investigated these components in ASD. While 
there  is  no  absolute  consensus,  the  general  interpretation  of  the  literature  is  that 
automatic, exogenous orienting is intact (Burack & Iarocci, 1995; Iarocci & Burack, 
2005; Minshew et al., 1999), while an impairment is seen in voluntary, endogenous 
orienting (see Bowler, 2007 for a review; Townsend et al., 1996a;  Wainwright-
Sharp & Bryson, 1993). The deficit seems to manifest itself as a delay or a slowing 
of the orienting process (Harris et al., 1999; Townsend et al., 1996a; Townsend et al., 
1996b; Wainwright-Sharp & Bryson, 1993). 
Attention disengaging and shifting, while part of the orienting process, has 
also been investigated specifically. Deficits in switching attention between locations 
(Casey  et  al.,  1993;  Wainwright  &  Bryson,  1996;  Wainwright-Sharp  &  Bryson, 
1993), object features and modalities (Courchesne et al., 1994; Rinehart, 2001) have 
been  highlighted  in  ASD.    Individuals  were  generally  slower  to  shift  attention 
between  stimuli during the tasks.  The  presence of such  an abnormality has been 
reinforced by the electrophysiological study by Belmonte (2000) who found altered 
Event  Related  Potential  (ERP)  responses  to  attention  shifting  in  individuals  with 
ASD. As mentioned above, his results suggest a more general level of arousal rather 
than the spatiotopically specific pattern of activation seen in typical adults. Other 
studies, however, have found no evidence of this deficit (Burack & Iarocci, 1995; 
Iarocci & Burack, 2004; Leekam et al., 2000).    54
An alternative suggestion is that a problem disengaging attention underlies 
the abnormal orienting behaviour seen in ASD. Landry and Bryson (2004) used three 
computer screens to present stimuli both centrally and peripherally while a child 
fixated on the central screen. On certain trials the central stimulus remained on the 
screen while the peripheral stimulus was presented (disengage condition) while in 
others the central stimulus was removed before the presentation of the peripheral 
stimulus (shift condition). The authors found that children with ASD, verbal age 
matched typically developing children and children with Down syndrome all look 
longer to shift their gaze in the disengage condition, but this difference was greatest 
for  the  ASD  group.  This  finding  was  taken  as  evidence  for  ‘sticky  attention’:  a 
difficulty in disengaging attention in ASD. This result conflicts with previous studies 
that  do  not  find  that  individuals  with  ASD  have  a  problem  with  disengagement 
(Townsend et al., 1996a; Townsend & Courchesne, 1994) but the discrepancy may 
be due to differences in the age of children tested and nature of the stimuli used 
(Bowler, 2007).  
 
Selectivity and Filtering 
  The most relevant set of studies with respect to the perceptual load theory of 
selective attention, and therefore this thesis, are those considering selectivity and 
filtering ability within ASD. Often cited is the theory that individuals with ASD 
show overselectivity. In one of the earliest studies regarding this issue, individuals 
with ASD were presented with complex stimuli composed of visual, auditory and 
tactile  components  (Lovaas  et  al.,  1971).  It  was  shown  that,  unlike  typically 
developing children and children with intellectual retardation, children with ASD 
have a limited ability to use information from incoming stimuli and therefore attend   55
only to one arbitrarily selected feature. This fits well with observations regarding the 
inability to integrate multiple components within the environment and the extremely 
focussed attention to detail (Lovaas et al., 1979). It has been suggested that this may 
be due  to “tunnel  vision”  or an  attentional  gaze that is reduced  in size – where 
individuals  focus  on  an  area  that  is  overly  contracted  and  therefore  only  allows 
processing of a reduced number of the relevant stimuli. This was demonstrated by 
(Rincover & Ducharme, 1987) who separated the form and colour of a stimulus in 
space and found that, under these conditions, the individuals with autism responded 
to only one feature whereas control participants responded to both. The view that 
individuals with ASD have overly focussed attention has also been put forward by 
Courchesne  and  colleagues  who  interpret  their  findings  from  attention  shifting 
paradigms as evidence of this (Townsend et al., 1996a; Townsend & Courchesne, 
1994). These findings may, however, have been due to developmental level and have 
not been replicated in older individuals (Burack et al., 1997; Enns & Akhtar, 1989; 
Pasto & Burack, 1995). Mann and Walker (2003) also disagree with Courchesne’s 
interpretation, arguing instead that the deficits seen are more appropriately explained 
by a difficulty in broadening an existing focus of attention. Using a task that involved 
presenting participants with cross-hairs and asking them to indicate which line was 
longer (horizontal or vertical), they found that children with ASD showed a reduction 
in accuracy and an increase in response time when a large cross-hair followed a 
small one – but not the other way round.  
  As was discussed in the previous chapter, the issue of filtering and selectivity 
is  commonly  investigated  by  examining  the  impact  of  distractor  stimuli  on  task 
performance. Burack (1994) showed that individuals with autism appear to have an 
inefficient attentional lens that fails to focus on the narrow visual field that is more   56
appropriate for successfully attending to a stimulus. He asked participants to classify 
a target in the centre of the screen (either O or +) in conditions that varied with 
respect  to:  a)  presence/absence  of  a  spatial  window  that  enclosed  the  target  and 
central region of the screen, b) number of non-target distractors and c) the distance 
between  the  target  and  the  distractors.  In  the  condition  with  no  distractors,  the 
children with autism showed more improvement with the presence of the window 
than  typically  developing  children  did.  There  was  also  an  increased  effect  of 
distractors on the performance of the ASD group compared with the control group. 
These  data  lead  to  the hypothesis  that  children  with  ASD  have  an  overly  broad 
attentional field that does not contract appropriately. Burack’s results could also be 
evidence of reduced filtering ability – something that is also suggested by Bryson, 
Wainwright-Sharpe  and  Smith  (1990).  Indeed,  Ciesielski  et  al.  (Ciesielski  et  al., 
1990)  used  a  divided-attention  task  (where  participants  had  to  identify  the  less 
frequently presented of two targets in visual and auditory modalities) and a filtering 
task (that involved ignoring the modality within which the target had been presented 
in  the  previous  task)  to  show  that  participants  with  autism  had  more  difficulty 
filtering out distracting stimuli than the corresponding control group. In this study the 
authors demonstrated that, while performing the tasks, there was an altered pattern of 
ERPs seen in the adults with ASD. It was seen that the selective attention-related 
potentials that indicate interchannel (Nd and N270) and intrachannel (Nc and P3b) 
stimulus selection were observed in the control group. Conversely, Nd, N270 and Nc 
were not seen in the ASD group and P3b was significantly reduced. Crucially, this 
difference was seen even in the few individuals with ASD for whom behavioural task 
performance  appeared  to  be  at  normal  levels  (as  measured  by  reaction  time  and 
accuracy  data).  The  same  group,  however,  published  a  subsequent  study  that   57
demonstrated no behavioural differences between a group of high-functioning adults 
with  ASD  and  a  group  of  control  adults  with  higher  IQ  than  in  the  first  study 
(Ciesielski et al., 1995) and later studies by Burack and colleagues (Burack et al., 
1996; Iarocci & Burack, 2004) also found no filtering deficits in ASD.   
Neuroanatomical  abnormalities  in  ASD  have  also  been  investigated  in  an 
attempt to clarify the seemingly contradictory evidence regarding selective attention 
ability within the condition. Studies using magnetic resonance imaging have revealed 
parietal abnormalities (most commonly, increased sulcal widths in superior posterior 
parietal lobes) in individuals with ASD (Courchesne et al., 1993; Heilman et al., 
1993).  It  was  hypothesised  that  these  anatomical  differences  may  explain  the 
attentional profile seen in ASD (Townsend & Courchesne, 1994). ERP studies were 
used to investigate this by measuring the P1 “attention effect” in response to visual 
stimuli in typical individuals and individuals with autism both with and without the 
parietal abnormalities: P+ and P- respectively. The pattern of P1 responses indicated 
that  P+  individuals  seem  to  show  an  enhanced  attention  effect  at  the  attended 
location but narrow distribution of attention overall, whereas P- individuals show a 
broad area of reduced activation (Townsend & Courchesne, 1994). In addition, the 
individuals with parietal abnormalities showed faster responses to the target stimuli 
than either the P- ASD individuals or the typical controls. This dichotomy may help 
resolve the conflicting reports of both over- and under-selectivity within ASD. The 
observation that a group of individuals with ASD show enhanced attention may also 
explain the superior  performance  that has been highlighted on  selective  attention 
paradigms such as visual search tasks.    58
Visual search 
Visual search tasks have become one of the most widely used tool in the 
study  of  selective  attention  (Huang  &  Pashler, 2005).  They  involve  presenting  a 
target, hidden amongst non-target elements, and asking the participant to locate the 
target. There are two main types of visual search: feature- and conjunctive-search 
conditions.  In  the  feature-search  condition  the  target  is  defined  by  one  distinct 
attribute (e.g. a red X among green Ns and blue Xs) and the time taken to detect the 
target is generally independent of the number of distractors present. In such cases, it 
seems that the search is carried out in a parallel fashion where information about all 
the items in the display is processed simultaneously (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). In 
the  conjunctive-search  condition  the  target  is  defined  by  a  combination  of  two 
features (e.g. searching for a red X among blue Xs and red Ts). In typical individuals, 
the response time to the target increases linearly with number of distractors. This is 
indicative of serial search – where one item is processed at a time until the target is 
located. Performance on visual search tasks has been used to examine processing 
capacity limits, based on the suggestion that the inefficiency of visual search seen as 
the number of stimuli increases is indicative of capacity limits (e.g. Nagy & Sanchez, 
1990).   
Attentional abilities within ASD have been investigated by looking at visual 
search behaviour. Plaisted, O’Riordan and Baron-Cohen (1998b) carried out a series 
of studies where typically developing and ASD participants had to search for a target 
hidden  amongst  distractor  items.  In  the  feature-search  condition  there  was  no 
difference  between  the  groups:  the  time  taken  for  both  the  ASD  and  control 
individuals to find the target was independent of the number of distractors present, 
suggesting that the search was carried out in a parallel fashion. In the conjunctive-  59
search condition the typical children showed the predicted rise in response times as 
the  number  of  distractor  stimuli  increased.  Conversely,  the  children  with  autism 
showed very little increase in response time and therefore seemed to be using parallel 
search mechanisms as with the feature-search tasks. In the following years, further 
studies  were  carried  out  to  clarify  these  findings.  Using  more  difficult  tasks  to 
eradicate ceiling effects that may have influenced the results from the 1998 study, it 
was  seen  that  superior  visual  search  behaviour  is  observed  in  both  feature-  and 
conjunctive-search  tasks  (O'Riordan  et  al.,  2001).  It  is  generally  accepted  that  a 
search rate lower than 10ms per item reflects parallel search, whereas higher rates 
suggest  serial  search  (Davis  &  Driver,  1998;  Treisman  &  Gelade,  1980).  Serial 
search is also indicated by an approximate ratio of 2:1 target-absent to target-present 
search rate ratio – i.e. serial search will be exhaustive in target-absent trials but, in 
target-present trials, would end after searching, on average, 50% of the stimuli. In 
O’Riordan et al’s study (2001) The pattern of response times for conjunctive search 
tasks of increasing difficulty was not consistent with parallel search (as hypothesised 
in  the  former  study)  but  seemed  to  be  more  efficient  serial  search.    It  is  also 
important to note that this ability was not  simply  the  result of increased general 
functioning as two groups were matched for IQ. More recently, this superior visual 
search has also been demonstrated in adults with ASD (O'Riordan, 2004).  
O’Riordan  et  al.  (2001b;  2001)  interpreted  the  results  from  these  visual 
search studies in a number of ways. Firstly, superior visual search may be due to an 
increased ability within ASD to discriminate between similar items. An alternative 
suggestion was that children with ASD have increased ‘inhibition of return’ whereby 
they have better memory for distractor locations that have already been inspected and 
therefore are more proficient due to reduced likelihood of revisiting a non-target   60
item. Joseph and colleagues, however, have shown that the superior search behaviour 
is unlikely to be due to memory ability. They compared search efficiency in dynamic 
and static conditions. If memory is a factor in search ability then the efficiency in the 
dynamic  condition  should  be  lower  (due  to  the  inability  to  memorise  visited 
locations). While the ASD group responded faster overall, there were no apparent 
differences in the search efficiency or the eye movement patterns of children with 
ASD and typical controls (Horowitz et al., 2007; Joseph et al., 2009).  
It  seems  that  more  evidence  has  come  down  on  the  side  of  the  former 
suggestion  regarding  increased  discrimination  between  similar  items.  A  series  of 
tasks where the similarity between the target and the distractors was manipulated 
demonstrated that discriminability was the rate determining factor in visual search. 
The increased target-distractor similarity did not adversely affect the ASD group to 
the same extent as the control group indicating that the superior performance by 
individuals with ASD on visual search tasks is likely to be due to an increased ability 
to discriminate between items (O'Riordan & Plaisted, 2001b; O'Riordan & Plaisted, 
2001a) 
Indeed  this  has  been  backed  up  by  other  studies  looking  at  responses  of 
individuals with ASD to highly similar novel stimuli (O'Riordan & Plaisted, 2001b; 
Plaisted et al., 1998a) and by Kemner et al. (Kemner et al., 2008) who showed that 
the individuals with ASD made fewer fixations than typical controls (indicative of 
enhanced discriminability).   
One intriguing possibility is that the superior visual search abilities in ASD 
could  be  explained  in  the  context  of  Lavie’s  (1995)  perceptual  load  theory  of 
selective attention. Given that the tasks used by Lavie and colleagues to test the 
perceptual load theory involve visual search, the two should be intrinsically linked;   61
although the relationship between them is a little counterintuitive. When applying the 
perceptual load theory to visual search, it would be predicted that more efficient 
search results in more distractor processing. When the search is ‘easy’ (i.e. when 
distractors  and  targets  are  dissimilar  and  therefore  easily  distinguishable)  the 
perceptual  load  is  low  as  fewer  aspects  of  the  non-target  stimuli  are  relevant. 
Perceptual capacity is therefore left over and results in unintentional processing of 
irrelevant  distractor  items.  This  outcome  was  demonstrated  experimentally  by 
manipulating the difficulty of a  search  task (dissimilar target  and non-targets  vs. 
similar target and non-targets) and evaluating the level of distractor interference in 
each  condition.  In  the  ‘easy-search’  condition,  distractor  interference  was  seen 
whereas  this  was  eliminated  when  the  search  was  more  difficult  (Lavie  &  Cox, 
1997).  
  It is possible therefore, that the enhanced performance may be a result of 
increased perceptual capacity in ASD. If an individual is able to process a greater 
number of visual stimuli simultaneously, then they will be able to locate the target 
item more quickly and will demonstrate more efficient visual search patterns. It may 
be the case therefore, that individuals with ASD can process more items within the 
visual search display before their capacity becomes saturated.  
  The research presented here will explore this hypothesis by re-examining the 
issue of selective attention in ASD with respect to the perceptual load theory of 
selective attention and cognitive control (Lavie, 1995), and will investigate whether 
the  varying  pattern  of  attentional  behaviour  seen  in  ASD  is  more  appropriately 
explained within this theoretical framework.   62
Chapter 3: Selective Attention and Perceptual Load in ASD 
 
Introduction 
It is clear from  the  discussion in  the  previous chapter that the attentional 
abnormalities that are seen within ASD are diverse and often contradictory. Among 
the various reports of altered attention, it has been suggested that a reduced ability to 
filter  out  irrelevant  information  could  be  causing  individuals  with  ASD  to  be 
bombarded  with  information  -  leading  to  over  arousal  (Dawson  &  Lewy,  1989). 
Indeed,  Ciesielski  et  al.  (1990)  showed  that  participants  with  autism  had  more 
difficulty  filtering  out  distracting  stimuli  than  the  corresponding  control  group. 
Ciesielski et al. (1990) also showed that there was an altered pattern of event related 
potentials (ERPs) in the autism group during selective attention tasks in both visual 
and auditory modalities. Similarly, Burack (1994) noted that there was an increased 
effect of distractors on the performance of the ASD group compared with the control 
group but concluded that individuals with ASD appear to have an inefficient, overly 
broad attentional lens that fails to contract appropriately when attending to stimuli.  
Given the theory put forward by Lavie et al. (1995), it is now important to re-
examine the issue of selective attention in ASD within this new frame of reference. 
Based on the studies outlined above that demonstrate an increased effect of distractor 
stimuli on individuals with ASD, it was predicted that when compared to the control 
group, the ASD group would require a higher level of perceptual load to eliminate 
distractor  processing.  According  to  load  theory  such  a  finding  would  indicate 
increased perceptual capacity in individuals with ASD.    63
  In  the  first  experiment  of  this  thesis,  a  version  of  the  Eriksen  flanker 
paradigm (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) similar to that employed by Maylor and Lavie 
(1998) was used to examine the extent of distractor interference at varying levels of 
perceptual load. A clinical and control group of participants took part in a two-way 
forced-choice  reaction  time  task  and  were  required  to  identify  a  target  letter 
presented within a circle of letters in the central area of a computer screen. The 
perceptual load of the task was manipulated by adding non-target letters to the circle. 
There was also a distractor letter presented – offset from the central letter circle – 
which participants were told to ignore. The distractor could either be incompatible or 
neutral  (see  method  section  for  details).  If  the distractor  letter  is  processed  (late 
selection),  then  a  slower  response  time  will  be  seen  for  trials  with  incompatible 
distractors  than  for  those  with  neutral  distractors  (which  should  not  affect  the 
response times). Conversely, if the distractors are being ignored (early selection), 
then the distractor type will have no differential effect on the response times.  
It was predicted that, in line with Lavie (1995), the typical adults would show 
distractor interference at low levels of perceptual load (set size 1 and 2) whereas this 
interference would be eliminated as the perceptual load of the task was increased (set 
size  four  and  six).  For  the  ASD  group  it  was  predicted  that  while  a  pattern  of 
interference modulated by perceptual load would still be seen, the distractor effects 
would persist at higher levels of perceptual load than for the control group.  
 
 Participants and Diagnosis 
Participants in this study were 15 adults with ASD and 25 typical adults. The 
participants with ASD were recruited by advertising on the National Autistic Society 
(NAS) website, handing out information packs at Prospects (NAS employment and   64
training service for people with autism and Asperger syndrome who wish to work) 
and contacting people  in online communities and on  social networking websites. 
Control participants were recruited from undergraduate and postgraduate courses at 
University College London and through social networking websites. A number of the 
participants took part in more than one of the studies presented within this thesis (see 
appendix I for details of participant overlap across studies). One individual with ASD 
and two control individuals were removed from the sample because their error rates 
were  higher  than  2.5  standard  deviations  above  the  relevant  group  mean.  All 
participants  in  the  ASD  group  had  received  a  clinical  diagnosis  of  autism  or 
Asperger’s Syndrome (AS) (3 autism, 11 AS), based on criteria listed in DSM-IV 
(American  Psychiatric  Association,  1994),  from  a  trained,  independent  clinician. 
Diagnosis  was  then  confirmed  by  assessment  with  module  4  of  the  Autism 
Diagnostic  Observational  Schedule  (ADOS)  (Lord  et  al.,  2002).  None  of  the 
participants  suffered  from  any  other  mental  or  neurological  disorder  and  all  had 
normal,  or  corrected-to-normal,  vision.  Groups  were  matched  for  non-verbal  IQ 
using  a  sub-scale  from  the  Wechsler  Abbreviated  Scale  for  Intelligence  (WASI) 
(Wechsler, 1999) (see table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1     Descriptive Statistics for each Group 
 
Group                Statistic    Age            WASI             WASI                WASI 
                      (years:        vocabulary         matrix         full scale IQ  
                months)       subtest          reasoning         (2 subtests) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
ASD (n=14)        mean    23:6               64.1               52.9      115 
7 males        S.D               4:4                7.0                8.4      12.3 
7 females        range        18:10-30:8        58-79              39-67               97-136 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Control (n=23)      mean    26:7        65.7               56.9      119 
13 males        S.D.     2:2        6.4               7.6      11.1 
10 females        range  21:5-30:0         52-74             41-67             101-138 
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Independent-sample t-tests indicated that there was no significant difference between the 
verbal, non-verbal and full scale IQ scores of the two groups (all p values > 0.14).    
Ethical Considerations 
  Ethical approval for all the studies within this thesis was obtained from the UCL 
ethics committee. All participants were given an information sheet about the tasks and had 
the study explained to them orally. Individuals were only included in the study once they 
had given written consent. Participants were informed that they could withdraw from the 
study at any time without penalty. This was the case for all the studies presented within this 
thesis. 
 
Methodology 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
Computer based stimuli were created using visual basic and were run on a 
custom built small form desktop computer and displayed on a ProLite 15” flat LCD 
screen (1280 x 1024 pixel resolution, 2ms response rate). The participant’s chair was 
positioned such that viewing distance was 60cm.  
The task was a response competition paradigm based on Maylor & Lavie 
(1998)  where  participants  were  required  to  respond  to  a  relevant  target  while 
ignoring irrelevant distractors. 
Stimuli were presented in light grey against a black background. Following 
the presentation of a fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 1000ms, a target 
letter (X or N) was presented in any of six positions that were positioned around the 
circumference  of  an  imaginary  circle  with  radius  of  2.1º  visual  angles  from  the   66
fixation point. The other positions in the ring were occupied by a non-target letter (Z, 
H, K, Y or V) or marked by a small dot depending on the condition. Target and non-
target elements measured 0.4 º x 0.6 º visual angles. A slightly larger distractor letter 
(0.5 º x 0.9 º) was presented on the right or left of the ring of letters, 4.3 º from the 
centre (see figure 3.1).  
The perceptual load of the task was manipulated by changing the number of 
non-target letters in the ring to create trials with set size of one (only the target letter 
in the ring), two (target + one other non-target in the ring), four (target + three non-
target elements) and six (target + five non-target letters).  The irrelevant distractors 
were either neutral (unrelated to the target letter: T or L) or incompatible (an X 
distractor  when  the  target  is  N  and  vice  versa).  The  experimental  display  was 
presented for only 100ms in order to preclude voluntary eye movement. 
Six blocks of 72 trials were created with each set size and distractor condition 
appearing equally. The target and non-target letters were equally likely to appear in 
each  of  the  six  ring  positions  and  the  proximity  to  the  distractor  letter  was 
counterbalanced. For set sizes two and four, the position of the group of letters and 
the position of the target within the group (edge/middle) was also counterbalanced.  
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Figure 3.1     Examples of Experimental Stimuli 
3.1a: Example of a high perceptual load trial with an incompatible distractor. In this 
case the set size is six and the target is X. 3.1b: Example of a low perceptual load 
trial with a neutral distractor. In this case the set size is one and the target is X. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1a                   Figure 3.1b 
 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they would see a ring made up of letters in the 
centre of the screen and that one of those letters would be either an X or an N. They 
were told to press the X key if an X was present and the N if an N was present. It was 
emphasised that they should ignore the letters that were presented outside the ring. 
Following a set of practice trials, the participants completed the six experimental 
blocks and were able to take breaks between blocks if required. Every response was 
followed  by  a  1000ms  inter-trial  interval  and  incorrect  responses elicited  a  brief 
computer tone. The accuracy and response time for each trial was recorded by the 
computer  program  and  subsequent  comparison  of  reaction  times  for  the  two 
distractor trial types within high and low load conditions allowed the influence of 
distractors to be ascertained.  
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Results 
Reaction times above 3000ms were discarded and median correct RT and 
error  rates  for  each  distractor  condition  at  set  size  one,  two,  four  and  six  were 
calculated. All incorrect trials were excluded from further analyses. An analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was performed on the median correct RTs with group (ASD vs. 
control)  as  the  between-subjects  factor  and  distractor  congruency  (neutral  vs. 
incompatible) and set size (one, two, four & six) as within-subject factors (see table 
3.2).  
 
Table 3.2     Overall mean RTs (ms) and standard deviations (SD) for the two groups 
under each condition 
 
 
         Set size 1                 Set size 2              Set size 4                 Set size 6             
            neutral   incomp       neutral   incomp       neutral   incomp      neutral   incomp
        mean RT        mean RT      mean RT                mean RT 
                     (SD)             (SD)        (SD)                       (SD) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
ASD         561       582             608       642               651       679               733      726 
                (106)    (116)          (125)     (123)            (129)    (144)             (158)   (173) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Control   538       563              584       611               651       636               701      704 
               (98.3)   (96.1)          (97.3)    (104)           (122)     (93.9)           (129)    (131)                             
 
 
There was a significant main effect of set size indicating that participants 
were slower to respond to trials with higher set sizes (F(3,105)=93.10, p < 0.001, ηp
2 
= 0.75). There was also a main effect of distractor congruency (F(1,35) =18.09, p < 
0.001, ηp
2 = 0.34) reflecting the fact that RTs were faster for neutral trials than for 
incompatible  trials.  These  two  main  effects  are  reassuring  as  they  imply  that 
perceptual load had been effectively manipulated and that participants were engaging 
with the task in the way that was intended.    69
There was no main effect of group (F(1, 26) =0.41, p=0.539, ηp
2 = 0.10), the 
reaction times were not significantly slower or faster in either group. This indicates 
that any differences between the groups are not due to a generalised reduction in 
processing speed within ASD.  
Most importantly, there was a significant interaction between set size and 
distractor congruency (F(3,105) = 4.23, p = 0.007, ηp
2 = 0.11) and a significant three-
way interaction between group, set size and distractor congruency (F(3,105)=2.79, 
p=0.044, ηp
2 = 0.07). The two-way interaction implies that the effect of distractor 
type varies with set size. The three-way interaction suggests that the two groups are 
showing a different pattern of congruency effects across the set sizes. These results 
can be seen more clearly in figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.2     Difference between RTs for neutral and incompatible trials at each set 
size 
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Using t-tests to explore the interactions, it can be seen that for the control 
group, there was a significant effect of distractor congruency at set sizes one (t(22)=-
3.470, p =0.002)and  two (t(22)=-3.925, p =0.001) but no significant effect at set 
sizes four (t(22)=1.191, p =0.246) and six (t(22) = -0.308, p=0.761). For the ASD 
group, there was a significant effect of distractor congruency at set sizes one (t(22)=-
3.355, p =0.005) , two (t(22)=-4.619, p < 0.001) and four (t(22)=-2.751, p =0.017) 
but no effect at set size six (t(22) = 0.499, p=0.626). 
The difference between the two groups is therefore based on the lingering 
interference effect at set size four in the ASD group and the elimination of this effect 
at set size four in the control group. The latter appears to be due to the reduction in 
RTs for incompatible distractors within the control group, resulting in equivalent 
RT’s for neutral and incompatible trials at that set size (see figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.3     Mean RTs for neutral and incompatible trials at each set size for the 
control group (figure 3a) and ASD group (figure 3b) 
Figure 3.3a – Control Group 
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Figure 3.3b – ASD group 
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Search Slopes 
 
The data from the neutral condition was examined in order to determine whether the 
visual  search  behaviour  was  different  in  the  two  groups  (see  figure  3.4).  The 
difference in response times between set size one and the other set sizes was used to 
calculate an average search rate (ms per item). The average search rate for the ASD 
group was 36.5ms per item, and for the control group was 34.8ms per item. An 
independent samples t-test indicated that there was no significant difference between 
these two rates (t(4) = 0.17, p = 0.873).  
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Figure 3.4     Response times for neutral trials at each set size 
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Accuracy data 
Analysis of variance was performed on the number of errors for each group 
across each condition (see table 3.3 for absolute values).  
 
Table 3.3     Accuracy rates and standard deviations for the two groups under each 
condition 
 
             Set size 1                   Set size 2                 Set size 4              Set size 6          
        neutral   incomp.      neutral   incomp.       neutral   incomp.       neutral   incomp.
   Accuracy             Accuracy          Accuracy           Accuracy 
                (SD)              (SD)          (SD)                  (SD) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
ASD    0.944     0.889         0.852     0.907           0.815     0.815            0.665     0.694      
           (0.048)  (0.091)       (0.087)   (0.104)        (0.078)  (0.104)        (0.057)  (0.103) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Control 0.944    0.977        0.944     0.870           0.852    0.778            0.741     0.704 
             (0.048)  (0.098)     (0.059)   (0.120)        (0.062)  (0.120)        (0.091)  (0.127) 
  
   73
There were main effects of set size (F(3,105) = 151.82, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.81) 
and distractor congruency (F(1,35) = 8.29, p = 0.007, ηp
2 = 0.19) indicating that more 
errors are made at higher set sizes and with incompatible distractors. Overall, there 
was no significant difference between the number of errors made by each group 
(F(1,35) = 0.48, p = 0.494, ηp
2 = 0.01). There were also no significant interactions 
between congruency, set size and group.  
  
Discussion 
As predicted, the individuals with ASD seem to be processing the distractors 
at higher levels of perceptual load than the control adults. There are a number of 
factors that can influence performance on a selective attention task and give rise to 
the difference seen in this study. Firstly, the ASD individuals may have a reduced 
filtering ability. Subjects who cannot effectively assign their attention to the central 
task  and  exclude  irrelevant  information  would  show  this  pattern  of  increased 
distractibility.  Likewise,  if  the  attentional  lens  was  overly  diffuse  such  that 
individuals  with  autism  were  unable  to  contract  it  sufficiently  to  block  out  the 
flanking distractor letters, then increased distractibility would be seen. A deficit of 
this  nature  which,  regardless  of  perceptual  load,  prevents  an  individual  from 
effectively  assigning  their  attention  to  the  central  task  would  be  reflected  by  an 
overall drop in accuracy and/or speed of performance on the task in question. 
Given that there was no significant difference between the reaction times and 
error rates of the two groups the data from this study does not support either of these 
conclusions. The results are also not likely to be due to any difference in the pattern 
of  eye  movements  between  the  two  groups.  While  no  gaze-tracking  data  was 
collected, the presentation of the experimental stimuli was brief (100ms) in order to   74
preclude voluntary eye movement. The absence of any difference between the visual 
search  rates  of  the  two  groups  also  suggests  that  the  altered  pattern  of  task 
performance in the ASD group is not due to the superior visual search abilities that 
have been highlighted within the condition (O'Riordan & Plaisted, 2001a; O'Riordan 
et al., 2001; Plaisted et al., 1998c). It is interesting that there was no replication of the 
enhanced visual search behaviour that has been previously been reported. This may, 
however, be due to two factors. Firstly, at the low set sizes the task was very easy 
and both  groups  were performing at ceiling which would prevent  any  difference 
being detected. Secondly, at the higher set sizes when the task became more difficult 
and a difference in search behaviour could be noted, the individuals with ASD were 
still processing the distractor letter. This could have offset any increase in search 
efficiency. 
The results presented here seem to suggest perceptual capacity differences 
between the groups. According to Lavie (1995), if the central task does not exhaust 
the perceptual capacity then additional information within the visual field would also 
be processed. A larger perceptual capacity in ASD would therefore result in more 
distractor processing at high levels of perceptual load - but without a reduction in 
task performance. This increased distractibility, therefore, could be conceptualised as 
a reflection of an increased ability rather than a ‘deficit’ – albeit with potentially 
detrimental effects in real-life situations.  
Increased perceptual capacity could also underlie the superior performance 
seen on experimental paradigms such as visual search and Embedded Figures tasks. 
In  both  feature-  and  conjunctive-search  tasks,  participants  with  ASD  were  more 
efficient at detecting the location of a target within an array of non-target elements 
(O'Riordan et al., 2001), and on the Embedded Figures Task  individuals with ASD   75
are faster  to  identify  the  hidden target  shape from  within  the  picture  (Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith, 1983). Increased perceptual capacity would allow 
more  elements  within  the  visual  field  to  be  processed  in  a  parallel  fashion, 
facilitating faster target location and therefore may underlie both these abilities.  
Interestingly, the performance of the control group within this study differs 
slightly  from  results  produced  by  previous  studies.  Maylor  and  Lavie,  (1998); 
Huang-Pollock et al., (2002); and Lavie et al, (2003) have reported that for typically 
developed adults, the reduction in interference effects is seen between set sizes four 
and  six.  The  control  group  within  this  study  shows  an  earlier  reduction  in 
interference (between set sizes two and four). It is unclear why this difference in 
performance is seen given that similar procedures were used and participants across 
the studies were equivalent in age and IQ.  There may have been some differences in 
stimulus presentation (for example, exact values for screen contrast, room lighting 
levels, exact  colour  of stimuli/background  were not reported in previous studies) 
although it is unclear whether these factors could influence the perceptual load effect 
(Lavie & de Fockert, 2003). Is it important to note, however, that all participants in 
this study (both ASD and control) performed the tasks under the same experimental 
conditions and therefore the difference between the two groups is still meaningful 
despite the shift in the absolute values seen for the control group.  
This first study, therefore, offers evidence of increased perceptual capacity in 
ASD. The implications of this finding will be further discussed in chapter seven.  
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Chapter 4: Perceptual Load and Conscious Perception in ASD 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
  In the previous chapter, evidence of increased perceptual capacity in ASD 
was  presented.  These  conclusions  were  based  on  analyses  of  reaction  time  data 
which indicated that individuals with ASD were processing distractor elements at 
higher levels of perceptual load than control participants. Reaction time (RT) data, 
however, is an indirect measure of attention. While such measures can demonstrate 
whether  non-target  elements  are  being  processed,  and  therefore  affecting  task 
performance, they cannot provide any information regarding whether the elements in 
question are actually consciously perceived. In the second experiment, I therefore 
explored  whether  an  increase  in  perceptual  load  differentially  affects  conscious 
perception of irrelevant distractors in ASD.   
Though the concepts of attention and consciousness are intrinsically linked, it 
is also possible to dissociate the two. Williams (1939) showed participants the very 
faint outline of a shape and asked them to state the first shape that entered their mind. 
They were also asked to indicate whether they had seen the shape clearly, had seen 
something but were not entirely sure which shape they had seen, or had seen nothing 
at all and therefore were making a pure guess regarding the identity of the shape. The 
results were greater than chance level – even for cases when the participant reported 
having  seen  nothing  at  all  on  the  screen.  In  a  more  extreme  example,  it  was 
demonstrated that while patients with a V1 lesion cannot consciously perceive, they 
can catch a ball and make correct guesses concerning visual stimuli that are at a 
greater level than chance (Weiskranz, Warrington, Sanders & Marshall, 1974). The   77
effect  of  distractors  on  RT  data  could  therefore  be  attributed  to  unconscious 
processing of stimulus-response associations rather than conscious perception. With 
this is mind, Lavie and colleagues have recently begun to explore whether perceptual 
load modulates the conscious awareness of task-irrelevant stimuli. Cartwright-Finch 
and Lavie (2007) used an attentional blindness paradigm to assess the awareness of 
an unexpected stimulus presented on the last trial of an experiment. They presented 
participants with a series of visual displays, each containing a cross, and asked them 
to indicate which arm of the cross was longer (high load condition) or which arm of 
the cross was blue (low load condition). On the final trial, the critical stimulus (a 
faint shape outline) was also presented next to the cross. Their results demonstrated 
that awareness of the critical stimulus (indicated by post-test questioning) was linked 
to  the  perceptual  load  of  the  experimental  task:  with  the  rate  of  awareness 
significantly  dropping  (by  approximately  40%)  in  trials  with  a  high  level  of 
perceptual load.  
With a retrospective method of awareness such as this, however, inattentional 
blindness may not be the only reason that the critical stimulus was not reported. It is 
possible that the critical stimulus was perceived, but that the combination  of the 
surprise question and the unexpected nature of the stimulus led to rapid forgetting 
(Wolfe, 1999) or weak signal generation (Barber & Folkard, 1972). 
To address this concern, MacDonald and Lavie (2008) employed a dual-task 
paradigm in which the conscious perception of an expected critical stimulus was 
measured online – thus negating the influence of memory limitations. Participants 
performed a central letter-search task while also looking out for a critical stimulus (a 
small grey figure) that they were told would appear in some trials. The perceptual 
load of the central task was manipulated to create a high and low load condition.   78
MacDonald and Lavie calculated the detection sensitivity (d’) and the response bias 
(β) for both the high and low load conditions. In line with the predictions from the 
more indirect methods of their earlier experiments, they showed that the sensitivity to 
the critical stimulus was significantly reduced in the high perceptual load condition 
whereas the response bias was unchanged. This confirmed that conscious perception 
was indeed modulated by perceptual load. 
  The  aim  of  the  experiment  reported  here  is  to  establish  whether  the 
differences between the two groups that were reported the previous chapter reflect 
the fact that individuals with ASD can consciously perceive more information at any 
one time. The conclusions made regarding increased perceptual  capacity in  ASD 
were based on indirect RT measures which, as discussed earlier, cannot lead to any 
definite  assertions  concerning  conscious  perception.  At  the  higher  set  sizes,  the 
lingering distractor interference effects in the ASD group may be solely due to the 
unconscious  processing  of  stimulus-response  associations  or,  conversely,  the 
distractors may have been perceived at all set sizes – with any elimination of the 
interference effect at the highest set size being a result of post-perceptual response 
selection processes (Macdonald & Lavie, 2008).  
  To  resolve  this  issue,  a  dual-task  paradigm  was  used  to  examine  the 
sensitivity to a critical stimulus under four different levels of perceptual load. It was 
predicted  that  both  the  ASD  and  control  individuals  would  show  a  reduction  in 
sensitivity to the critical stimulus as the perceptual load of the central task increased. 
This reduction, however, would occur earlier for the control participants resulting in 
the ASD individuals showing greater sensitivity than control individuals at the higher 
levels of perceptual load. This would indicate that the findings from the previous 
experiment extend to conscious perception – and would be manifest as an increased   79
awareness of the critical stimulus at higher levels of perceptual load on the dual-task 
paradigm. 
 
 Experiment Two: Dual-task performance under perceptual load. 
 
 Participants 
 
Participants in this study were 16 adults with Asperger’s Syndrome and 16 
typical adults.  The participants were diagnosed and recruited in the same manner as 
in the previous experiment. Two participants with ASD and two control participants 
were excluded from the sample due to high error rates. The remaining 14 in each 
group  were  matched  for  chronological  age  and  non-verbal  IQ  using  the  matrix 
reasoning sub-scale from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale for Intelligence (WASI) 
(Wechsler, 1999) (see table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1    Descriptive Statistics for each Group 
 
Group                Statistic    Age            WASI             WASI                WASI 
                      (years:        vocabulary         matrix         full scale IQ  
                months)       subtest          reasoning         (2 subtests) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
ASD (n=14)        mean    24:1               65.2               55.9      119 
11 males        S.D               4:5                6.7                9.6      13.4 
3 females        range        18:09-30:11        54-76             39-67              97-138 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Control (n=14)      mean    25:9        66.9               56.0      121 
6 males        S.D.     3:0        3.8               8.4      8.0 
8 females        range  19:8-30:1         60-71             41-65             109-131 
 
 
Independent samples t-tests indicated that the groups did not differ on any of these 
measures (all p values > 0.3).  
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 Methodology 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
Visual basic was used to create computer based stimuli that were presented 
on a custom built small form desktop computer and displayed on a ProLite 15” flat 
LCD screen (1280 x 1024 pixel resolution, 2ms response rate). Viewing distance was 
60cm.  
  The task involved a dual-task paradigm that required participants to identify a 
target letter (X or N) and then indicate the presence or absence of a meaningless 
small grey character (the critical stimulus (CS)) that was presented outside the ring.  
 Participants were presented with six letters that were placed, equally spaced, 
around the circumference of an imaginary circle with a radius of 1.7º visual angles. 
In each trial, one of the letters was the target letter (X or N) and, depending on the 
condition, the  other  ring  positions  were  occupied  by  a  non-target  letter  that  was 
perceptually similar to the target (Z, H, K, Y or V) or a small letter O (easy to 
distinguish from the target-letter). Target and similar non-target elements measured 
0.6 º x 0.6 º visual angles. The dissimilar non-target element (O) measured 0.2º x 
0.2º.  
The perceptual load of the task was manipulated by changing the number of 
similar non-target letters and Os in the ring to create trials with set size of one (the 
target letter and five Os in the ring), two (target, one similar non-target and four Os 
in  the  ring),  four  (target,  three  similar  non-target  elements  and  two  Os)  and  six 
(target and five similar non-target letters).   
In 50% of the trials the CS, a meaningless grey squiggle, measuring 0.3º x 
0.3º visual angles  was presented, outside the ring of letters, in one of six positions 
that were arranged on the circumference of an imaginary circle with radius 5.4 º. The   81
six  CS  positions  were  such  that  each  one  lay  on  an  imaginary  line  that  passed 
through the centre of the circle and bisected two adjacent letter locations (see figures 
4.1 and 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.1      Examples of Experimental Stimuli  
4.1a: Example of a high perceptual load trial with the CS present. In this case the set 
size is six and the target is X.  
4.1b: Example of a low perceptual load trial with a no CS present. In this case the set 
size is one and the target is N. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1a                   Figure 4.1b 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2     The positions that the critical stimulus could occupy outside the ring of 
letters 
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The location of the target, its proximity to the CS and, in set size 4, the target 
letter’s location within the group of similar non-target elements (edge/middle) were 
counterbalanced across all the trials.  
The letters in the ring were presented in black on a light grey background 
(Red Green Blue (RGB) values: 204,204,204) and the CS was a darker grey (RGB: 
153,153,153). Following the presentation of the experimental stimulus, a black mesh 
pattern that covered the entire screen other than the central 9.5º by 9.5º square, was 
presented as a mask. The clear square in the centre was to ensure that the ring of 
letters was not masked.  
  72 trials of each set size were created. These were presented as four blocks 
of  each  set  size,  where  each  block  contained  18  trials  of  the  same  set  size. 
Participants were permitted to take short breaks between each block. Blocks were 
presented such that all 72 trials of any one set size were performed before moving on 
to  four  blocks  of  a  different  set  size.  The  first  four  blocks  presented  to  each 
participant contained trials of set size two, the presentation order of the other set 
sizes was randomly determined by the computer program. 
A control block of 72 trials was also created where participants were told not 
to search for the target letter but only to indicate the presence or absence of the CS. 
18 trials of each set size, 50% containing the CS, were used to create the control 
block.    
 
Procedure  
Following a fixation cross that was presented for 1000ms, the experimental 
display was presented for only 100ms in order to preclude voluntary eye movement.   83
The mask was then presented for 500ms, followed by a blank screen for 1.4s, a 
question mark for 100ms and a final blank screen for 1.9 seconds (see figure 4.3). 
The duration of the two blank screen phases was such that there was a 2-second 
response window for the letter identification and the CS detection tasks. Both these 
2-second windows elapsed regardless of the response time. If no response was given 
within the time limit, the trial was recorded as ‘time out’ and classed as an error.  
Participants were told that they would see a ring made up of letters in the 
centre of the screen and that one of those letters would be either an X or an N. They 
were told to press the Z key if an X was present and the X key if an N was present – 
and to respond as quickly as they could after they saw the ring of letters. Participants 
were also told that they should look for a little grey squiggle that would appear 
outside the ring in some of the trials. They were instructed to wait until they saw the 
question  mark  and  then  indicate  with  a  key-press  (N  for  present,  M  for  absent) 
whether the CS was present or absent in that trial. Stickers were placed over the Z, X, 
N and M keys in order to clarify which key corresponded to which response. 
Following  a  set  of  practice  trials,  the  participants  completed  the  16 
experimental blocks and were able to take breaks between blocks if required. No 
difference was noted in the number, or duration, of breaks taken by each group. An 
incorrect response on the letter detection task elicited a brief computer tone, and 
participants were informed that this indicated an error had been made. The accuracy 
and  response  times  for  each  trial  were  recorded  by  the  computer  program  and 
subsequent comparison of CS detection rates at the various levels set sizes allow the 
effect  of  perceptual  load  on  dual-task  performance  to  be  ascertained.  After 
completing the experimental trials, participants performed the control block in order 
to  ensure  that  all  the  participants  were  able  to  detect  the  CS.  This  was  vital  to   84
confirm that any failures to detect the CS during the experimental trials were due to 
the perceptual load of the central letter search task, and not an underlying inability to 
recognise or perceive the squiggle.     
 
 
Figure 4.3     Time-course of experimental trials 
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Results 
Letter Search 
 All incorrect trials were excluded from further analyses and an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was performed on the median correct RTs with group (ASD vs. control) 
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as the between-subjects factor and set size (one, two, four & six) as the within-
subject factor (see table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2     Mean reaction times (RT) and standard deviation for each group at each 
set size  
Mean RT (Standard Deviation)                  
 
Set size        ASD           Control        
____________________________________________________________________
1      794  (140)           864  (204)        
2      845  (226)           823  (177) 
4      928  (205)           935  (233) 
6      990  (242)           966  (225) 
 
There was a significant main effect of set size indicating that participants 
were slower to respond to trials with higher set sizes (F(3,78)=13.90, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 
1.00). There was no main effect of group (F(1, 26) =0.01, p=0.933, ηp
2 = 0.05) which 
means that the reaction times were not significantly slower or faster in either group. 
This indicates that any differences between the groups are not due to a generalised 
reduction in processing speed within ASD. There was also no significant interaction 
between set size and group (F(3,78) = 1.35, p = 0.264, ηp
2 = 0.35).  
 
Letter search error analysis 
Analysis of the letter search error rates at each set size revealed a main effect 
of set size (F(3, 78) =60.88, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 1.00). Inspection of the means indicated 
that this is a reflection of the increasing number of errors as perceptual load of the   86
central task was increased (see table 4.3). There was no main effect of group (F(1, 
26) =0.14, p=0.708, ηp
2 = 0.07) – neither group made significantly more errors – and 
no significant interaction between group and set size (F(3, 78) =0.18, p=0.907, ηp
2 = 
0.08). 
 
Table 4.3     Mean error rates (%) and standard deviation.  
Mean error rate (Standard Deviation)                  
 
Set size        ASD           Control        
____________________________________________________________________
1      3.6  (6.0)          1.9   (3.3)        
2      5.7  (7.6)          5.6   (6.0) 
4      16.5  (12.5)          16.6  (7.4) 
6      22.3  (8.8)           20.6  (8.2) 
 
This  main  effect  of  set  size  in  the  RT  and  error  analyses  confirm  that 
perceptual load had been effectively manipulated and that participants were engaging 
with the task in the way that was intended.  
 
CS Detection 
All  trials  with  incorrect  letter  search  responses  were  excluded  from  the 
analysis. The percentage detection rate, false alarm rate and sensitivity (d’) for each 
participant at each set size was calculated (see table 4.4 for group means). The d’ 
measure takes into account both the percentage detection rate and the false alarm rate 
in order to give a true measure of how sensitive an individual is to the presence of the 
critical stimulus.   87
 
Table 4.4       Mean  Percentage  CS  detection  rate, false  alarm rate and d’  (with 
standard deviation) for each group under each condition.       
 
Detection Rate (%)       False Alarm Rate (%)         d’ 
 
Set size  ASD     Control       ASD       Control            ASD       Control 
____________________________________________________________________
1    85.7   90.1          8.49  6.34    2.91      3.21  
    (13.5)  (11.8)          (13.5)  (6.16)             (1.00)       (0.92) 
2    86.9   87.5          12.5  8.44    2.76      2.88  
    (16.8)  (13.6)          (13.3)  (6.00)    (1.08)      (0.82) 
4    89.7   81.3           12.0  14.3    2.90      2.32 
    (14.5)  (18.2)          (12.3)  (13.2)              (0.75)      (0.81) 
6    87.2   70.2          15.8  19.7    2.62      1.74 
    (15.5)  (24.5)          (17.0)  (17.2)    (0.94)     (1.22) 
 
Percentage Detection 
A repeated measures ANOVA on the percentage detection rate indicated that 
there was a significant main effect of set size (F(3,78) = 3.92, p = 0.012, ηp
2 = 0.81), 
reflecting the fact that the CS was detected less often as the perceptual load of the 
central task increased. There was no significant main effect of group (F(1,26) = 1.03, 
p = 0.319, ηp
2 = 0.17) - neither group showed an overall difference in the rate of CS 
detection. There was, however, a significant interaction between group and set size 
(F(3,78) = 5.10, p = 0.003, ηp
2 = 0.91) suggesting that the two groups were showing 
a different pattern of sensitivity change across the various set sizes. The nature of this 
difference can be seen in figure 4.4.  
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Figure 4.4      Graph of percentage CS detection 
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Post-hoc ANOVA for each group demonstrated that this interaction was a 
result of a greater drop in percentage detection rate in the control group as the set 
size increased. In the ASD group there was no significant difference between the 
detection  rates  at  the  different  set  sizes  (F(3,39)  =  0.48,  p  =  0.698,  ηp
2  =  0.14) 
whereas  in  the  control  group  there  was  a  significant  effect  of  set  size  on  the 
percentage of CS detection ((F(3,39) = 6.41, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.95). T-tests showed 
that there was also a significant difference between the detection rates of the two 
groups at set size six (t (26) = 2.19 p = 0.037).  
 
False alarm rate 
A repeated measures ANOVA indicated that the main effect of set size was 
significant  (F(3,78)  =  5.84,  p  =  0.001,  ηp
2  =  0.94),  with  the  false  alarm  rate 
increasing with set size (see figure 4.5). This was expected, as the task becomes more 
difficult and therefore necessitates a greater level of guessing. Neither the interaction 
between group and set size (F(3,78) = 1.06, p = 0.089, ηp
2 = 0.28) nor the main effect 
of group was significant (F(1,26) = 1.42, p = 0.245, ηp
2 = 0.21).   89
Figure 4.5     Graph of false alarm rates.  
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Detection sensitivity 
  The d’ measure gives a more accurate reflection of task performance as it 
takes into account both the percentage detection and false alarm rates. Results of the 
repeated measures ANOVA on the d’ values for each participant at each set size 
indicated a significant main effect of set size (F(3,78) = 9.25, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.99). 
Inspection of the means showed that sensitivity was lower at the higher set sizes. 
There was also a significant interaction between group and set size (F(3,72) = 5.17, p 
= 0.003, ηp
2 = 0.91) which suggests that the sensitivity is changing differently for the 
two groups as the perceptual load increased (see figure 4.6). There was no significant 
main effect of group (F(1,26) = 0.81, p = 0.377, ηp
2 = 0.14) – there was no overall 
difference in the sensitivity levels of the two groups.    
 
 
 
   90
Figure 4.6     Graph of detection sensitivity. 
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
1 2 4 6
set size
d
e
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
(
d
'
)
ASD
control
 
ANOVA within each group showed that there was no effect of set size on the 
sensitivity of the ASD group (F(3,39) = 0.86, p = 0.470, ηp
2 = 0.22) but that there 
was a significant main effect of set size in the control group (F(3,39) = 10.80, p < 
0.001, ηp
2 = 0.99). 
Post-hoc  t-tests  indicated  that  while  there  was  no  difference  between  the 
groups at set size one and two (both p values > 0.4) there was a significant difference 
between the d’ values of the two groups at set size 6 (t (26) = 2.14 p = 0.042) and the 
difference at set size four was close to significance (t (26) = 1.98 p = 0.058).  
Paired t-tests comparing the means for each set size within the groups showed 
that  for  the  ASD  individuals  there  was  no  significant  difference  between  the  d’ 
values across the set sizes (all p values > 0.2). Within the control group, however, 
there was a significant difference between the d’ values at set size two and four (t 
(13) = 2.81 p = 0.015).  
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Response Bias 
The response bias (β) was also calculated for each participant at each set size:  
        
where  Z
2
S|s  =  normal  value  corresponding  to  proportion  of  correct  ‘CS  present’ 
responses, and Z
2
S|n = normal value corresponding to proportion of incorrect ‘CS 
present’ responses.  
The response bias did not change at the various levels of perceptual load 
(F(3,78) = 0.57, p = 0.639, ηp
2 = 0.16) and did not differ between the groups (F(1,26) 
= 0.19, p = 0.664, ηp
2 = 0.07). The interaction between group and set size was also 
non-significant: F(3,78) = 1.25, p = 0.297, ηp
2 = 0.32 (see table 4.5 for means). 
 
Table 4.5      Mean response bias (β) for each group at each set size. 
 
        Response Bias (β) 
    Set size 1  Set size 2  Set size 4  Set size 6                        . 
ASD        2.5 (2.5)       1.6 (1.5)       1.7  (2.5)      1.3 (1.1) 
Control      1.5 (1.2)       1.6 (1.6)       1.6 (1.4)      1.9 (2.5) 
 
Error Analysis 
Analysis of the CS detection error rates revealed a main effect of set size 
(F(3, 78) =15.46, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 1.00). Inspection of the means indicated that this is 
a reflection of the increasing number of errors as perceptual load of the central task 
was increased (see table 4.6). There was no main effect of group (F(1, 26) =0.03, 
p=0.859,  ηp
2  =  0.05)  –  neither  group  made  significantly  more  errors  –  and  no   92
significant interaction between group and set size (F(3, 78) = 2.28, p=0.086, ηp
2 = 
0.56). 
 
Table 4.6    Mean error rates (%) and standard deviation for each group at each set 
size.  
Mean error rate (Standard Deviation)                  
 
Set size        ASD           Control        
____________________________________________________________________
1      11.5  (9.6)            7.3  (7.5)        
2      13.4  (13.0)            9.2  (6.0) 
4      16.4  (14.6)           20.4  (7.4) 
6      22.5  (15.2)            29.8  (8.2) 
 
 
Control Block 
  All  the  participants  achieved  a  correct  response  rate  of  over  84%  on  the 
control block. Analysis of variance indicated that there were no significant effects of 
set size on the detection rates, and no group differences (all p values > 0.2). This 
confirms that any differences seen in the pattern of CS detection under various levels 
of perceptual load is not due to an underlying inability to recognise or respond to the 
CS.  
Discussion 
The results presented here provide preliminary evidence for the fact that ASD 
individuals show altered performance on a dual-task paradigm under various levels 
of perceptual load.    93
In  line  with  MacDonald  and  Lavie  (2008),  the control  individuals  in this 
study demonstrated that their ability to detect the irrelevant stimulus was dependant 
on the perceptual load of the central search task. Both the percentage detection rate 
and the sensitivity (d’) dropped as the perceptual load increased while response bias 
(β) remained constant (implying that the drop in detection rates is not due to a shift in 
response criteria). These results replicate MacDonald and Lavie’s findings regarding 
the  modulation  of  conscious  perception  by  perceptual  load.  In  their  study,  two 
different load conditions were used (high and low, set size 1 and 6 respectively) and 
the results are very similar to those found for the typical group in my experiment. In 
the low load condition, MacDonald and Lavie recorded a detection rate of 92%, a 
false alarm rate of 5% and a d’ of 3.38. Within my study, the detection rate for the 
control group was 90%, the false alarm rate was 6.3% and d’ was 3.21.  
The pattern of results in the ASD group, however, appears to be different. 
Both  the  percentage  detection  rate  and  the  perceptual  sensitivity  seem to  remain 
constant as the level of perceptual load increases; individuals detected the presence 
of the CS more often than the control individuals at the higher levels of perceptual 
load (set size four and six). 
These results varied slightly from the original predictions. It was predicted 
that the ASD individuals would show higher levels of CS detection at the higher set 
sizes – something that is indeed seen in the data. It was also predicted, however, that 
both groups would show an effect of perceptual load on the ability to detect the CS. 
This variation is not seen for the ASD group: where d’ and percentage detection does 
not change across the various set sizes. These findings and possible explanations will 
be discussed more fully in the chapter discussion.  
   94
 Experiment Three: Dual-task performance under perceptual load – mixed 
trials.  
 
One potentially problematic issue that may have arisen within the previous 
experiment concerns the use of a blocked design: where each block only contained 
trials of the same set size. It is possible that an experimental design such as this could 
allow the use of different strategies for high and low perceptual load blocks. These 
strategy differences, rather than the level of perceptual load, could be responsible for 
the effects seen on percentage detection and d’ values as the load of the central task 
was  increased.  This  issue  has  been  addressed  in  a  number  of  studies  (Brand-
D'Abrescia & Lavie, 2007; Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Macdonald & Lavie, 
2008) where the procedure is modified to create experimental blocks containing all 
trial types randomly intermixed.  
   In order to explore the possibility of strategy effects within the dual-task data 
presented above, a second version of the task was created – with all trial types mixed 
evenly across the blocks. It was predicted, in line with the findings of MacDonald 
and Lavie (2008), that this modification would not alter the results obtained: as the 
perceptual load of the central task increased, the control group would show a drop in 
sensitivity while the ASD group would show no change.  
 
Participants 
The participants were the same 28 subjects that had previously taken part in 
the blocked experiment. 
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 Methods 
  The stimuli and procedures were the same as those of experiment two, except 
that the blocks contained trials of all four set sizes randomly intermixed. The trials 
were divided into four blocks of 72 trials, containing 18 trials of each set size that 
were presented in a random order. Each of these four blocks was then further divided 
into four smaller blocks. As in experiment two, participants were permitted to take a 
break after each block.   
Results 
Letter Search 
   All incorrect trials were excluded from further analyses and an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was performed on the median correct RTs with group (ASD vs. 
control) as the between-subjects factor and set size (one, two, four & six) as the 
within-subjects factor (see table 4.7).  
 
Table 4.7     Mean reaction times (RT) and standard deviation for each group at each 
set size. 
Mean RT (Standard Deviation) (ms)                 
 
Set size        ASD           Control        
____________________________________________________________________
1      715  (195)           694  (185)        
2      779  (216)           756  (196) 
4      885  (246)           883  (242) 
6      919  (243)           924  (246) 
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As in the previous experiment, there was a significant main effect of set size 
indicating  that participants were slower to respond to trials with  higher set sizes 
(F(3,78)= 69.49, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 1.00). There was no main effect of group (F(1, 26) 
=0.02,  p=0.900,  ηp
2  =  0.05)  which  means  that  the  reaction  times  were  not 
significantly  slower  or  faster  in  either  group.  There  was  also  no  significant 
interaction between set size and group (F(3,78) = 0.32, p = 0.814, ηp
2 = 0.11).  
   
Analysis of the letter search error rates at each set size revealed a main effect 
of set size (F(3, 78) =80.02, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.76). The number of errors increased 
with the perceptual load of the central task (see table 4.8). There was no main effect 
of group (F(1, 26) =0.67, p=0.420, ηp
2 = 0.03) and no significant interaction between 
group and set size (F(3, 78) =0.23, p=0.878, ηp
2 = 0.01). 
 
 
Table 4.8   Mean error rates (%) and standard deviation for each group at each set siz  
Mean error rate (Standard Deviation) (%)                 
Set size        ASD           Control        
____________________________________________________________________
1       4.3  (8.6)           2.0  (2.5)        
2       6.1  (8.2)           3.0  (2.3) 
4      14.3  (15.5)           12.9  (6.3) 
6      24.1  (14.0)           20.6  (9.2)   97
 
CS Detection 
All  trials  with  incorrect  letter  search  responses  were  excluded  from  the 
analysis. The percentage detection rate, false alarm rate and d’ for each participant at 
each set size was calculated (see table 4.9 for group means). 
 
Table 4.9    Mean Percentage CS detection rate, false alarm rate and d’(and standard 
deviation) for each group under each condition.       
____________________________________________________________________ 
Detection Rate (%)       False Alarm Rate (%)         d’ 
      (S.D.)         (S.D.)        (S.D.) 
Set size  ASD     Control       ASD       Control            ASD       Control 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1    89.7     93.9          7.57  8.74    3.33      3.39  
    (17.0)     (9.2)        (11.2)  (9.1)    (1.2)      (0.9) 
2    89.0     90.1          7.47  10.4    3.07      3.10  
    (11.5)     (11.9)       (7.3)  (10.3)    (0.9)      (0.9) 
4    85.5     90.7           8.45  11.9    3.00      2.94 
    (21.5)     (12.9)       (8.5)  (12.2)    (1.0)     (0.9) 
6    85.4     85.9          8.53  10.9    2.90      2.67    
              (21.3)     (14.3)       (12.9)  (10.1)    (1.2)      (0.8) 
 
Percentage Detection 
A repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated that there was a significant main 
effect of set size (F(3,78) = 3.46, p = 0.020, ηp
2 = 0.76). The detection rate fell as the 
perceptual load of the central task was increased. This is in line with the previous 
experiment, and suggests that mixing the trial types has not eliminated the effect of 
perceptual load on the level of CS detection, though the effect has been somewhat   98
reduced (a reduction in d’ of 0.72 compared to a reduction of 1.47 in experiment 
two) .  
In this second experiment however, the interaction between group and set 
size was not significant (F(3,78) = 0.70, p = 0.554, ηp
2 = 0.19).  
The main effect of group was also not significant (F(1,26) = 0.26, p = 0.319, ηp
2 = 
0.08). 
 
Figure 4.7     Graph of CS detection rates.  
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Inspection of the graph indicates that, although not significantly different, the 
CS detection rates for the control group were consistently higher than for the ASD 
group  -  and  were  higher  than  the  results  for  the  corresponding  set  sizes  in  the 
previous experiment. It seems to be this shift that has led to the elimination of the 
significant  interaction  between  group  and  set  size.  However,  this  increased  CS 
detection rate cannot be interpreted as an increase in performance without first taking 
into account the number of false alarm responses made by each group. Increased 
performance is only true if the number of hits (CS detection rate) rises without a 
concurrent rise in false alarm rates.  
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False alarm rate 
There was no significant main effect of set size (F(3,78) = 1.25, p = 0.296, 
ηp
2 = 0.32), main effect of group (F(1,26) = 0.28, p = 0.599, ηp
2 = 0.08) or interaction 
between the two (F(3,78) = 0.50, p = 0.686, ηp
2 = 0.15). Inspection of the graph, 
however, shows a generally higher level of false alarm responses in the control group 
(see figure 4.8). Given this trend, it is more appropriate to consider the d’ values 
(which take into account both detection and false alarm rates) when assessing any 
difference in behaviour between the two groups.  
 
Figure 4.8     Graph of false alarm rates of each group under each condition. 
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Detection sensitivity (d’) 
The main effect of set size was significant (F(3,78) = 6.74, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 
0.97) indicating that the sensitivity to the CS dropped as the perceptual load of the 
central task increased. There was no significant main effect of group (F(1,26) = 0.06, 
p  =  0.802,  ηp
2  =  0.06).  Both  these  findings  are  consistent  with  experiment  two.   100
However, the significant interaction between group and set size was no longer there 
(F(3,78) = 0.53, p = 0.663, ηp
2 = 0.15) (see figure 4.9). 
  
 Figure 4.9     Graph of detection sensitivity to the CS for each group at each set size 
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Following the a priori predictions that were made regarding this experiment, 
one way ANOVA was carried out on each group separately to examine the effect of 
perceptual load on d’. These analyses showed that there was only a significant effect 
of set size for the typical group (F(3,39) = 4.79, p = 0.006, ηp
2 = 0.87) and not for the 
ASD group (F(3,39) = 2.22, p = 0.102, ηp
2 = 0.52).  
 
Response Bias 
  The mean response bias was calculated for each group under each condition. 
The response bias did not change at the various levels of perceptual load (F(3,78) = 
0.95, p = 0.420, ηp
2 = 0.04) and did not differ between the groups (F(1,26) = 0.47, p 
=  0.500,  ηp
2  =  0.02).  The  interaction  between group  and  set  size  was  also  non-
significant: F(3,78) = 1.12, p = 0.345, ηp
2 = 0.04 (see table 4.10 for means). 
 
   101
Table 4.10    Mean response bias (β) and standard deviation for each group  
        Response Bias (S.D) 
       Set size 1  Set size 2        Set size 4         Set size 6                         . 
ASD        1.7 (2.7)  1.7 (1.4)  1.9 (2.6)  1.8 (2.2) 
Control      0.9 (0.8)  1.9 (2.9)  1.1 (1.1)  1.5 (1.3) 
 
Error Analysis 
Analysis of the CS detection error rates revealed a main effect of set size 
(F(3, 78) =11.98, p < 0.001, ηp
2  =  0.32). This main effect  is a reflection of the 
increasing number of errors as perceptual load of the central task was increased (see 
table 4.11). There was no main effect of group (F(1, 26) =0.14, p=0.715, ηp
2 = 0.01) 
and no significant interaction between group and set size (F(3, 78) = 0.20, p=0.898, 
ηp
2 = 0.01). 
 
Table 4.11    Mean error rates (%) and standard deviation for each group 
Mean error rate (Standard Deviation)                  
Set size        ASD           Control        
____________________________________________________________________
1      9.02  (12.2)            7.89  (8.13)       
2      9.94  (7.70)            9.70  (8.04) 
4      15.1  (16.6)           12.8  (10.8) 
6      19.5  (20.7)           16.8  (12.0) 
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Discussion  
The data from experiment three demonstrate that the pattern of behaviour of 
the two groups is no longer significantly different when the trial types are presented 
in mixed blocks. Post-hoc one way ANOVA results showed that only the control 
group is showing an effect of perceptual load on detection sensitivity and hence, as in 
experiment two, that the two groups are showing differing responses. The effect of 
perceptual  load  on  detection  sensitivity  in  the  control  group,  however,  was 
significantly reduced in comparison to the reduction seen in response to high levels 
of load in the blocked procedure of experiment two. This is in line with the results 
reported in Macdonald and Lavie (2008) for the mixed trial paradigm. In my study, 
this  reduction  means  the  effect  is  no  longer  sufficient  to  produce  a  significant 
interaction in the repeated measures ANOVA. Consequently, it seems that changing 
the  method  of  trial  presentation  has affected  the  task  performance  in  the  typical 
group.  
Given that the modification to the experimental procedure was made in an 
attempt to rule out any effect of strategy differences that may arise in the blocked 
design,  it  is  possible  that  it  was  strategy  differences  which  were  leading  to  the 
difference between the two groups in experiment two. To investigate this, a further 
analysis was carried out – adding experiment type as an additional within-subject 
factor in the ANOVA. This will establish in what way the presentation methodology 
is altering task performance and will help elucidate possible strategy influences.  
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Comparing the blocked and mixed trial procedures 
  A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on the detection rate, false 
alarm rate, detection sensitivity and error rate data from each experiment - with set 
size (1/2/4/6) and experiment (mixed/blocked) as within-subject factors and group as 
the between-subject factor.  
 
Comparison of search task RT data in experiment two and three 
When the data from the two experiments were combined, ANOVA results 
indicated that there was a significant main effect of set size (F(3,78) = 38.03, p < 
0.001, ηp
2 = 0.59). Inspection of the means indicated that as the set size increased, the 
reaction times also increased. There was also a significant main effect of experiment 
(F(1,26) = 50.84, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.66): the overall RTs are quicker when the trial 
types were presented in mixed blocks (experiment three). 
The interactions between set size and group, experiment and group, set size 
and experiment and the three way interaction were not significant (all p values > 
0.05) and there was no significant main effect of group (F(1,26) = 0.03, p = 0.867, 
ηp
2 < 0.01). 
 
Comparison of RT error rates in experiment two and 3. 
There was a significant main effect of set size (F(3,78) = 102.88, p < 0.001, 
ηp
2 = 0.80) and the main effect of experiment was just non-significant (F(1,26) = 
3.96, p = 0.057, ηp
2 = 0.13). The number of search task errors increased with set size 
and  the  number  of  errors  made  in  the  mixed  experiment  was  lower  than  in  the 
blocked design. The interaction between experiment and set size was also significant   104
(F(3,78)  =  3.33,  p  =  0.024,  ηp
2  =  0.11).  The main effect  of  group  and  all  other 
interactions were non-significant (all p values > 0.05).  
 
Comparison of detection rates in experiment two and 3. 
  There was a significant main effect of set size (F(3,78) = 5.47, p = 0.002, ηp
2 
= 0.17) and a significant interaction between set size and group (F(3,78) = 3.39, p < 
0.022, ηp
2 = 0.12). This reflects the results seen in the previous analyses where the 
detection rate dropped as the set size was increased, and the fact that the perceptual 
load of the task appears to have less impact on the detection rates of the ASD group. 
There was a main effect of experiment (F(1,26) = 21.72, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.46) with 
the detection rate appearing higher in the mixed trial experiment. The interaction 
between experiment and group is significant (F(1,26) = 6.63, p = 0.016, ηp
2 = 0.20) 
and  the  three  way  interaction  between  set  size,  group  and  experiment  was  also 
significant (F(3,78) = 4.32, p = 0.007, ηp
2 = 0.14). Inspection of the means suggests 
that the experiment-group interaction is significant due the typical group showing 
higher  detection  rates  in  experiment  three  than  they  do  in  experiment  two.  The 
detection rates for the ASD group are similar in both experiments. This discrepancy 
between the two groups may well be due to a ceiling effect: the ASD group were 
already achieving very high detection rates in experiment two and therefore there 
was no potential for an increase of the same magnitude. The three way interaction 
reflects both this difference and the fact that in the mixed experiment, the ASD group 
showed slightly more effect of perceptual load on detection rates than they did in the 
blocked experiment.   105
  There was no overall effect of group (F(1,26) = 0.15, p = 0.706, ηp
2 = 0.01) 
and no interaction between set size and experiment (F(3,78) = 1.13, p = 0.342, ηp
2 = 
0.04).  
  As previously explained, it is also important to take the false alarm rates into 
account in order to truly assess the task performance on each experiment.  
 
Comparison of false alarm rates in experiment two and 3. 
  There was a main effect of set size (F(3,78) = 6.07, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.19) and 
a main effect of experiment (F(1,26) = 9.61, p = 0.005, ηp
2 = 0.27). The interaction 
between  the  two  was  also  significant  (F(3,78)  =  3.63,  p  =  0.016,  ηp
2  =  0.12). 
Inspection of the means indicated that the false alarm rates increased with set size 
and were higher in the blocked experiment. There was less impact of set size on the 
false alarm rates in the mixed experiment. The main effect of group and all other 
interactions were not significant (all p values > 0.05).  
 
Comparison of detection sensitivity in experiment two and 3. 
There was no significant main effect of group (F(1,26) = 0.07, p = 0.796, ηp
2 
= 0.07). Overall, neither group was more sensitive to the CS. There was a significant 
main  effect  of  set  size  (F(3,78)  =  13.86,  p  <  0.001,  ηp
2  =  0.35),  a  significant 
interaction between set size and group (F(3,78) = 3.82, p = 0.013, ηp
2 = 0.13) and a 
significant main effect of experiment (F(1,26) = 30.16, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.54). These 
results  reflect  the  fact  that  d’  dropped as  the  perceptual  load  of  the  central  task 
increased, d’ was lower in the blocked design and that the d’ levels dropped more for 
the control group than the ASD group as the set size was increased.  The interaction   106
between experiment and group was just not significant (F(1,26) = 4.09, p = 0.053, ηp
2 
= 0.14) and there was no significant interaction between set size and experiment 
(F(3,78) = 1.79, p = 0.156, ηp
2 = 0.06).  
There was a significant three way interaction between set size, experiment 
and group (F(3,78) = 3.15, p = 0.03, ηp
2 = 0.11). This implies that the experiment 
type is  affecting  the pattern of d’  change across the set  sizes in the two  groups 
differently. To investigate this, repeated measured ANOVA was carried out for the 
two  groups  separately.  There  was  a  significant  interaction  between  set  size  and 
experiment in the control group (F(3,78) = 3.31, p = 0.03, ηp
2 = 0.20) but not in the 
ASD group (F(3,78) = 1.01, p = 0.398, ηp
2 = 0.07). There was also a main effect of 
set size in the control group (F(3,78) = 12.66, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.49) but not the ASD 
group (F(3,78) = 2.63, p = 0.064, ηp
2 = 0.17). There was a main effect of experiment 
in both ASD (F(1,26) = 12.63, p = 0.004, ηp
2 = 0.49) and control group (F(1,26) = 
18.54, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.59). 
 
Comparison of CS error rates in experiments two and three. 
   There was a significant main effect of both set size (F(3,78) = 23.29, p < 
0.001, ηp
2 = 0.47) and experiment (F(1,26) = 14.44, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.36). The 
number  of  errors  was  greater  at  the  higher  set  sizes  and  was  also  higher  in 
experiment  two  (blocked  design).  The  set  size  by  experiment  interaction  was 
significant (F(3,78) = 3.85, p = 0.013, ηp
2 = 0.13) and reflected the greater increase in 
errors with increasing set size in experiment two.    107
Discussion 
  The results of this comparison of the data from the blocked and mixed-trial 
experiments demonstrate some interesting findings that help elucidate the reasons for 
the differing patterns in the two studies. Overall, the response times were faster and 
the number of errors was lower in the mixed-trial experiment (experiment three). The 
detection  rate  for  the  CS  was  significantly  higher  for  experiment  three  than  for 
experiment two, but this was mainly due to an increase in the performance level of 
the typical group (reflected by the significant interaction between experiment and 
group). The ASD group appear to show more impact of perceptual load on detection 
rates  in  the  mixed-trial  experiment  than  they  did  in  the  blocked  experiment 
(experiment  two).  With  respect  to  detection  sensitivity,  the  d’  values  were 
significantly lower in the blocked-trial experiment, and while the experiment type 
affected the overall level of  d’ in  both groups,  only the typical group  showed a 
significant effect of perceptual load on detection sensitivity. The interaction between 
perceptual load and experiment was also significant in the control group; there was 
less impact of set size on the CS sensitivity in the mixed-trial experiment. As was 
suggested in the discussion of experiment three, it seems to be this reduction in the 
effect of perceptual load on detection sensitivity in the control group that eliminated 
the significant difference in the pattern of task performance between the two groups 
in the mixed-trial paradigm. Macdonald and Lavie (2008) also found that mixing the 
trials resulted in a less pronounced effect of perceptual load on CS sensitivity and 
suggest that this may be due to carry over effects from one level of load to another – 
thus altering the load of the subsequent trial. Alternatively, it may reflect a strategy 
difference  between  the  two  paradigms.  Theeuwes  et  al.  (Theeuwes  et  al.,  2004) 
suggested  that  when  a  blocked  design  is  employed,  the  search  strategy  is  set   108
differently for each of the different blocks. If strategy differences were involved, 
however, it would be predicted that this would offer an advantage in the blocked 
design.  Using  expectancies  and  setting  a  search  strategy  for  each  block  is  done 
precisely because it allows the task to be performed more effectively. When the trials 
are mixed, therefore, one would expect to see an increase in the RTs and the error 
rates. The data from the comparison analyses, however, indicates that this is not the 
case. In all cases, the error rates were lower and the RTs were shorter in the mixed-
trial  experiment.  This  is  incompatible  with  the  hypothesis  that  removing  the 
influence  of  strategy  by  mixing  the  trials  resulted  in  the  elimination  of  the 
performance differences seen between the two groups. 
  After inspecting the data, what seems to be a more plausible explanation is 
that practice effects are responsible for the discrepancy between the two experiments. 
Unlike previous studies such as those by Macdonald and Lavie (2008), the same 
participants performed both tasks – and always performed the blocked experiment 
first.  In  retrospect,  this  was  not  advisable  and  seems  to  have  resulted  in  a  vast 
improvement on the second experiment. While practice effects appear to have caused 
an increase in the performance level of both groups on the mixed design, the ASD 
group were already performing at a very high level in experiment two. This may 
have led to a ceiling effect and meant that any possible increase would be on a 
smaller scale for this group. As a result, the rise in performance level has caused the 
control group performance to become closer to the ASD performance and significant 
differences between the behaviours are eliminated.  
  The comparison ANOVA results back up this hypothesis. The detection rate 
and d’ comparisons both show that the control group is demonstrating a much bigger 
rise in performance level in the mixed design. The results also show, although no   109
longer significant, the ASD group is still showing less influence of perceptual load 
on detection sensitivity than the control group. 
  Given  this  hypothesis,  it  may  not  be  appropriate  to  take  the  results  of 
experiment  two  as  an  accurate  reflection  of  task  performance.  It  is  necessary  to 
repeat  the  mixed-trial  design  with  a  new  set  of  participants  in  order  to  draw 
conclusions regarding any potential strategy influences. 
 
Overall Discussion 
Having concluded that data from the mixed-trial experiment may have been 
affected by practice or carry over effects, the conclusions drawn from this study 
regarding conscious perception in ASD will be based primarily on the blocked-trial 
experiment (experiment two).  
The results presented here suggest that while the control group’s conscious 
perception  of  the  CS  was  modulated  by  perceptual  load,  the  ASD  group  show 
consistently high detection sensitivity across all the set sizes. This resulted in the 
ASD individuals detecting the CS significantly more than the control group at the 
higher set sizes. This observation is consistent with the findings of experiment one 
where the ASD group showed increased distractibility at high levels of perceptual 
load.  It  appears,  therefore,  that  the  increased  perceptual  capacity  in  ASD  –  as 
determined by the indirect RT comparison methods – is also reflected in conscious 
perception.  
  While this increased sensitivity at high set sizes was in line with the original 
hypothesis, the demonstration that the ASD group did not show a significant effect of 
perceptual  load  on  the  detection  sensitivity  was  more  surprising.  It  had  been 
predicted that both groups would show a drop in d’ levels as the perceptual load of   110
the  central  search  task  was  increased,  with  the  ASD  group  showing  the  drop  in 
performance  at  a  higher  set  size  than  the  control  group.  There  are  a  number  of 
reasons why this trend may not have been seen.       
  Firstly,  it  may  be  the  case  that  perceptual  load  theory  does  not  apply  to 
conscious  perception  in  ASD.  The  data  presented  in  chapter  three  showed  a 
modulation of selective attention by perceptual load and hence it seems unlikely that 
this pattern is no longer seen in conscious perception. Furthermore, the d’ data shows 
that, although the trend is not significant, there is a slight drop in detection sensitivity 
for the ASD group as the set size increases. 
A more likely explanation is that the increased perceptual capacity means that 
even at set size six (the highest set size used in this study) individuals with ASD have 
not  exhausted  their  processing  capacity  and  therefore  can continue  to  effectively 
detect the CS. This is consistent with the fact that the error rates were no higher in 
the  ASD  group  –  and  therefore  individuals  were  still  performing  the  task 
successfully. It may well be the case that the central task used in the current study did 
not reach a level of perceptual load that would result in the necessity for individuals 
with ASD to exhibit early selection (and hence fail to detect the CS) in order to 
efficiently  perform  the  letter-search  task.  It  is  possible  that  if  the  set  size  was 
increased further, a more significant decline in CS detection would be observed for 
the ASD group. It is important to now carry out a further experiment with larger set 
sizes  in  order  to  investigate  whether  an  effect  of  perceptual  load  on  conscious 
perception can be observed in the ASD group.  
As with the results presented from experiment one, the findings from this 
experiment do not demonstrate enhanced visual search performance. There was no 
overall  difference  between  the  groups  in  the  response  times for  the  central  task.   111
Again, this may be due to ceiling effects at the low set sizes and an impact of CS 
processing by the individuals with ASD at the higher set sizes.  
The preliminary results presented here, however, offer the first suggestion 
that increased perceptual capacity in ASD is reflected by the increased ability to 
detect a critical stimulus at high levels of perceptual load.   
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Chapter 5: Visual Short Term Memory Capacity in ASD 
 
Introduction  
The  data  presented  in  the  previous  experimental  chapters  suggest  that 
individuals  with  ASD  have  an  increased  perceptual  capacity  relative  to  control 
individuals. This conclusion was drawn from the observation that at high levels of 
perceptual  load,  individuals  with  ASD  continue  to  be  distracted  by  irrelevant 
distractor stimuli in a selective attention task (chapter three) and continue to detect 
the critical stimulus (CS) in a dual-task paradigm (chapter four). Load theory states 
that if a central task does not exhaust perceptual capacity then elements from the 
surrounding environment will also be processed; the capacity is filled automatically. 
This reasoning, together with results from a selective attention task under various 
levels of load, has already been used to glean information regarding the perceptual 
capacity of subgroups within the typical population. Young children and the elderly 
have  been  shown  to  have  reduced  capacity  compared  to  young  adults  (Huang-
Pollock et al., 2002; Maylor & Lavie, 1998). The pattern of increased distractibility 
and CS detection under high perceptual load seen for the ASD group in experiments 
one and two (given that there was no drop in central-task performance) suggests that 
it took a greater level of load to exhaust the perceptual capacity of the individuals 
with ASD. 
   One  hypothesis  arising  from  experiments  one  and  two  is  therefore  that 
individuals  with  ASD  have  increased  perceptual  capacity.  The  aim  of  this  next 
experiment was to test this hypothesis by directly measuring a cognitive element that 
reflects perceptual capacity. Visual short-term memory was chosen as an appropriate   113
measure  as it provides  a value for  the  amount of visual information that can be 
encoded at any one time.  
 
Visual Short-Term Memory 
The term visual short-term memory (VSTM) refers to the temporary storage 
of visual information over an extended period of time and is different from both 
iconic and  long-term memory. Phillips (1974) demonstrated the existence  of two 
distinct classes of visual memory. He observed a process of high capacity sensory 
storage  (iconic  memory)  which  was  very  brief  (100ms  storage  time),  could  be 
disrupted by a stimulus mask and was tied to spatial position. Conversely, the ‘short-
term visual memory’ he highlighted had a limited capacity, showed a duration of 
600ms  (followed  by  a  slow  degradation  over  at  least  nine  seconds),  was  not 
undermined by masking and was not tied to spatial position.  
  Visual  short-term  memory  is  most  commonly  assessed  using  change-
detection paradigms. In these experiments, participants are presented with two arrays 
which are separated by a short temporal interval, and asked to indicate whether the 
arrays are the same or different. One such procedure that has been widely used by 
many research teams since its conception is the task devised by Luck and Vogel 
(1997). Participants were briefly shown an array of coloured squares which varied in 
size  between  one  and  twelve  squares.  Following  a  blank  interval,  the  array  was 
shown again. In half the trials, one of the squares had changed colour whereas in the 
other trials the sample and test array were identical. Participants were required to 
indicate whether a change had occurred. Results indicated that task performance was 
at ceiling for arrays of up to two squares, dropped slightly for arrays of three to four   114
squares, and fell sharply as the array size was increased further. One would predict 
that, once the number of squares in the array exceeded short-term memory capacity, 
the  participant  would  begin  to  make  errors  on  the  change  detection  task.  They 
therefore concluded, in line with many other studies, that typical adults have the 
visual capacity to encode approximately four items (Kahneman et al., 1992; Luck & 
Vogel, 1997; Sperling, 1960). By modifying the procedure, Luck & Vogel (1997) 
and Vogel, Woodman & Luck (2001) also demonstrated that visual memory stores 
integrated objects rather than individual features, and that verbal load does not affect 
task performance. They showed that participants were able to retain both the colour 
and the orientation of three to four objects, and that objects defined by a conjunction 
of four features were held in visual working memory just as well as single-feature 
objects.  The  capacity  of  visual  working  memory  appears  to  increase  with 
development, reaching adults levels by 10 years of age (Riggs et al., 2006).  
At this point, it is important to mention terminology. The terms ‘short-term 
memory’ and ‘working memory’ are often used interchangeably, and the distinction 
between  them  is  frequently  unclear  due  to  different  researchers  using  different 
definitions.  What  appears  to  be  the  case  is  that  they  are  related  concepts  with 
different historical origins (Cowan, 2008). Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) used ‘short 
term memory’ to reflect the cognitive components that can temporarily hold a limited 
amount  of  information  in  an  accessible  state.  Working  memory  became  a  more 
dominant term within the field after Baddeley and Hitch (1974) put forward a multi-
component model for temporary memory.  The term ‘short-term memory’ was used 
to  refer  to  the  single  store  of  information  (as  in  the  Modal  Model  of  memory 
associated with (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971) while ‘working memory’ was used to 
refer to the entire multi-component system and processes that hold and manipulate   115
information in short-term memory. More recently, Cowan and colleagues (Conway 
et al., 2002; Cowan, 1995) have aimed to clarify the confusion by asserting that 
short-term memory is a simple storage buffer whereas working memory consists of 
both a storage component and an attention component. Working memory is used to 
maintain  memory  representations  when  distraction,  attention  shifts  or  concurrent 
processing threatens to undermine them (Conway et al., 2002). Cowan also asserts, 
however, that no one task is a ‘pure’ measure of short-term or working memory. The 
more that a task requires a participant to perform effortful and controlled processing, 
the  more  that  task  will  reflect  working  memory  capacity  rather  than  short-term 
memory capacity (which would be invoked in a task that required more automatized 
skills).  
  Both terms have been used with respect to varieties of the change-detection 
paradigm (outlined above) that are most commonly used to obtain capacity estimates. 
While  some  studies  have  used  the  task  to  investigate  visual  short-term  memory 
(Todd & Marois, 2004), others consider that the results of such a task reflect visual 
working memory (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Riggs et al., 2006; Rouder et al., 2008). The 
task used within this thesis aims to provide a measure of visual short-term memory. 
Participants were asked to perform a change detection task that did not involve any 
distractors,  concurrent  processing  or  loading  of  working  memory.  An  array  of 
coloured squares (two, five, eight or twelve) was presented briefly, followed by a 
blank  delay,  a  mask  and  lastly  a  single  test  square.  Participants  were  asked  to 
indicate whether the test square was the same colour as the one that had been in that 
location  within  the  initial  array.  Examining  the  relative  performance  across  the 
various array sizes can give an indication of how many squares can be processed at   116
any one time. We consider this measure analogous to the perceptual capacity that we 
referred to in experiments one and two.  
 
Calculating visual short-term memory capacity 
While  it  is  possible  to  obtain  a  rough  estimate  for  short-term  memory 
capacity by observing the array size at which task performance drops (as explained 
above), it is also possible to calculate a more precise capacity value using Pashler’s 
probabilistic model for change detection (Pashler, 1988). Pashler reasoned that if an 
individual has a visual capacity of k items, then performance should be at ceiling for 
arrays of n squares, where n ≤ k. When the array size exceeds k, the participant can 
still  only  encode  the  same  number  of  squares  and  therefore  the  chance  that  the 
participant encoded any one particular square and can correctly detect a subsequent 
change is k/n. If the relevant square in the sample array was not encoded then the 
participant  must  guess,  resulting  in  either  a  ‘miss’  (a  change  trial  where  the 
individuals responds ‘no change’) or a ‘false alarm’ (a no change trial where the 
individual  reports  a  change).  Pashler  devised  a  formula  that  uses  the  hit  rate 
(proportion of changes correctly detected) and the false alarm rate at any given array 
size to provide a value for visual short-term memory capacity: 
k = (n(h-g))÷(1-g) 
where k is visual short-term memory, n is array size, h is the hit rate and g is the false 
alarm rate.  
 
While this equation provides an estimate for capacity, it does not take into 
account the accuracy of responses in the no-change situations. This may become 
problematic in situations where an individual has a strong bias towards responding   117
‘change detected’ and therefore achieves a high hit rate that is due to indiscriminate 
guessing rather than a true reflection of task performance. Cowan (2001) has put 
forward a revised version of the formula that also incorporates the proportion of 
‘correct  rejections’  (accurately  responding  ‘no  change’  on  no change  trials).  The 
formula now states that: 
          k = n(h+cr-1) )÷cr 
where k is the visual short-term memory capacity, n is array size, h is the hit rate and 
cr is the proportion of correct rejections. Cowan’s revised equation that will be used 
within this study. 
 
Predictions 
It was predicted that individuals with ASD would show superior performance 
on  the  short-term  memory  task  when  compared  to  control  participants.  If,  as 
suggested by the previous experiments within this thesis, the young adults with ASD 
have a higher perceptual capacity and can take in more visual information at any one 
time, then one would expect that such individuals would be able to encode more of 
the squares in the sample array. This would result in more accurate responses to the 
test square and, consequently, a higher calculated value for visual short-term memory 
capacity. This hypothesis fits well with existing work on change detection in ASD. It 
has been shown that individuals with ASD show an increased ability on spot-the-
difference tasks (Teunisse et al., 2001). Similarly, in a recent study, Smith and Milne 
(2009) showed that the participants with autism were less prone to change blindness. 
Change blindness is the phenomenon whereby unexpected changes in the visual field 
are overlooked – usually as a result of distraction such as camera angle change in 
films, luminance change or a visual saccade. When shown videos with continuity   118
errors, the adolescents with autism were significantly better at detecting the errors. A 
study by Fletcher-Watson et al. (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2006), however, failed to 
show a difference between the ability of control individuals and individuals with 
ASD to detect changes in visual scenes. Likewise, Burack et al. (2009a) also reported 
no  difference  in  performance  on  a  change  detection  task.  However,  when  task 
performance  was  related  to  the  developmental  level  of  the  participants  a  group 
difference emerged. In the typically developing group, the number of errors on the 
task decreased as the developmental level of the children increased (as measured by a 
non-verbal, visuo-spatial test of intelligence). Conversely, there was no relationship 
between task performance and developmental level in the ASD group. Given that the 
visual short-term memory paradigm used within this thesis involves detecting when 
the  colour  of  the  test  square  has  changed,  these  previous  studies  on  change 
perception may add weight to the prediction regarding enhanced visual short-term 
memory capacity. 
 
Participants 
 
Participants in this study were 16 adults with Asperger’s Syndrome and 16 
typical adults.  The participants were diagnosed and recruited in the same manner as 
in the previous experiments and were matched for chronological age and non-verbal 
IQ using the matrix reasoning sub-scale from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale for 
Intelligence (WASI) (Wechsler, 1999) (see table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1     Descriptive Statistics for each Group 
 
Group                Statistic    Age            WASI             WASI                WASI 
                      (years:        vocabulary         matrix         full scale IQ  
                months)       subtest          reasoning         (2 subtests) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
ASD (n=16)        mean    24:9               64.6               54.5      117 
12 males        S.D               4:7                5.7               10.2      13.5 
4 females        range        18:09-33:4        58-72              37-67               95-136 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Control (n=16)      mean    26:9        66.9               54.1      119 
11 males        S.D.     3:4        6.0               8.3      11.4 
5 females        range  21:5-32:8         52-74             41-66             101-137 
 
Independent  samples  t-tests  indicated  that  there  was  no  difference  between  the 
groups on any of the above measures (all p values > 0.1)  
 
Methodology 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
Visual basic was used to create computer based stimuli that were presented 
on a custom built small form desktop computer and displayed on a ProLite 15” flat 
LCD screen (1280 x 1024 pixel resolution, 2ms response rate). Viewing distance was 
60cm.  
  The stimulus arrays were composed of two, five, eight or twelve coloured 
squares that were presented on a grey background. Each square measured 0.75º by 
0.75º visual angles and was randomly positioned within a 9.8 º by 7.3 º region of the 
screen, with no less than 2º between the centre of each square. No squares were 
presented within the central 2º of the screen. The colour of each square was assigned 
randomly, with  replacement, from a choice of  black, white, red, light blue, light 
green, yellow, orange, cyan, purple, dark blue and dark green.   120
Procedure 
  Participants were told that they would briefly see a set of coloured squares on 
the centre of the screen. They were informed that these squares would then disappear 
and be replaced by one square that was in the same location as one from the initial 
array but which may, or may not, be the same colour as the square that had originally 
been in that position. They were instructed to indicate, with a key-press, whether the 
colour of the single square had changed or whether it was the same as that of the 
corresponding square from the sample array.  
  Each  trial  began  with  the  presentation  of  a  fixation  cross  for  1000ms, 
followed by the sample array which remained on the screen for 500ms. This was 
replaced by a blank screen (500ms) and then a mask (same as sample array but with 
each square filled with a multicoloured checker board pattern) for 500ms and then 
the test probe: a single square in the same position as one from the sample array with 
the  colour  either  changed  or  unchanged  (50%  of  trials  with  each  condition). 
Participants were then given three seconds to indicate whether or not the colour had 
been changed and the response time was recorded. If no response was given within 
the time limit then the trial was classified as a ‘time-out’ error. 72 trials of each array 
size were created and these were randomly mixed and presented in eight blocks of 36 
trials - with participants able to take breaks between blocks if required (see figure 
5.1).   
Prior to performing the computer based task, participants were shown a white 
piece of paper on which a sample array of five squares had been drawn. They were 
asked to name the colours (to ensure normal colour vision) and were then asked to 
memorise the colour and location of the squares. Participants were then shown a 
second piece of paper on which one unchanged square from the first array was drawn   121
and asked to confirm that the colour of this square was the same as in initial array. 
They were then shown one further example where a colour-change had occurred. 
Following successful completion of the paper examples, a set of computer based 
practice  trials  were  performed  where  participants  were  given  feedback  regarding 
their  accuracy.  The  experimental  trials  were  then  run.  There  was  no  accuracy 
feedback on the main experimental task. 
 
Figure 5.1     Time-course of experimental trials 
 
          Fixation cross: 1s 
 
            Experimental stimulus: 500ms 
 
    Blank screen: 500ms 
                     
                 Mask: 100ms 
                            
                  Test probe: 3s  
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Results 
The number of correct responses on ‘change trials’ (hits), and ‘no change’ 
trials  (correct rejections),  were calculated for  each participant at each array  size. 
These scores were then added together to provide an overall task performance score 
(see tables 5.2 and 5.3 for mean values). The number of false alarms (reported a 
change when no change occurred) was also obtained for each participant at each 
array  size.  This  provided  an  indication  of  guessing  rate.  An  ANOVA  was  then 
performed on the hit rate, the total correct response rate and the false alarm rate with 
array size (two, five, eight & twelve) as the within-subject factor and group (ASD vs. 
control) as the between subject factor. 
 
Percentage change detection 
 
Table 5.2    Mean % of changes detected on change-trials (hit rate) and standard 
deviation for each group at each array size  
                                       Mean hit rate (Standard Deviation)                  
 
Array size        ASD           Control        
____________________________________________________________________ 
2      89.2  (0.68)        88.5    (6.56) 
5      79.9  (0.93)      79.0    (1.33) 
8      77.8     (1.33)      72.4    (1.37) 
12      76.0     (1.30)      73.1    (1.16) 
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Figure 5.2      Graph of mean percentage of changes detected.  
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Analysis of the hit rates at each array size revealed a main effect of set size 
(F(3, 90) =28.56, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.45). Inspection of the means indicated that this is 
a reflection of the increasing number of errors as the array size was increased (see 
table 5.2). There was no main effect of group (F(1, 30) =0.08, p=0.784, ηp
2 < 0.01) – 
neither group made significantly more errors – and no significant interaction between 
group and array size (F(3, 90) =0.87, p=0.459, ηp
2 = 0.03). 
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Overall correct response rate 
 
Table 5.3      Mean % correct responses and standard deviation for each group at 
each array size. 
  
     Mean correct response rate (Standard Deviation)                  
 
Array size        ASD           Control        
____________________________________________________________________ 
2      87.6  (9.34)        91.2    (4.60) 
5      70.1  (12.2)      73.3    (9.23) 
8      62.5     (12.6)      66.3    (8.22) 
12      57.9     (5.14)      58.9    (8.87) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3     Graph of mean correct responses.  
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Analysis of the correct response rate for each participant at each array size 
revealed a main effect of set size (F(3, 90) =162.00, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.84). As with 
the hit rates, this is a reflection of the increasing number of errors made at the larger 
array  sizes  (see  table  5.3).  There  was  no  main  effect  of  group  (F(1,  30)  =1.15, 
p=0.2914, ηp
2 = 0.04) and no significant interaction between group and array size 
(F(3, 90) =0.37, p=0.774, ηp
2 = 0.01). 
 
False Alarm Rate 
 
Table 5.4     Mean % false alarm rate and standard deviation for each group at each 
array size.  
                             Mean false alarm rate (Standard Deviation)                  
 
Array size        ASD           Control        
____________________________________________________________________ 
2      13.5  (16.2)        5.24    (3.00) 
5      38.7  (19.2)      29.1    (13.3) 
8      51.6     (18.7)      39.5    (12.1) 
12      59.2     (10.4)      53.4    (11.8) 
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Figure 5.4     Graph of mean false alarm rate.  
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Analysis  of  the  false  alarm  rate  for  each  participant  at  each  array  size 
revealed  a  main  effect  of  set  size  (F(3,  90)  =144.36,  p  <  0.001,  ηp
2  =  0.83). 
Participants seemed to be guessing more as the array size increased (see table 5.4). 
There  was  also  a  main  effect  of  group  (F(1,  30)  =5.00,  p=0.033,  ηp
2  =  0.15). 
Inspection  of  the  means  indicated  that  this  was  a  reflection  of  slightly  higher 
guessing rates across all array sizes within the ASD group. The interaction between 
group and array size was not significant (F(3, 90) =0.62, p=0.605, ηp
2 = 0.02). 
                 
Response Bias 
Calculating  response  bias  provides  an  indication  of  whether  participants  have  an 
underlying  bias  towards  responding  ‘change’  or  ‘no  change’.  In  the  present 
experiment,  the  colour  of  the  test  square  was  changed  in  50%  of  the  trials  and 
remained the same in the other 50%. Therefore, the tendency to respond ‘change’ 
and ‘no change’ should be equal. Task instructions or demands can, however, affect 
this equilibrium. By exploring response bias, one can elucidate whether there are   127
response criteria that may be influencing the results. Response bias was calculated 
for each participant at each array size using the formula                   (see 
p.90,  chapter  four).  A  value  greater  than  one  indicates  that  a  participant  has  a 
tendency to respond ‘change’, whereas a value below one reflects a bias towards 
responding ‘no change’.  
 
 
Table 5.5    Mean response bias (β) and standard deviation for each group at each 
array size.  
 
Mean response bias (Standard Deviation)                 
 
Array size        ASD           Control        
____________________________________________________________________ 
2      1.20  (0.94)        0.75    (0.60) 
5      1.43  (0.69)      1.46    (0.65) 
8      1.86     (1.86)      1.27    (0.46) 
12      1.73     (1.16)      1.27    (0.35) 
 
Analysis of the response bias values indicated that the main effect of set size was not 
significant  (F(3,  90)  =2.71,  p  =  0.077,  ηp
2  =  0.08).  This  is,  however,  close  to 
significance  and  appears  to  reflect  a  tendency  to  respond  ‘change’  slightly  more 
often at the higher array sizes. There was no significant main effect of group (F(1, 
30) =3.88, p=0.058, ηp
2 = 0.11) but again the difference is close to significance. The 
ASD group seems a little more likely to respond ‘change’. There was no significant 
interaction between group and array size (F(3, 90) =0.72, p=0.542, ηp
2 = 0.02). 
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Capacity 
Cowan’s revised formula (see p.116) was used to calculate capacity estimates for 
each participant at each array size. The mean capacity calculations for each group are 
displayed in table 5.6 and figure 5.5.  
 
Table 5.6    Mean visual short-term memory capacity and standard deviation for each 
group at each array size.  
 
Mean capacity (Standard Deviation)                  
 
Array size        ASD           Control        
____________________________________________________________________ 
2      1.50  (0.37)        1.72   (0.19) 
5      2.01  (1.22)      2.36    (1.95) 
8      2.00     (2.01)      2.81    (1.39) 
12      1.90     (1.23)      2.36    (1.95) 
 
Figure 5.5   Graph of mean values for visual short-term memory capacity.  
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Using ANOVA to analyse the capacity estimates highlighted a main effect of set size 
(F(3, 90) =3.81, p = 0.013, ηp
2 = 0.11). This is due to the fact that the capacity value 
rose as the array size was increased. Once the number of items in the array exceeds 
capacity then the value will not increase any further and this plateau indicates the 
true visual short-term memory capacity. There was no main effect of group (F(1, 30) 
=1.9, p=0.179, ηp
2 = 0.06) and no significant interaction between group and array 
size (F(3, 90) =0.52, p=0.669, ηp
2 = 0.02). 
 
In order to compare the overall capacities of the two groups, it is necessary to obtain 
one  value  for each  participant.  According  to  Cowan,  the formula  should  yield  a 
constant result once the array size exceeds a participant’s capacity. By examining the 
graphs  displaying  percentage  hits  and  overall  correct  responses,  and  noting  the 
reduction in task performance as the array size increased, it could be deduced that an 
array of eight squares was greater than the visual short term memory capacity for 
both participant groups. Therefore, the value calculated for each participant at this 
array size was used as the overall capacity estimate (ASD capacity = 2.0, control 
capacity = 2.8, see table 5.6). An independent samples t-test indicated that there was 
no significant difference between the capacity estimates of two groups (t(30)=-1.3, 
p=0.197).    
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Discussion 
This experiment investigated, for the first time, the extent of visual short-term 
memory capacity in adults with ASD. In the results presented here, no evidence was 
found  of  any  difference  between  the  capacity  of  individuals  with  ASD  and  IQ-
matched controls. This is similar to the findings of Fletcher-Watson et al. (2006) who 
demonstrated  that  the ability  to  detect changes  was  equivalent  in  both  ASD  and 
control groups, and may also be consistent with Burack’s work (Burack et al., 2009a) 
that suggests differences will only be seen when developmental level is taken into 
account. The absence of any increased level of visual short-term memory capacity 
would suggest that the increased distraction at high perceptual load seen in ASD in 
experiments one and two is not due to increased capacity.  
  An  alternative  suggestion  is  that  the  increased  distractibility  was  due  to 
increased  working  memory  load  in  the  ASD  group.  Lavie  and  colleagues  have 
extended load theory to include the impact of working memory load and cognitive 
control  on  selective  attention.  They  suggest  that  in  order  to  direct  attention 
appropriately, individuals must maintain stimulus priorities in working memory – i.e. 
to  remember  which  stimuli  are  relevant.  Therefore,  loading  working  memory 
processes  should  result  in  reduced  differentiation  between  high-  and  low-priority 
stimuli (targets and distractors) and lead to the opposite effect from that of perceptual 
load; as working memory load increases, the extent of distractor processing will also 
increase  (de  Fockert  et  al.,  2001;  Lavie  et  al.,  2004c).  Given  the  absence  of  an 
increased in VSTM capacity, it could therefore be suggested that the increased effect 
of  distractors  seen  in  experiments  one  and  two  was  due  to  task  demands 
disproportionately loading the working memory processes of the individuals with 
ASD. Indeed it has been suggested that working memory is one of the components of   131
the executive system that are impaired in ASD (Bennetto et al., 1996; Russell et al., 
1996). This will be discussed more fully in chapter seven.  
However,  we  need  to  be  cautious  before  ruling  out  the  perceptual  capacity 
explanation on the basis of the result regarding VSTM. The VSTM task used within 
this thesis, and change detection paradigms in general, are extremely sensitive to 
small  manipulations  in  procedure.  For  example,  the  conflict  between  the  results 
found by Smith and Milne (2009) that those of Fletcher-Watson et al. (2006) and 
Burack et al. (2009a) may be due to procedural differences. The paradigms used by 
both  Fletcher-Watson  and  Burack  involved  the  presentation  of  picture  pairs  and 
participants were asked to identify what alteration had been made. It was therefore 
known that a change must be found on each trial. On such tasks, no difference was 
found between ASD and control groups. Conversely, Smith and Milne used film 
clips, only some of which contained continuity errors. Participants were informed 
that some of the clips may contain a mistake and, following stimulus presentation, 
were then asked if they had noticed anything unusual. On this task, the individuals 
with ASD performed better than control individuals; spotting more of the continuity 
errors.  
Bearing  in  mind  the  impact  of  relatively  small  task  manipulations  in  these 
previous studies, there are a number of possible explanations for my null result found 
on  experiment  four.  Firstly,  it  may  be  due  to  differing  response  criteria  in  the 
individuals with ASD. The difference in response bias between the two groups was 
close to significance, with the ASD group showing more of a tendency to respond 
‘change’  and  the  ASD  group  made  a  significantly  higher  number  of  false  alarm 
errors  (responding  ‘change’  in  ‘no  change’  conditions).  This  is  accounted  for  in 
Cowan’s equation, and leads to a reduction in the capacity estimate. This altered bias   132
may have arisen from the way in which a single probe square, rather than the whole 
array, was used to test VSTM within the task. The previous studies are split with 
regard to this aspect. Some present the whole array at the test phase (Luck & Vogel, 
1997; Riggs et al., 2006) while others present only the relevant square (Rouder et al., 
2008; Todd & Marois, 2004). The latter was selected for the task presented within 
this  thesis  as  it  ensures  that  the  amount  of  decision  making  is  kept  constant 
throughout  the  trial  types.  If  the  whole  array  is  presented  as  the  probe,  then 
participants must consider each square before being able to indicate whether any 
colour  change  has  occurred.  This  means  that  the  amount  of  decision  making 
increases with array size and the difficulty of the task increases exponentially. Using 
a single-probe test also removes any ‘grouping’ advantage that might arise in the 
higher  set  sizes.  It  is  my  belief,  however,  that  in  selecting  the  single  probe  test 
method, the nature of the task is radically changed and this has implications for its 
use with a clinical population such as ASD. This method relies on being able to 
understand that, although the single square is in a different context and presentation 
style, it corresponds to one that was presented in the sample array. The individuals 
with ASD may have been overly literal and responded ‘change’ because there was 
only one square in the test phase- rather than several squares as in the sample array.  
Secondly, the difference between the higher array sizes may have been too great. 
Due to the prediction regarding increased VSTM capacity in ASD, it was important 
to include trials with a large array. A failure to do this may have resulted in the ASD 
group performing at ceiling and therefore a true capacity value would be impossible 
to determine. The maximum array size was therefore set at 12 squares. It is also 
important to maximise the number of trials of each array size (in order to increase 
statistical power and negate the effect of sample variance as far as possible) but if the   133
overall  number  if  trials  is  too  great  then  fatigue  can  ensue.  For  this  reason,  the 
number of different array sizes included in the experiment was kept to a minimum 
(two, five, eight and twelve). In hindsight, however, it seems that an array size of 
eight is sufficient to exceed the capacity of both groups. It may also be the case that 
differences between the groups may have been evident at the point at which the 
capacity limits are just being reached. For this reason, it would be important to repeat 
the experiment using a more fine-tuned set of array sizes such as two, three, four and 
six.  
  Lastly,  a  recent  study  has  presented  data  concerning  abnormal  colour 
perception  in  ASD.  Franklin  and  colleagues  (Franklin  et  al.,  2008)  compared 
children with ASD and typically developing children on visual search and matching-
to-sample  and  discrimination  tasks  that  involved  colour  perception.  In  the  visual 
search task, participants were shown a grid of coloured squares and asked to identify 
the odd one out, while in the delayed matching-to-sample task the participants were 
shown the target design and then subsequently asked to identify the initial stimulus 
from a pair of possible stimuli. The results demonstrated that the children in the 
clinical group were less accurate at colour memory, search and chromatic target-
detection than the controls. They conclude that the ‘enhanced perceptual functioning’ 
that has been observed in ASD does not extend to the domain of colour. This finding 
was unexpected as the few existing studies in this area suggest that individuals with 
ASD process colour more readily and that colour cues can be detected more easily 
(Brian et al., 2003; Kovattana & Kraemer, 1974). Franklin’s findings however, have 
ramifications for the data presented within this chapter. A central requirement of the 
visual short-term memory task employed here was to memorise and discriminate 
between different colours and therefore indicate whether the colour of the test square   134
was the same as the corresponding square in the sample array. If processing colour is 
problematic  for  individuals  with  ASD  then  the  task  would  be  rendered 
disproportionately  difficult, and  any perceptual advantage  derived from  enhanced 
capacity would be undermined. The absence of any significant difference between 
the  groups  fits  well  with  this  idea  that,  for  the  individuals  with  ASD,  increased 
ability  and  deficit  are  cancelling  each  other  out  to  result  in  performance  which 
matches  that  of  typical  adults.  If  a  true  measure  of  visual  short-term  memory 
capacity is to be obtained for individuals with ASD, a task that does not involve 
colour perception must be used. Such a task could involve encoding a sample array 
of different shapes or squares with different fill patterns.  
  In  order to address the various drawbacks and concerns with  the existing 
methodology before concluding that perceptual capacity is not enhanced in ASD, a 
modified version of the experiment should be performed. Rather than using coloured 
squares,  a  set  of  lines  –  defined  by  orientation  –  would  overcome  any  issue  of 
abnormal colour processing. Array sizes of two, three, four and six would also allow 
more detailed information regarding the capacity of each group to be ascertained.  
  In  conclusion,  the  findings  from  the  thesis  to  this  point  suggest  that 
perceptual capacity may be enhanced in ASD. This increased level is seen both in 
unconscious  and  conscious  tasks  of  attention,  and  fits  well  with  anecdotal  and 
experimental reports of superior performance in certain areas within the condition. In 
the second part of this thesis, the research will focus on the question of selective 
attention and perceptual load in the social domain. Given that social processing is a 
fundamental impairment in ASD, this is a vitally important area of investigation.    135
Chapter 6: Selective Attention and Perceptual Load with 
Face Distractors 
 
Introduction  
The research within this thesis can be split into two parts: the first dealing 
with socially-meaningless stimuli, the second with social attention – in particular 
attention to faces. Face perception is a crucial process that enables us to interact with 
those  around  us  (Ellis  &  Young,  1988).  Processing  the  faces  of  others  involves 
recognition, an evaluation of the degree of familiarity, the gender, the emotional 
state, lip-reading and extraction of a great deal of other socially valuable information. 
The essential nature of successful face perception and processing is highlighted by 
the debilitating consequences when this process is impaired. As discussed earlier in 
this  thesis,  one  of  the  fundamental  deficits  with  ASD  is  a  problem  with  social 
behaviours. Individuals seem to fail to use information from the face such as eye 
gaze and expression, and therefore show inappropriate, if any, social interaction (see 
Spezio et al., 2007). The reason for these altered behaviours has been extensively 
debated within the literature but no consensus has yet been reached. Existing findings 
point to a dysfunction of face processing regions in the brain (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2000;  Dawson  et  al.,  2005)  and/or  a  lack  of  interest  in  social  stimuli  in  early 
childhood (Dawson et al., 2005; Grelotti et al., 2002; Schultz, 2005). The latter is 
clearly intrinsically linked to attention – with individuals with ASD assigning less 
attentional  resources  to  social  stimuli  than  typical  controls  (Klin  et  al.,  2002; 
Swettenham  et  al.,  1998).  Anecdotally,  this  is  well  documented  by  parents  who   136
report that children with ASD pay a great deal of attention to certain toys or objects 
but not to family members or contemporaries.  
With this in mind, it is important to extend the work on selective attention 
and perceptual load to include social stimuli. In an interesting manipulation of the 
perceptual  load  procedure,  Lavie,  Ro  and  Russell  (2003)  carried  out  a  further 
experiment  using  famous  faces  as  the  distractors  to  explore  whether,  with  such 
socially salient items, the extent of distractor processing would still depend on the 
perceptual load of the task. They reasoned that if face processing is automatic and 
mandatory (Farah et al., 1995; Kanwisher et al., 1997) then faces may continue to be 
effective distractors even when perceptual load is high. 
Lavie et al. (2003) designed a task that involved searching for a name (target) 
among  a  list  of  non-words  (non-target  elements)  while  ignoring  famous  faces 
(distractors) that were presented at the side of the list. The target word was a name of 
a pop star or politician and the participant was asked to classify the name and press a 
button to indicate their choice. The faces presented could either be congruent (e.g. 
the  face  of  a  pop  star  presented  concurrently  with  the  name  of  a  pop  star)  or 
incongruent (e.g. the face of a pop star presented with the name of a politician) with 
equal probability. The perceptual load of the task was manipulated by altering the 
number of non-words flanking the target (see figure 6.1).   
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Figure 6.1     Example of stimuli used by Lavie et al, 2003.  
 
 
 
 
 
This is an example of a high perceptual load, incongruent trial 
 
The results of this study demonstrated that, unlike the task with the letter 
distractors (Lavie, 1995and see experiment 1 in this thesis), there was an effect of 
congruency at all set sizes. This indicated that the faces were being processed at all 
levels of perceptual load. The hypothesis that faces hold a special status in attention 
was reinforced by a second study that employed the same paradigm but participants 
were asked to classify names of fruits and musical instruments. The results with 
these meaningful non-face items were similar to those found when using the original 
letter stimuli – the distractor processing was eliminated at high levels of perceptual 
load (Lavie et al., 2003).  
  Within  this  thesis,  the  behaviour  of  individuals  with  ASD  on  a  task  of 
selective attention and perceptual load with face distractor stimuli was investigated. 
The relevant literature on face processing will now be outlined, before discussing the 
issue of face processing abnormalities in ASD. Given that the central concern within 
this experiment is the question of whether individuals with ASD prioritise faces in 
the same way as typical adults, the bulk of the literature discussed will focus on the 
debate regarding whether faces are indeed a ‘special’ class of visual stimuli and what 
implications this has for ASD.      138
Face Processing in Typical Individuals 
The Development of Face Processing Abilities 
  In typical individuals, face processing is evident early in life. The propensity 
to look at faces in preference to other visual stimuli is evident nine minutes after 
birth (Goren et al., 1975; Johnson et al., 1991; Valenza et al., 1996). There are two 
main hypotheses regarding the mechanism underlying this seemingly innate ability. 
The ‘structural hypothesis’  (Johnson & Morton, 1991) argues that babies are born 
with a reflex-like mechanism based on an inborn representation of the human face 
that contains information regarding the configuration of the main facial elements. 
They  assert  that  there  are  two  sub-cortical  systems:  ‘Conspec’,  a  primitive  and 
experience-independent  mechanism  that  causes  infants  to  preferentially  attend  to 
faces, and ‘Conlern’, a system that is modified by visual input to allow competent 
processing  of  faces  leading  to  recognition  and  discrimination.  In  contrast,  the 
‘sensoric hypothesis’ (Banks & Salapatek, 1981; Kleiner & Banks, 1987) refutes the 
claim that there is any innate knowledge of faces and states that babies prefer faces 
because the physical properties of faces are perfectly matched to the sensoric abilities 
of newborns. Hence, faces are highly interesting compared to other visual patterns. A 
set of experiments by Valenza and colleagues (Valenza et al., 1996) examined the 
respective roles that the structural information and distribution of spatial frequencies 
play  in  face  preference.  They  showed  that  even  when  the  distribution  of  spatial 
frequencies was optimal, the structural information was the factor that determined 
the  infants’  preference,  thus  providing  evidence  in  favour  of  the  structural 
hypothesis.  
  Though very young infants already have remarkable face processing skills, 
these  abilities  develop  throughout  childhood.  It  has  been  demonstrated  that   139
performance on a task of face recognition increases between the ages of 2 and 10 
years  (Blaney  &  Winograd,  1978;  Carey  et  al.,  1980;  Carey  &  Diamond,  1977; 
Chung  &  Thomson,  1995;  Flin,  1980;  Schwarzer,  2000).  The  methods  of 
identification also evolve. Two to three year olds analyse single features and focus 
alternately  on  different  features,  five  year  olds  consistently  focus  on  a  specific 
feature and, from age six to adulthood, there is a shift from analytical to holistic 
processing  (Carey  &  Diamond,  1994;  Tanaka  et  al.,  1998).  It  seems  that  during 
childhood, the single facial features become integrated into the face as  a whole; 
allowing  better categorisation and  recognition. This shift may be due  to the vast 
number of facial representations that are acquired – leading children to discover that 
holistic processing is the best method to facilitate differentiation between the many 
different  faces  that  they  encounter.  This  dependence  on  configural,  rather  than 
featural, information in adulthood was clearly demonstrated by Young, Hellawell 
and  Hay  (1987)  who  constructed  ‘chimeric’  face  stimuli  by  joining  the  top  and 
bottom halves of different famous faces (see figure 6.2). They found that when the 
halves  were  aligned,  participants  found  it  hard  to  name  the  identity  of  the  two 
individuals. Conversely, when the halves were misaligned, identification was a great 
deal easier. It is thought that when the two halves are aligned, they produce a new 
configuration which is processed holistically and therefore undermines the ability to 
extract the information from the separate halves that is necessary for recognition of 
the famous faces.  
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Figure 6.2     Example of a chimeric face of Johnny Depp and Tom Cruise. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2a: aligned face        6.2b: misaligned face 
 
Are Faces Special? 
Much of the research into the cognitive neuroscience of face processing is 
devoted to one central question: is face processing carried out by specialised domain-
specific modules or by domain-general systems that can also process non-face visual 
stimuli?  Studies  from  behavioural,  neuropsychology,  neuroimaging  and 
neurophysiology research have addressed this issue.  
  At  the  behavioural  level,  demonstration  of  an  inversion  effect  appears  to 
suggest  domain  specificity.  Yin(1969)  showed  that  inverting  stimuli  hinders  the 
identification of faces to a greater degree than is seen with objects. It also appears 
that by inverting a face, one is forced to use a featural style of analysis rather than the 
configural process that is generally applied to upright faces. The ‘Thatcher Illusion’, 
where the face is inverted but the eyes and mouth remain upright, is clear evidence of 
this.  The  altered  face  seems  almost  normal  until  it  is  rotated  to  its  canonical 
orientation, at which point it appears grotesque and extremely altered (Thompson, 
1980).  This  inversion  effect  is  generally  taken  as  evidence  that  faces  engage 
mechanisms that are not used when processing non-face stimuli.    141
  Compelling evidence for a specific face processing system is found within 
neuropsychological literature regarding deficits in face processing. Prosopagnosia is 
a syndrome where the ability to recognise and identify previously familiar faces is 
compromised,  yet  the  ability  to  recognise  objects  is  preserved  (Bodamer,  1947). 
Prosopagnosia most commonly occurs after neurological trauma (usually bilateral 
damage to the inferior aspect of the temporal cortex, in the region of the fusiform 
gyrus (Benton, 1980; Farah, 1990) but can also result from a developmental disorder. 
Moreover, a double dissociation is seen; Moskovitch, Wincour and Behrmann (1997) 
present CK, an individual who demonstrated intact face processing skills but whose 
ability to recognise objects was impaired. Such lesion studies also play a role in the 
debate, outlined above, regarding whether any innate face processing ability exists in 
newborn infants. Farah and colleagues (Farah et al., 2000) report the case of Adam, a 
16 year old boy who, following bilateral infarction in the occipital lobes one day 
after birth, displayed prosopagnosia. The selective impairment in face recognition led 
the authors to conclude that this case was evidence for an innate face processing 
mechanism which cannot be compensated for by other neural structures – despite the 
fact that there had been many years to develop alternative strategies.     
  The  domain-specific  hypothesis  is  also  supported  by  neuroimaging  and 
electrophysiological  ERP  studies  that  have  shown  a  difference  in  the  responses 
elicited  by  face  and  non-face  stimuli  in  typical  individuals.  Positron  emission 
tomography (PET) and fMRI studies have highlighted a region in the fusiform gyrus 
of  the  extra-striate  visual  cortex  (usually  on  the  right  side)  that  is  activated  in 
response to faces – and is activated at least twice as strongly for face stimuli as it is 
for objects (Haxby et al., 1994; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Kanwisher, 2000; McCarthy 
et al., 1997; Tong et al., 2000). Termed the ‘fusiform face area’ (FFA), there is a   142
great deal of evidence that this is the primary locus of face processing. In support of 
this, Vignal and colleagues (Vignal et al., 2000) demonstrated that direct electrical 
stimulation of the right anterior inferior frontal gyrus can lead to hallucinations of 
faces.  
Using electrophysiological studies, Jeffreys and Tukmachi (1992) found that 
an early positive ERP (P190) is elicited in response to faces, whereas the responses 
to non-face stimuli were smaller and later. A negative peak (N200) that appears to be 
specific to face processing has also been identified – and is localised over regions of 
the inferior occipito-temporal cortex (Allison et al., 1994). This is consistent with the 
areas of activation observed in PET and fMRI studies.  
  The nature of this proposed specific neural system has also been explored. 
Bruce and Young (1986) suggest that the system has multiple components and may 
be  subdivided  into  subsystems  (underpinned  by  different  neural  loci)  that  are 
responsible  for  various  tasks  involved  in  face  processing.  They  emphasise  the 
distinction between processes that work on the recognition of identity, and those that 
work on recognition of expression and speech-related movement. This distinction is 
backed up by studies that seem to show that recognition of identity and expression 
can proceed independently (Ellis et al., 1990; Young et al., 1986b). These studies 
showed that familiarity and repetition priming facilitates face identity processing but 
not  face-expression  processing.    In  line  with  this  componential  hypothesis,  ERP 
studies have identified a marker of face processing called the N170 (Bentin et al., 
1996) and shown that while this response is unaffected by the familiarity of the face 
presented,  later  ERPs  (250ms  to  500ms  after  stimulus  onset)  are  influenced  by 
familiarity.  Furthermore,  an  imaging  study  by  Moscovitch  and  colleagues 
(Moscovitch  et  al.,  1997)  revealed  a  right  anterior  region  on  the  border  of  the   143
fusiform and parahippocampal gyri that is activated in response to face recognition 
but not when only simple face discrimination is required. These findings suggest that 
there is an early visual analysis phase followed by recognition mechanisms.  
  Aside from the FFA, additional neural regions have also been linked to face 
processing. fMRI and intracranial recordings have shown face-related activation in 
right  posterior  lateral  temporal  areas  around  the  superior  temporal  sulcus  (STS) 
(Haxby et al., 2000; Pelphrey et al., 2003; Puce et al., 1998). This area is suggested 
to  play  a  role  in  eye-gaze  processing  (Puce  et  al.,  1998;  Wicker  et  al.,  1998), 
extracting socially relevant information such as theory of mind judgments (Fletcher 
et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000) intention (Allison et al., 2000; Frith & Frith, 
1999) and trustworthiness (Winston et al., 2002). The anterior middle temporal gyrus 
and the orbitofrontal cortex have also been implicated: there is increased activation 
in response to famous and personally familiar faces (Gorno-Tempini et al., 1998; 
Gorno-Tempini & Price, 2001; Nakamura et al., 2000; Sergent & Signoret, 1992).  
  The  amygdala,  insula,  limbic  stystem,  sensori-motor  cortex  and  inferior 
frontal cortex (IFC) are also thought to play a role in the emotional evaluation of 
facial expressions (Johnson, 2005; Nakamura et al., 1999). Both the STS and the IFC 
belong to the mirror neuron system, a system that generates internal representations 
of the actions performed by oneself or others (Gallese et al., 2004). 
Taken together, these neuropsychological, imaging and electrophysiological 
studies provide a convincing argument for a specific distributed neural system that 
underlies face processing. Proponents of this idea go on to suggest that this specific 
face processing system is subject to its own capacity limits (Boutet & Chaudhuri, 
2001; Palermo & Rhodes, 2002). Jenkins et al. (Jenkins et al., 2003) showed that 
distraction from face distractors could only be reduced by adding an additional face   144
(rather than extra non-face stimuli) – indicating that  face processing capacity is not 
filled  by  non-face  items.  This  may  explain  how  the  face  distractors  in  Lavie’s 
perceptual load study (Lavie et al., 2003) were able to be processed at even the high 
levels of perceptual load. 
  However, the debate about faces being special is far from over. It has been 
suggested that rather than the FFA being a module devoted to face processing, it is 
responsible for ‘expert-level’ categorisation (Gauthier et al., 1999; Gauthier et al., 
2000;  Tarr  &  Gauthier,  2000).  It  may  be  that  our  vast  exposure  to,  and  hence 
extensive knowledge of, faces that leads to an extremely high level of expertise that 
sets faces apart from other visual stimuli. Studies have shown that the fusiform gyrus 
is activated when bird and car experts view examples from within their category of 
expertise  (Gauthier  et  al.,  2000).    With  this  hypothesis  in  mind,  however,  the 
question still remains as to why alphanumeric stimuli (for which we have a level of 
expertise similar to that for faces) fail to activate the proposed face-selective regions. 
Furthermore, Duchaine et al. (Duchaine et al., 2004) were able to successfully train a 
patient with severe developmental prosopagnosia to obtain a high level of expertise 
in the recognition and discrimination of ‘Greebles’ (face like stimuli) – suggesting 
that  Greeble and  face recognition rely on separate mechanisms. It  seems that, at 
present, the evidence indicates that domain-specific accounts are more likely. 
 
Faces processing as a mandatory and automatic process 
  Linked to the idea of a specialised neural network is the concept that faces are 
processed automatically. Fodor (1983) initially described specialised modules as a 
system  characterised  by  the  fact  that  it  responds  in  an  automatic  and mandatory 
manner whenever the triggering input is presented. Subsequently, neuropsychologists   145
have argued that the dedicated face module responds whenever a face is presented 
(Allison et al., 1995; Farah et al., 1995; Puce et al., 1996). However, Wojciulik et al. 
(Wojciulik et al., 1998) showed that the neural responses were somewhat modulated 
by attention; with less FFA activation recorded when the stimuli were presented in 
the periphery. 
  The  apparent  automaticity  of  face  processing  means  that,  for  typically 
developing individuals, faces seem to capture attention more above and beyond other 
visual stimuli (Ro et al., 2001; Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006). This, together 
with the idea of a separate capacity, seems to explain why individuals taking part in 
Lavie’s selective attention study (Lavie et al., 2003) were unable to ignore distractor 
faces  even  when  they  were  irrelevant  and  may  have  hindered  task  performance 
(Jenkins et al., 2002; Lavie et al., 2003; Young et al., 1986a). 
   Within  this  chapter,  we  explore  whether  this  automatic  and  mandatory 
processing of faces is evident in ASD. In order to approach this issue, the existing 
literature on face processing deficits in ASD will be examined.  
 
Face Processing in ASD 
A deficit in face processing is commonly highlighted as a component of the 
impaired  social  behaviours  that  are  displayed  by  individuals  with  ASD.  As 
mentioned above, it is thought to result from a dysfunction of face processing neural 
regions such as the fusiform gyrus (Dawson et al., 2005) or amygdala (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2000) and/or a lack of interest in social stimuli early in life (Dawson et al., 
2005; Grelotti et al., 2002; Schultz, 2005). Parental reports and retrospective analysis 
of home videos indicate poor eye contact, delayed, reduced or absent gaze-following,   146
reduced  orienting  to  faces,  lack  of  responsiveness  to  parents’  voice  and  lack  of 
spontaneous imitation (see Jemel et al., 2006).  
 
Behavioural Studies 
Behavioural techniques have been used to investigate a number of aspects of 
face processing within ASD and findings have highlighted problems with recognition 
of  previously  familiar  faces    (Boucher  et  al.,  1998),  matching  facial  expressions 
(Celani et al., 1999; Gepner et al., 2001) and immediate recognition of novel faces 
(Boucher & Lewis, 1992; Hauck et al., 1998). Klin et al. (1999) found a deficit in 
face recognition in children with ASD when compared to both typical children and 
children with pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS) 
– even when the groups were matched on both non-verbal and verbal mental age. 
This led the authors to conclude that the observed abnormalities in ASD cannot be 
due to verbal or non-verbal deficits, task demands or visual memory deficits.  While 
such studies propose the presence of an absolute deficit, others suggest that though 
face processing is abnormal and may well involve altered mechanisms, performance 
can be at normal levels. In an influential study, Langdell (1978) asked participants to 
identify the partially obscured faces of their peers. He varied which facial areas were 
masked and showed that the children with autism were poorer than controls when the 
lower regions were obscured but outperformed controls when the upper face regions 
were obscured. Therefore, despite there being no overall difference in task accuracy, 
there  was  an altered pattern  of correct  responses. This  finding  may  indicate  that 
individuals  with  ASD  have  a  deficit  in  configural  face  processing;  relying  more 
heavily  on  featural  part-based  encoding.  This  possibility  is  backed  up  by  the 
observation that the inversion effect is not as strong, or is absent, in ASD. Hobson et   147
al. (Hobson et al., 1988) showed that adolescents with ASD were superior to controls 
in identifying expression and identity of upside down faces and Tantam et al. showed 
an  absence  of  the  inversion  effect  (Tantam  et  al.,  1989).  More  recent  studies, 
however, have questioned these findings and have produced evidence of a typical 
face inversion effect in ASD (Joseph & Tanaka, 2003; Lahaie et al., 2006; Teunisse 
& de Gelder, 2003) and a typical response to the Thatcher illusion (Rouse et al., 
2004). Other studies show that ASD individuals are capable of extracting the holistic 
representation  of faces (Joseph  & Tanaka,  2003; Lopez  et al., 2004). Lopez  and 
colleagues used cued and non-cued tasks of face matching that involved both whole-
face and part-face stimuli. In the cued condition, both the group of adolescents with 
ASD and the control group showed a face recognition advantage after viewing face 
features in context rather than isolation, and showed an effect of configural cueing. 
In the non-cued condition, however, the individuals with ASD failed to process the 
faces holistically. These results go against the suggestion that there is an overall 
deficit in holistic processing in ASD (e.g. Mottron & Belleville, 1993) and rather 
conclude that holistic processing can be elicited under appropriate testing conditions.  
 
Neuroimaging and electrophysiological Studies 
Given that several neural correlates of face processing have been suggested, 
neuroimaging is a powerful tool with which to investigate face processing in ASD.  
Schultz and colleagues were the first to use neuroimaging studies to provide 
evidence of atypical face processing within this clinical population (Schultz et al., 
2000).  They  scanned  high  functioning  individuals  with  ASD  and  age  and  IQ-
matched control participants while they performed a within-category discrimination 
task that involved face and object stimuli. Overall, there was a different pattern of   148
activation in response to the face stimuli in the ASD individuals when compared to 
the control group, whereas the pattern in response to objects was similar across all 
participants. In the face task, the individuals with ASD showed reduced fusiform 
gyrus activation and greater inferior temporal gyrus (ITG) activation. This may again 
be evidence that individuals with ASD have a tendency to use alternative part based 
featural strategies to process faces and, as a result, recruit neural regions that are 
usually used for non-face object perception in typical adults (Schultz et al., 2000).  
Three other studies have also reported similar reduced fusiform gyrus activation in 
ASD (Critchley et al., 2000; Hubl et al., 2003; Pierce et al., 2001). It is important to 
note, however, that unlike patients with fusiform damage (who also have reduced/ 
absent FFA activation), individuals with ASD are generally not prosopagnosic. The 
abnormal face processing behaviour seems to not simply be a reflection of a basic 
deficit in face identification.  
Hadjikhani and colleagues (Hadjikhani et al., 2007) also observed differences 
in the activation levels of several areas belonging to the face perception network in 
ASD. These included parts of the mirror neuron system (the inferior frontal cortex 
and  STS),  the  amygdala,  somatosensory  cortex  (S1)  and  premotor  cortex  (PM). 
These regions are particularly associated with emotion perception. The mirror neuron 
system has been suggested to be the neural basis of ‘mind reading’ and empathy 
(Gallese, 2003; Leslie et al., 2004), and therefore it has been hypothesised that it is 
the basis of some of the social deficits that are seen in ASD (Williams et al., 2001; 
Williams et al., 2006). Both anatomical and functional abnormalities of the mirror 
neuron  system  have  been  recently  highlighted  in  ASD  (Dapretto  et  al.,  2006; 
Hadjikhani et al., 2006). Given that strong correlations have been found between the 
STS and other areas of the face-processing network (amygdala, FFA, PM), it has also   149
be  hypothesised  that  face-processing  is  modulated  by  the  mirror  neuron  system 
(Hadjikhani et al., 2007). Overall, it seems that although neuroimaging studies have 
shown that activation of areas involved in face processing can be found in ASD, this 
is  generally  accompanied  by  hypoactivation  of  other  regions  of  the  wider  face 
perception system.  
Electrophysiological  studies  have  added  to  the  literature  regarding  face 
processing in ASD. The differences in ERP responses to faces observed between 
ASD and control individuals have included delayed latency (McPartland et al., 2004; 
O'Connor et al., 2005), smaller amplitude of responses overall (Bailey et al., 2005; 
O'Connor et al., 2005), atypical distribution across the scalp (Bailey et al., 2005), an 
absence of right-hemisphere lateralisation (Dawson et al., 2005; McPartland et al., 
2004;  Senju  et  al.,  2005),  no  influence  of  familiarity  or  expression  on  evoked 
responses (Dawson et al., 2002; Dawson et al., 2004b) and lack of a differential 
response to upright and inverted faces (Grice et al., 2001; McPartland et al., 2004).   
  The delayed N170 face-sensitive peak in ASD has been taken as evidence of 
a  reduced  speed  of  early  structural  encoding  of  faces  (McPartland  et  al.,  2004). 
O’Connor et al. (2005) looked at the N170, P1 and occipital P2 responses elicited by 
emotional face stimuli in children and adults with ASD. The results indicated longer 
latencies of P1 and N170 and smaller N170 amplitude in adults with ASD when 
compared to an age-matched control group but no difference between the groups of 
children.  
  The atypical scalp distribution has been used as evidence of abnormal cortical 
specialisation for faces in ASD (Dawson et al., 2005). Most noticeably, the absence 
of the right hemisphere lateralisation was highlighted. In contrast, however, a MEG   150
study  showed  right-sided  activation  to  faces in  ASD  during  a  categorisation and 
identification task (Bailey et al., 2005).   
  The absence of the inversion effect has also been indicated by Grice et al, 
(2001) who reported no difference in the spectral gamma responses (oscillations in 
EEG within a 30-70 Hz frequency band) to inverted and upright faces. 
 
Gaze Fixation 
  Investigation of gaze patterns has been used to shed light on what seems to be 
an altered pattern of face processing. Abnormal gaze behaviour when viewing face 
stimuli, whether the face appears in isolation (Dalton et al., 2005), within a social 
scene picture (Riby & Hancock, 2008) or movie extract (Klin et al., 2002; Speer et 
al., 2007) appears to be evident in ASD. While watching videos of social interaction 
between actors, individuals with ASD spent significantly less time fixating on the 
eye than the mouth region. They fixated equally on the eyes and bodies, and least on 
the surrounding objects. In contrast, the typical adults generally focussed on the eyes 
of the actors. The ASD individuals also fixated to a greater extent on ‘unimportant’ 
face regions such as an ear, chin or hairline, than on internal features such as the 
eyes,  nose  and  mouth  (Pelphrey  et  al.,  2002).  Klin  and  colleagues  showed 
participants  video  sequences  and  found  that  individuals  with  ASD  looked  at  the 
actors’ mouths more than at their eyes while the opposite pattern was seen for control 
participants (Klin et al., 2002). Dalton et al. (2005) suggests that the differing pattern 
is due to a reduced interest in the eye region. They asked participants to perform 
tasks of face expression and familiarity judgements and found that while there was 
no difference in the amount of fixation to the mouth, the individuals with ASD spent 
less  time  looking  at  the  eye  region  than  the  control  participants.  This  lack  of   151
spontaneous gaze fixation towards the eyes has been echoed in a number of other 
studies (Dalton et al., 2005; Klin et al., 2002; Pelphrey et al., 2002; Riby & Hancock, 
2008). It may be the case, therefore, that the reduced FFA activation (cited above) is 
due to a failure to adequately inspect the areas of the face that are necessary for face 
identification and discrimination. Indeed, in the study by Hadjikhani et al. (2004) 
where a fixation point was used to ensure that all participants were attending to the 
stimuli  in  the  same  manner,  the  fusiform  gyrus  was  activated  normally  in  the 
individuals with ASD.  
  The abnormal gaze behaviour in ASD may well play a role in the proposed 
inability to interpret information from the faces of others – such as the observed 
deficits in joint-attention and following gaze cues (Swettenham et al., 1998).  
Emotion Processing 
  Emotion processing in ASD has received a great deal of attention within the 
literature and a full review of the extensive literature on this topic is beyond the 
scope of the thesis. Instead, a brief outline is given in order to allow a complete 
picture of face processing deficits in ASD to be obtained. Gross (2004) and Hobson 
(1986a) have put forward the hypothesis that a problem with understanding others’ 
emotion and an inability to perceive social cues in faces is the basis of the social 
deficit in ASD.  Various studies  have  highlighted  impairments in recognition and 
understanding  of  facial  expressions  in  ASD  (Celani  et  al.,  1999;  Gross,  2004; 
Hobson, 1986a; Hobson, 1986b; Tantam et al., 1989). Low-functioning children with 
autism  were  shown  to  have  a  difficulty  matching  photographs  and  videos  of 
emotional faces with appropriate drawings of the facial expressions (Celani et al., 
1999; Deruelle et al., 2004). More specifically, Pelphrey et al.(2002) found that the 
deficits were primarily evident in the processing of fearful faces, while Adolphs and   152
colleagues  (Adolphs  et  al.,  2001)  showed  that  judgement  of  trustworthiness  and 
approachability proved the most challenging. Conversely, a number of studies have 
shown intact face expression processing in ASD (Castelli, 2005; Grossman et al., 
2000;  Pelphrey  et  al.,  2002).  When  participants  were matched  on  verbal  IQ,  the 
deficit disappeared. Ozonoff et al.(Ozonoff et al., 1990) showed that the ability to 
sort and match emotional faces was equivalent to that of control children when the 
groups  were  matched  on  verbal  mental  age.  This  suggests  that  the  problems 
previously reported may have been due to the verbal demands of a task of emotion 
recognition.  Many  researchers  have  also  failed  to  find  any  impairment  in  the 
recognition of basic emotions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; 
Grossman et al., 2000).  
 
Aetiology of abnormal face processing in ASD 
When considering a possible cause of the altered face processing behaviour in 
ASD, there is a debate regarding the extent to which environment contributes to the 
face  processing  impairment  and  whether  or  not  there  is  an  innate  deficit.  For 
example, it could be that an innate lack of prioritisation of attention for face stimuli 
leads to less experience looking at faces, and consequently less specialisation of the 
face-processing mechanism. Researchers  have  analysed the early home videos of 
infants and found that the children who were later diagnosed with autism failed to 
attend to faces (Baranek, 1999; Osterling & Dawson, 1994). Moreover, Osterling et 
al. (Osterling et al., 2002) used a similar methodology to show that, at one year of 
age, infants who were later diagnosed with autism could even be differentiated from 
infants with mental retardation on the basis of how much time they spent looking at 
other people. In favour of the hypothesis that it is this lack of attention to faces in   153
ASD that could lead to a later impairment is the ‘experience expectant’ model of face 
processing by Nelson  (2001). This theory proposes  that humans  are  born with  a 
neural  system  that  is  predisposed  to  specialise  in  face  processing,  but  that  only 
through  exposure  to  faces  does  this  specialisation  occur.  If  the  system  does  not 
receive the necessary input, then there may be no development of a specific face 
processing network (Marcus & Nelson, 2001). It has also been suggested that early 
infancy is a sensitive period during which this experience of faces must occur in 
order to set up the neural mechanisms necessary for future face processing ability.  
Pascalis, De Hann and Nelson (2002) examined the ability of 6-month olds, 9-month 
olds  and  adults  to  discriminate  between  pairs  of  human  and  monkey  face 
photographs. They found that the youngest group could distinguish between both 
human  and  monkey  face-pairs  but  by  the  age  of  nine  months  the  ability  to 
discriminate monkey faces had been lost. This indicates that without experience of 
the relevant social stimuli in early infancy, the ability to expertly process faces may 
not develop. This finding parallels the work regarding a critical period for language 
acquisition and the observation that the ability to distinguish between phonemes from 
foreign languages is lost if there is no relevant input in the months after birth. The 
importance  of  early  exposure  has  also  been  demonstrated  by  Le  Grand  and 
colleagues  (Le  Grand  et  al.,  2001)  who  measured  featural  and  configural  face 
processing  in  adolescents  who,  due  to  bilateral  congenital  cataracts,  had  been 
deprived  of  visual  exposure  to  faces  during  the  first  few  months  of  life.  They 
demonstrated  that,  when  compared  to  an  age-matched  control  group,  these 
participants  were  performing  at  normal  levels  on  the  tasks  that  required  the 
processing of featural information but were significantly impaired on the tasks that 
involved  processing  configural  face  information.  Crucially,  this  configural   154
processing  deficit  was  specific  to  faces  –  no  problem  was  observed  in  encoding 
configural  information  present  in  geometric  patterns.  Le  Grand  et  al’s  findings 
indicate that exposure to faces in early months of life is critical for an individual’s 
propensity to process faces configurally. Given that a number of studies (outlined 
above) have highlighted a reduced tendency to process faces configurally in ASD, Le 
Grand’s finding has particular implications for the question of altered face processing 
in ASD.  
  If a reduced attraction to faces during infancy in ASD is indeed responsible 
for the face processing deficits, the question still remains as to why this diminished 
interest exists. One suggestion is that individuals with  ASD have an  aversion  to 
looking at the rapid motion that is inherent in faces. Grandin (1986) and Williams 
(1992), both authors with high-functioning ASD, have expressed that the darting 
movement  of  the  eyes  is  particularly  overwhelming  for  them  to  process. 
Consequently,  the  developing  neural  systems  are  denied  the  visual  input  that  is 
necessary  for  long-term  face  processing  competency  (Sasson,  2006).  It  seems, 
therefore,  that  current  literature  supports  a  synthesis  of  the  nature  and  nurture 
hypotheses  outlined  above:  neural  abnormalities  may  lead  to  the  failure  of 
individuals with ASD to pay preferential attention to faces, which in turn prevents 
the development of specialised face processing systems.  
 
Attention to social stimuli – are faces special in ASD? 
  The most relevant question to this thesis is whether faces are ‘special’ within 
ASD. The behaviour shown by typical adults on tasks  of selective attention and 
perceptual load in the presence of social stimuli (Lavie et al., 2003) demonstrates that 
face distractors are processed in an automatic and mandatory fashion – and capture   155
the attention even at the expense of central task performance. With respect to ASD, 
however, social attention appears to be altered. It has been suggested that individuals 
show an overly selective response to social stimuli (Schriebman & Lovaas, 1973). 
More  recently,  Leekam  and  Moore  (2001)  have  highlighted  an  impairment  in 
exogenous orienting of attention to social cues but not to objects in individuals with 
ASD. In an fMRI study, Bird et al. (Bird et al., 2006) showed that there was a lack of 
attentional modulation of the neural responses to face stimuli in the ASD group (i.e. 
attention to the face did not enhance FFA activation levels). With house stimuli, 
however, attention modulated the neural response in house-selective areas for both 
participant groups. The authors hypothesised the absence of attentional modulation to 
social stimuli was due to weaker connectivity between V1 and extrastriate areas in 
ASD. As mentioned above, it has also been shown that individuals with ASD assign 
less of their attention to social stimuli, and instead show a preference for non-social 
stimuli (Dawson et al., 2004a; Klin et al., 2002; Swettenham et al., 1998). In this 
chapter, these suggestions of altered social attention in ASD will be further examined 
within  the  framework  of  the  perceptual  load  theory  of  selective  attention  and 
cognitive control.  
 
Summary 
  Though the evidence regarding a face processing in ASD is mixed, it seems 
clear that altered strategies and behaviours are employed by individuals with the 
condition. Crucially, there does not seem to be any evidence that individuals with 
ASD show the same prioritised attention for social stimuli. With respect to my own 
studies, it was predicted, therefore, that for individuals with ASD, the capacity for 
processing socially meaningless stimuli would be dissociable from the capacity to   156
process social stimuli. In contrast to the neutral stimuli used in earlier studies, it was 
predicted that the proposed increase in perceptual capacity within ASD (as suggested 
by the results of experiments one and two) would not confer an advantage with face 
stimuli. It was also predicted that the individuals with ASD would not show the 
automatic and mandatory processing of the distractor face stimuli that was evident in 
the typical group at high levels of perceptual load. As a result, it is expected that the 
individuals with ASD will show a reduced congruency effect of the distractor faces 
at the higher set sizes. This prediction will be explored in the following experiments.  
 
 
Experiment Five - The Effect of Non-Famous Faces as Distractors in Perceptual 
Load Tasks 
As discussed above, Lavie, Ro and Russell (2003) demonstrated that famous 
distractor  faces  are  processed  at  all  levels  of  perceptual  load.  While  this  is 
compelling evidence for the ‘special’ status of faces, it is possible that the distractor 
faces influenced attention specifically because they were familiar, famous faces. The 
familiarity of a face has been shown to affect the way it is processed and Rossion and 
colleagues  (Rossion  et al.,  1999)  have  demonstrated  this  at  a  neural  level.  They 
examined event related potentials (ERPs) to face processing and found that while the 
N170 (a marker of face-specific processing) is unaffected by familiarity of the face, 
there are  later markers (between 250ms  and 500ms  after stimulus onset)  that  do 
relate to familiarity. On a behavioural level it was also seen that individuals show 
faster visual search for their own face (Tong & Nakayama, 1999).  
In order to address this issue, the present study used a variation of the flanker 
task used by Lavie et al. (2003) but with anonymous faces. The effect of perceptual   157
load  on  processing  non-famous  distractor  faces  could  therefore  be  assessed. 
Participants were asked to perform a central task that involved classifying names 
based on gender while ignoring male and female distractor faces.  
 
Methods  
Participants.   
20 young adults between the ages of 21 and 29 years took part in the study. 
All had normal, or corrected to normal vision. 
 
Table 6.1     Descriptive Statistics for Participants 
                 Statistic    Age            WASI             WASI                WASI 
                      (years:        vocabulary         matrix         full scale IQ  
                months)       subtest          reasoning         (2 subtests) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
[n=20]         mean    26:5               65.7               58.8      122 
6 females        S.D               2:4                6.9                6.1      10.4 
14 males        range        21:5-29:9        52-74                47-67               101-137 
 
Stimuli. 
As with the previous experiments, Visual Basic was used to create computer 
based stimuli that were presented on a custom built small form desktop computer and 
displayed  on a  ProLite 15” flat  LCD screen (1280 x  1024 pixel resolution,  2ms 
response rate). Viewing distance was 60cm.  
Stimuli were presented in black against a grey background. Following the 
presentation of a fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 500ms, a target name 
was presented in centre of the screen. In order to manipulate the perceptual load of 
the task, the name would be presented alone (set size one) or among a list of one,   158
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three or five non-words (set sizes two, four and six respectively). In each trial, a 
distractor face measuring 4.1 º x 3.3 º visual angles was presented at the side of the 
list of words, 5º from fixation. These distractor faces were either congruent (same 
sex as the target name) or incongruent (opposite sex as target name). Four blocks of 
192 trials were created with each set size and distractor condition appearing equally. 
For  set  sizes  two  and  four,  the  position  of  the  target  within  the  list  was 
counterbalanced. A set of six male and six female forenames were used as the target 
words and a set of twelve non-words  were used as the non-target elements. The 
names and non-words were matched in length and varied between four and seven 
letters (see appendix II).   
 
Figure 6.3      Examples of stimuli used in experiment five 
 
Example  of  a  compatible  trial 
with high perceptual load.    
 
 
 
Example of an incongruent trial 
with low perceptual load. 
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Procedure. 
Participants were instructed to ignore the faces and to indicate whether the 
name presented was male or female by pressing a key (X or M respectively). The 
relevant buttons were labelled accordingly. Following a set of five practice trials, 
with feedback, the participants completed the four experimental blocks and were able 
to take breaks between blocks if required. Every response was followed by a 1000ms 
inter-trial  interval  and  incorrect  responses  elicited  a  brief  computer  tone.  The 
accuracy and response time for each trial was recorded by the computer program and 
subsequent comparison of reaction times for the two distractor trial types within high 
and low load conditions allowed the influence of distractors to be ascertained (see 
figure 6.4).  
 
Figure 6.4     Time course of experimental trials. 
 
          Fixation cross: 500ms 
 
Experimental display: until response  
                 
 
              Inter-trial interval: 1000ms 
 
 
Results 
For  each  participant,  the  median  reaction  times  for  correct  responses  to 
congruent and incongruent trials at each set size were calculated (see table 6.2).  
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Table  6.2  Overall  mean  median  RTs  (ms)  and  standard  deviations  (SD)  under 
congruent (cong.) and incongruent (incong.) distractor conditions at each set size 
 
       Set size 1           Set size 2           Set size 4                 Set size 6          
                     cong  incong.        cong  incong.       cong  incong.           cong  incong. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Mean RT       569       596          634        661            826       869          1064      1098 
 (SD)             (50)     (59)          (58)       (61)          (101)    (117)          (122)    (113) 
 
 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was then performed on these values. There 
was a main effect of set size (F (3,57)=369.05, p < 0.001, ηp
2 =  0.95) and a main 
effect of distractor congruency (F (1,19) =13.95, p = 0.001, ηp
2 =  0.42). Inspection of 
these results revealed that the significant effects reflect the fact that reaction times 
increased  with  set  size  (as  the  task  became  more  difficult)  and  were  longer  for 
incongruent trials (see figure 6.5). 
Figure 6.5     Median reaction times for each trial condition. 
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There  was  no  interaction  between  set  size  and  distractor  congruency  (F 
(3,57)=0.40, p = 0.673, ηp
2 =  0.02) indicating that the congruency effect did not vary 
with set size (see figure 6.6). 
 
Figure 6.6 Difference in reaction times between incongruent and congruent trials 
(congruency effect) for each set size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-hoc t-tests indicated that there was a significant congruency effect at all set sizes 
(set size one (t(19)= 3.27, p=0.004) set size two (t(19)=3.98, p=0.001) set size four 
(t(19)= 2.98, p=0.008) set size six (t(19) = 2.48, p=0.023)). 
 
Discussion 
The results echo those of Lavie et al. (2003) where familiar famous faces 
were  used.    Our  findings  show  that  even  with  unfamiliar  faces,  distractor  faces 
continued to be processed in high perceptual load situations. 
This  study  has  demonstrated  that  when  anonymous  faces  are  used  as 
distractors in a flanker experiment, the extent to which they are processed is not 
modulated by the perceptual load of the central task. In even the high load conditions   162
(set size four and six) there is a congruency effect – with incongruent trials eliciting 
longer response times than congruent trials. This confirms that the pattern of results 
seen by Lavie et al. (2003) was not simply an artefact of the use of famous faces. The 
data from this study also adds to the body of evidence indicating that faces are not 
processed in the same way as other stimuli. Given that previous research has shown 
that meaningful non-face distractor items do not affect reaction times at set sizes of 
four and six, it seems that irrelevant distractor faces are processed even in situations 
within which there would be no interference from non-face items.  
The adaptation of the famous face flanker task into one involving anonymous 
faces  also  has  useful  implications.  The  task  no  longer  has  a  world-knowledge 
component. This makes it more accessible to participants who may have a reduced 
level of world-knowledge. This task can therefore be used to assess the nature of 
face-processing with respect to perceptual load in individuals with ASD.   
 
Experiment Six - Faces as distractor elements in a task of selective attention 
with ASD. 
 
  In the previous experiment, it was established that anonymous face distractors 
are processed at all levels of perceptual load in typical adults. This is similar to the 
findings  by  Lavie  et  al.(2003)  concerning  the  processing  of  famous  faces  under 
various  levels  of  perceptual  load.  Given  that  the  new  paradigm  developed  in 
Experiment five  no longer has the world-knowledge component, and is therefore 
suitable for use with a clinical population, it was used to examine selective attention 
and  perceptual  load  in  ASD.  Based  on  the  observed  social  deficits  within  the 
condition, it was predicted that individuals with ASD would not show an increased   163
capacity for face distractors when compared with control participants. This would be 
in  contrast  to  the  increased  capacity  for  neutral  stimuli  that  was  highlighted  in 
experiments one, two and three.   
Methods 
Participants.   
16  young  adults  with  ASD  and  16  control  adults  took  part  in  the  study. 
Participants were matched on non-verbal IQ (WASI) and reading ability was verified 
using the National Adult Reading Test (NART).  
 
 
Table 6.3 Descriptive Statistics for each Group 
 
Group       Statistic    Age            WASI          WASI             WASI           NART 
           (years:         vocabulary      matrix      full scale IQ  
       months)       subtest       reasoning      (2 subtests) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
ASD  
(n=16)         mean    23:8              63.1          52.1          113        18.7 
10 males      S.D            4:0               5.7           9.1          12.0         5.8 
6 females     range    18:8-33:7          54-72           37-67       95-136             10-28 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Control  
(n=16)         mean    26:8              64.6            57.9               120         15.7 
11 males      S.D     2:5       7.4             6.6         11.6         6.4 
5 females     range    21:5-29:9         52-74           41-67       101-138           7-27 
 
Independent samples t-tests showed that the WASI and NART scores of the two 
groups were not significantly different (all p values > 0.05).  
 
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
  The stimuli and procedure were identical to those used in Experiment five.    164
 
Results 
The median correct RT and error rates for each distractor condition at set size 
one,  two,  four  and  six  were  calculated.  All  incorrect  trials  were  excluded  from 
further analyses. For each participant, the median reaction times for correct responses 
to congruent and incongruent trials at each set size were calculated (see table 6.4) 
 
Table 6.4     Overall mean median RTs (ms) and standard deviations (SD) for the 
two groups under congruent (cong.) and incongruent (incong.) distractor conditions 
at each set size. 
 
      Set size 1                   Set size 2            Set size 4                 Set size 6__          
cong  incong.              cong  incong.           cong  incong.       cong  incong.                 
    mean RT         mean RT                 mean RT          mean RT 
                     (SD)             (SD)          (SD)                     (SD) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
ASD     702       749         803        852             1086       1096         1356      1317 
              (231)     (200)             (235)     (322)           (303)        (362)        (345)   (377) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Control  574       607              651         676              848      885            1088      1126 
              (68.7)     (95.2)           (110)      (108)           (167)   (138)            (172)   (155)                             
 
 
 
An  analysis  of  variance  (ANOVA)  was  performed  on  the  mean  median 
correct  RTs  with  group  (ASD  vs.  control)  as  the  between-subjects  factor  and 
distractor congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and set size (one, two, four & six) 
as within-subject factors.  
There was a main effect of set size (F (3,90)= 369.69, p<0.001, ηp
2 = 0.93) 
and a main effect of distractor congruency (F (1,30)=11.94, p = 0.002, ηp
2 =0.29). 
Inspection of these results revealed that reaction times increased with set size (as the   165
task became more difficult) and were longer for incongruent trials. The main effect 
of congruency did not interact with set size (F (3,90)=2.03, p=0.116, ηp
2 = 0.06 or 
group (F (3,90)=1.27, p=0.268, ηp
2 = 0.04). There was also no significant interaction 
between set size and group (F (3,90)=3.09, p=0.063, ηp
2 = 0.09). 
There was a main effect of group (F(1,30)= 10.88, p=0.003, ηp
2 = 0.27) due 
to generally slower reaction times of the ASD participants. 
The three-way interaction between group, set size and distractor congruency 
was also significant (F (3,90) =3.22, p = 0.039, ηp
2 = 0.10) indicating that the two 
groups are showing different congruency effects at the various set sizes (see figure 
6.7). 
 
Figure 6.7    Congruency effects of each group at each set size  
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Post hoc t-tests were used  to further investigate  the  significant three  way 
interaction. In the control group, there was a significant effect of congruency at all   166
set sizes (set size one (t(15)=3.06, p=0.008) set size two (t(15)=4.32, p=0.01) set size 
four (t(15)=2.5, p=0.026) set size six (t(15) =2.27, p=0.039)).  
In the ASD group, there was significant effect of congruency at set size one 
(t(15)=3.97,  p=0.001)  and  two  (t(15)=3.26,  p=0.005)  but  not  for  set  size  four 
(t(15)=0.68, p=0.509) or six (t(15) = -0.84, p=0.414). 
 
Accuracy Data 
Analysis of variance was performed on the number of errors for each group 
across each condition (see table 6.5 for absolute values). 
 
Table 6.5  Accuracy rates (proportion correct) and standard deviations (SD) for the 
two groups under congruent (cong.) and incongruent (incong.) distractor conditions 
at each set size. 
 
 
     Set size 1               Set size 2__             Set size 4                 Set size 6__          
            cong.   incong.         cong.   incong.            cong.   incong.       cong.   incong.
      Accuracy                Accuracy              Accuracy         Accuracy 
                  (SD)          (SD)                 (SD)                     (SD) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
ASD       0.948      0.943         0.948     0.945         0.979     0.956          0.956     0.971      
              (0.047)   (0.052)     (0.054)   (0.069)       (0.043)  (0.058)       (0.044)  (0.039) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Control   0.927    0.945  0.956     0.919           0.948    0.943         0.961     0.948      
              (0.076)  (0.045)       (0.041)   (0.086)       (0.047)  (0.037)      (0.057)  (0.202)                             
 
 
There were no significant main effects or interactions between the error rates 
for  both  groups  under  each  condition  (all  p  values  >  0.05).  The  error  rates  are 
consistently low across all conditions for both participants with ASD and control 
participants.    167
Discussion 
  The  results  from  this  experiment  show  that,  in  a  task  involving  selective 
attention  and  perceptual  load,  the  impact  of  distractor faces  is  very  different for 
typical adults and adults with ASD. Whereas typical adults continue to be distracted 
at all set sizes, ASD individuals show the same pattern with face distractors as was 
seen with neutral letter distractors in experiment one. When the perceptual load of 
the central task is increased, the individuals with ASD seem not to be processing the 
face distractors; there is no congruency effect observed.  
It appears, however, that the participants with ASD are not ignoring the faces 
entirely. They show an effect of distractor congruency on response times at low set 
sizes but  this effect  disappears  at  the  higher  set sizes. The implications of these 
results will be discussed in the overall chapter discussion.  
 
Experiment Seven - Selective Attention and Perceptual Load with Musical 
Instrument Distractors.  
  In order to truly determine whether any a ‘special’ response is seen to face 
distractors  at  various  levels  of  perceptual  load,  the  results  from  the  previous 
experiment must be compared to data from an equivalent task involving meaningful 
non-face  distractors.  The  paradigm  in  experiment  one  (using  neutral  letter 
distractors) is not sufficient for this purpose as the task demands and procedure were 
very different from those used in experiment six. Instead, a control task identical in 
structure to experiments five and six but that uses pictures of musical instruments 
was employed. Participants were asked to classify the name of an instrument (string 
or wind) while ignoring pictures of the instruments that flanked the words. By using 
photographs of musical instruments, the distractors are meaningful, of similar visual   168
complexity to faces and require subordinate category discrimination. In this way, the 
impact of face stimuli on selective attention can be more accurately ascertained.    
 
Methods 
Participants 
  14  young  adults  with  ASD  and  14  control  adults  took  part  in  the 
study. Participants were matched on non-verbal IQ (WASI) and reading ability was 
verified using the National Adult Reading Test (NART) (see table 6.6).  
 
Table 6.6     Descriptive Statistics for each Group 
 
Group       Statistic    Age            WASI          WASI             WASI              NART 
           (years:         vocabulary      matrix      full scale IQ  
       months)       subtest       reasoning      (2 subtests) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
ASD  
(n=14)         mean    24:8              64.4          54.4          117        16.6 
11 males      S.D            4:9               6.9           10.5          14.9         5.5 
3 females     range    19:8-33:7          54-76           37-67         95-138             8-25 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Control  
(n=16)         mean    26:1              65.0            52.1               116         15.7 
10 males      S.D     2:9       6.7             8.2         11.3         6.9 
4 females     range    21:5-31:2         59-71           41-65       101-133           7-27 
 
Independent samples t-tests verified that there was no difference between the groups 
on these measures (all p values > 0.4). 
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
The experimental paradigm was similar to that of experiment six, but the 
male and female names and face distractors were replaced by the names of wind or   169
stringed musical instruments and corresponding pictures. Stimuli were presented in 
black against a grey background. Following the presentation of a fixation cross in the 
centre of the screen for 500ms, then name of a target instrument was presented in 
centre of the screen. The target could be one of six wind instruments (clarinet, horn, 
saxophone, trombone, trumpet, tuba) or one of six stringed instruments (banjo, bass, 
cello, guitar, harp, violin). In order to manipulate the perceptual load of the task, the 
name would be presented alone (set size one) or among a list of one, three or five 
non-words (set sizes two, four and six respectively). A set of twelve non-words were 
used as the non-target elements. The names and non-words were matched in length.  
In each trial, a distractor instrument measuring 4.1 º x 3.3 º visual angles (identical 
size to face distractor from experiment six) was presented at the side of the list of 
words, 5º from fixation. These distractor instruments were either congruent (same 
instrument class as the target name) or incongruent (opposite instrument class to the 
target name). Four blocks of 192 trials were created with each set size and distractor 
condition appearing equally. For set sizes two and four, the position of the target 
within the list was counterbalanced (see figure 6.8). Following the completion of the 
experimental trails, the pictures of the instruments were presented to each participant 
and they were asked to both name the instrument and indicate which group (string or 
wind)  it  belonged  to.  This  was  to  ensure  that  all  participants  had  the  relevant 
knowledge  to  meaningfully  complete  the  task  (see  appendix  III  full  set  of 
experimental stimuli).   
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Figure 6.8     Example of stimuli used in Experiment seven 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example of a congruent trial with high perceptual load 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example of an incongruent trial with low perceptual load 
 
 
 
Results 
The median correct RT and error rates for each distractor condition at set size 
one,  two,  four  and  six  were  calculated.  All  incorrect  trials  were  excluded  from 
further analyses. For each participant, the median reaction times for correct responses 
to congruent and incongruent trials at each set size were calculated (see table 6.7) 
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Table 6.7   Overall mean RTs (ms) and standard deviations (SD) for the two groups 
under congruent (cong.) and incongruent (incong.) distractor conditions at each set 
size. 
 
          Set size 1              Set size 2           Set size 4                   Set size 6__          
              cong  incong.         cong  incong.           cong  incong.            cong  incong.  
                 mean RT     mean RT            mean RT          mean RT 
                      (SD)          (SD)               (SD)                      (SD) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
ASD     730       827            897        924            1154       1151            1420     1436 
             (103)     (107)          (211)     (159)          (272)       (196)            (273)   (253) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Control   731       841           822         856           1060     1109             1344      1382 
             (143)     (206)          (139)      (139)         (170)     (198)             (205)   (244)                             
 
 
 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the median correct RTs 
with  group  (ASD  vs.  control)  as  the  between-subjects  factor  and  distractor 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and set size (one, two, four & six) as within-
subject factors.  
There was a main effect of set size (F (3,84)= 322.50, p<0.001, ηp
2 = 0.92) 
and a main effect of distractor congruency (F (1,28)=31.88, p < 0.001, ηp
2 =0.53). 
These significant effects reflect the fact that reaction times increased with set size (as 
the task became more difficult) and were longer for incongruent trials. The main 
effect of congruency did not interact with group (F (3,84)=0.18, p=0.671, ηp
2 = 0.01). 
There was also no significant interaction between set size and group (F (3,84)=0.94, 
p=0.427, ηp
2 = 0.03). There was, however, a significant interaction between set size 
and congruency (F (3,84)=3.11, p=0.031, ηp
2 = 0.10). As in experiment one, this is a 
reflection of the fact that there is a congruency effect at low set sizes (when the 
perceptual load of the task is low) but not at higher set sizes.    172
There  was  no main effect of group  (F(1,28)=  0.76, p=0.392, ηp
2 = 0.03); 
overall, both groups were performing the task at a similar speed. 
The three-way interaction between group, set size and distractor congruency 
was not significant (F (3,84) =0.05, p = 0.984, ηp
2 < 0.01) indicating that the two 
groups are showing the same pattern of congruency effects at the various set sizes 
(see figure 6.9). 
 
 
Figure 6.9     Graph of congruency effects for each group at each set size 
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It appears that both groups display an effect of distractor type at the lower set sizes, 
which then disappears as the perceptual load of the task increased.  
 
Accuracy Data 
Analysis of variance was performed on the number of errors for each group 
across each condition (see table 6.8 for absolute values). 
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Table 6.8   Accuracy rates (proportion correct) and standard deviations (SD) for the 
two groups under congruent (cong.) and incongruent (incong.) distractor conditions 
at each set size. 
 
 
      Set size 1                 Set size 2             Set size 4                  Set size 6__          
           cong.   incong.             cong.   incong.         cong.   incong..       cong.   incong..
       Accuracy     Accuracy      Accuracy           Accuracy 
                    (SD)           (SD)         (SD)             (SD) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
ASD   0.976      0.920            0.917     0.935         0.964     0.961          0.979   0.958      
           (0.035)   (0.101)         (0.126)   (0.084)       (0.065)  (0.060)       (0.036) (0.057) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Control   0.973    0.884   0.958     0.949           0.967    0.949         0.967     0.961      
              (0.031)  (0.066)       (0.046)   (0.047)       (0.041)   (0.052)      (0.059) (0.042)                             
 
 
An ANOVA was performed on the accuracy data and revealed a main effect 
of set size (F (3,78)= 5.83, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.18) and a main effect of distractor 
congruency (F (1,26)=9.43, p = 0.005, ηp
2 =0.27). Inspection of these results revealed 
that the error rates were higher for the lower set sizes and for incongruent trials. The 
latter observation is logical, while the idea of more errors being made at lower set 
sizes is a little counterintuitive. It may be that because the incongruent distractors are 
being processed at the lower set sizes, they are negatively influencing the responses. 
There was a significant interaction between congruency and set size (F (3,78)=7.90, 
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.23). In line with the reasoning regarding the main effect of set size, 
this reflects a greater number of errors in the incongruent trials vs. congruent trials at 
the lower set sizes. There was no significant interaction between set size and group 
(F (3,78)=2.85, p=0.055, ηp
2 = 0.10 or between congruency and group (F(1,26)=0.98, 
p=0.331, ηp
2 = 0.04).   174
There was no main effect of group (F(1,26) <0.01, p > 0.999, ηp
2 < 0.01) due 
to generally slower reaction times of the ASD participants. 
The three-way interaction between group, set size and distractor congruency 
was not significant (F (3,78) =0.76, p = 0.520, ηp
2 = 0.03) indicating that the two 
groups  are  not  showing  a  different  pattern  of  error  rates  across  the  various 
conditions. 
 
Comparing distractor interference from face and instrument distractors 
The results from this last experiment can be displayed along side the results 
from experiment six to illustrate the relative performance on the tasks involving face 
and musical instrument distractors. For each group (ASD and control) the results 
from the 16 individuals who participated in experiment six (face distractor task) and 
the results from the 14 individuals who participated in experiment seven (instrument 
distractor task) were compared.  
 
ASD group 
  The behaviour of the ASD group was similar for both the face and musical 
instrument distractor tasks. There was an effect of both distractor types at the lower 
set sizes but not at the high set sizes (see figure 6.10). 
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Figure 6.10   Graph to show congruency effect of face and instrument distractors in 
ASD group. 
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It appears from the graph (and the analysis of the previous experiments) that 
the behaviour of the participants with ASD is similar for both the face and instrument 
tasks. In order to confirm this statistically, an ANOVA was performed on the median 
correct  RTs  with  task  (face  vs.  instrument)  as  the  between-subjects  factor  and 
distractor congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and set size (one, two, four & six) 
as within-subject factors.  
There was a main effect of set size (F (3,84)= 260.30, p<0.001, ηp
2 = 0.90) 
and a main effect of distractor congruency (F (1,28)=11.70, p = 0.002, ηp
2 =0.30). 
Inspection of these results revealed that reaction times increased with set size (as the 
task  became  more  difficult)  and  were  longer  for  incongruent  trials.  There  was a 
significant interaction between set size and congruency (F (3,84)=4.34, p=0.007, ηp
2 
= 0.13). This reflects the fact that there was an effect of distractor congruency at the 
lower  set  sizes  but  not  at  the  higher  ones.  There  was  no  significant  interaction 
between set size and task (F (3,84)=0.49, p=0.691, ηp
2 = 0.02, or between congruency 
and task (F (3,84)=2.27, p=0.143, ηp
2 = 0.08).    176
There was no main effect of task (F(1,28)= 0.47, p=0.501, ηp
2 = 0.02) due to 
generally slower reaction times of the ASD participants. 
The three-way interaction between group, set size and distractor congruency 
was also not significant (F (3,84) =1.38, p = 0.254, ηp
2 = 0.05) confirming that the 
ASD  participants are not  showing  different congruency  effects at the  various set 
sizes on the two separate tasks. 
 
Control group 
 
Comparison of control group’s performance on the face and instrument distractor 
tasks highlights the markedly different behaviour that in seen in response to these 
two classes of stimuli (See figure 6.11). There is a congruency effect across all set 
sizes when faces are used as distractors, but when musical instruments were used the 
congruency effect that was present at low set sizes was eliminated as the perceptual 
load of the task increased. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11   Graph of congruency effects seen in the control group for face and 
instrument distractor tasks.   177
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As with the ASD group, an ANOVA was performed on the median correct 
RTs  with task  (face vs.  instrument) as  the  between-subjects  factor and  distractor 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and set size (one, two, four & six) as within-
subject factors.  
There was a main effect of set size (F (3,87)= 581.60, p<0.001, ηp
2 = 0.95) 
and a main effect of distractor congruency (F (1,29)=28.00, p < 0.001, ηp
2 =0.49). 
Overall, for both face and instrument tasks, the reaction times increased with set size 
(as the task became more difficult) and were longer for incongruent trials. There was 
a significant interaction between set size and task (F (3,87)=3.57, p=0.017, ηp
2 = 0.11 
or  group  (F  (3,90)=1.27,  p=0.268,  ηp
2  =  0.04).  There  was  also  a  significant 
interaction between set size and distractor congruency (F (3,87)=3.71, p=0.015, ηp
2 = 
0.11). Overall, across the tasks there was a greater congruency effect at the lower set 
sizes.  There  was  no  interaction  between  congruency  and  task  (F  (3,87)=0.62, 
p=0.436, ηp
2  =  0.02); incongruent  trials were responded to more slowly than the 
congruent trials in both tasks.   178
There was a main effect of task type (F(1,29)= 32.35, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.53). 
Inspection  of  the  means  showed  that  this  is  due  to  the  response  times  on  the 
instrument task being longer than those on the face task.  
Crucially, the three-way interaction between group, set size and distractor 
congruency was also significant (F (3,87) =4.27, p = 0.007, ηp
2 = 0.13). This reflects 
what  can  be  seen  on  the  graph  (see  figure  6.11)  and  indicates  that  there  is  a 
significantly different pattern of congruency across the various set sizes on the two 
tasks.  
Post hoc ANOVA indicated that this three-way interaction is due to the fact 
that there is an interaction between set size and congruency in the instrument task (F 
(3,39) =4.28, p = 0.011, ηp
2 = 0.25 but not in the face task (F (3,48) =0.68, p = 0.569, 
ηp
2 = 0.04).  
 
 
Discussion 
  The findings from this experiment, where pictures of meaningful non-social 
stimuli were used as distractor stimuli, provide crucial information that can be used 
to reference behaviour on tasks involving social stimuli. On the musical instrument 
task the typical adults showed an effect of distractor congruency that was modulated 
by perceptual load of the central task. While the pictures were processed at the lower 
set sizes, they appear to be ignored as the perceptual load of the task increased. This 
pattern of responses was also seen in the ASD group, where individuals showed a 
distractor congruency effect that was extinguished at higher set sizes.  
  The real value of this data, however, is as a control baseline with which to 
contrast the results from experiment six (face distractor task). A distinct difference is 
seen between the behaviour of the typical participants on the face and instrument   179
tasks.  On  the  latter,  individuals  seem  able  to  disregard  the  distractors  when  the 
perceptual load of the task is sufficiently high. Conversely, the face distractors are 
processed – and impact on response times – irrespective of perceptual load level. 
This disparity was shown to be statistically significant. 
  The same distinction between the impact of social and non-social distractors 
is not seen within the ASD group. On both tasks, individuals with ASD seem to only 
process the distractor stimuli when the perceptual load of the central task is low. 
These findings will be fully discussed subsequently.   
Overall Discussion 
 
  The results from the three experiments presented within this chapter can be 
used to draw a number of conclusions regarding the processing of social distractor 
stimuli.  Firstly,  it  was  confirmed  that  anonymous  faces  capture  the  attention  of 
typical adults at all levels of perceptual load. This is consistent with the findings that 
Lavie and colleagues (Lavie et al., 2003) report concerning selective attention under 
various levels of perceptual load in the presence of famous face distractors.  
  Within this thesis, by using a paradigm with anonymous faces and asking 
participants to classify names based only on gender rather than identity, the world-
knowledge component of the task was removed. This allows it to be used with a 
clinical population such as ASD where a typical level of world knowledge cannot be 
assumed.  
  In experiments 6 and 7, the performance of individuals with ASD and typical 
individuals on this task and a control task involving musical instrument distractors 
was examined. The results of the typical adults were similar to those reported by 
Lavie et al. (2003); the congruency effect of instrument distractors was eliminated at   180
high levels of perceptual load whereas face distractors were processed at all set sizes. 
In stark contrast, the individuals with ASD showed the same pattern of results with 
both the face and instrument distractors. Both were processed at low set sizes but 
appear to be ignored as the perceptual load increased.  
  This finding provides evidence that faces do not capture attention in the same 
manner as for typical adults. In mainstream attention research, the inability to ignore 
distractor  faces  at  high  levels  of  load  is  used  in  support  of  the  idea  that  face 
processing  is  an  automatic  and  mandatory  process  and  is  not  subject  to  general 
capacity limits (Lavie et al., 2003). The altered behaviour of the ASD group on the 
tasks presented here calls into question whether faces play a special role in attention 
for this clinical population. A distractor face, though irrelevant, may contain socially 
important information that is detrimental to ignore. The ability of individuals with 
ASD to disregard such stimuli clearly demonstrates the lack of importance that is 
placed on such details.  
  Interestingly, the faces are not completely ignored by the individuals with 
ASD; they are just treated in the same manner as any other non-social stimulus. This 
suggests that individuals with ASD are not averse to looking at faces entirely. One 
question that still remains, however, is whether the faces are being looked at, but are 
then  discarded,  or  whether  they  are  entirely  disregarded  at  the  higher  set  sizes. 
Unlike the brief presentation time in experiments one, two and three (where there 
was no time for voluntary eye movement), in experiments six and seven the stimuli 
remained on the screen for much longer. At the higher set sizes it may have been the 
case, therefore, either that the individuals with ASD did not fixate on the faces at all, 
or that they were looking at the faces but were then able to inhibit any impact that an 
incongruent face would have on the response time. If only the control individuals   181
were looking at the faces at higher set sizes, one would expect that they would be 
slower to respond than the ASD individuals. This pattern was not seen; instead the  
participants  in  the  ASD  group  were  slower  to  respond  at  all  the  set  sizes.  This 
difference may, however, be due to problems with decision making or difficulty with 
the reading component of the task (although all participants reached typical levels on 
the National Adult Reading Test). To explore these issues, further research using 
eye-tracking equipment could be carried out to investigate to what extent the faces 
were fixated on by the individuals with ASD, and to identify any group differences in 
the  gaze  patterns.  Additionally,  it  would  be  meaningful  to  carry  out  a  similar 
experiment using fMRI. By asking participants to perform a selective attention task 
in the presence of flanking distractor faces within the scanner, the extent of FFA 
activation  could  be  ascertained.  This  would  indicate  whether,  and  in  which 
conditions, the distractor faces were being processed  
  The findings discussed thus far are in line with the original predictions made 
regarding the processing of distractor faces in ASD. Though it seems that there is 
evidence of an increased perceptual capacity (experiments one, two and three) it was 
hypothesized that not only would this not confer an advantage on a task that involved 
social stimuli, but that the propensity to process irrelevant face distractors would be 
reduced in comparison to typical controls.  
  It had also been expected, however, that on the task of non-social stimuli 
(musical  instruments)  there  would  be  some  evidence  of  the  increased  perceptual 
capacity in ASD; yet the results of experiment seven do not provide any indication of 
a significant difference in task performance between the two groups. There are a 
number of possible reasons for this. The most likely explanation concerns the task 
demands –  which were very  different from  the  earlier  experiments that involved   182
identification  of  a  target  letter.  As  raised  above,  the  instrument  task  involved  a 
reading  component  and,  while  all  participants  reached  the  required  level  on  the 
National  Adult  Reading  Test  (Nelson,  1982),  it  is  possible  that  this  component 
placed  disproportionately  large  cognitive  demands  on  the  ASD  participants.  This 
would  have  eradicated  any  superior  performance  that  may  have  arisen  due  to 
increased capacity.  
  Overall, the results from experiments five,  six and  seven suggest  that for 
individuals  with  ASD,  faces  do  not capture  attention  in  an automatic mandatory 
fashion.  Both  the  social  and  non-social  distractor  items  are  treated  in  the  same 
manner – and seem to be subject to the same capacity limits. Within mainstream 
attention literature, the observation that face distractors are processed irrespective of 
perceptual  load  (Lavie  et  al.,  2003)  has  been  taken  as  evidence  for  a  separate 
processing  capacity  for  faces.  This  is  reinforced  by  the  work  of  Jenkins  and 
colleagues who demonstrate that the congruency effect of face distractors can only 
be diluted by the addition of other face stimuli and not by additional non-face items 
(Jenkins  et  al.,  2003).  It  is  possible  that  within  ASD  there  is  no  such  separate 
capacity, resulting in the observed impact of the perceptual load of the central task on 
the  processing  of  the  distractor  faces.  Alternatively,  it  may  be  that  this  separate 
capacity in typical adults is not innately assigned for faces but result from an interest 
in  faces  which  leads  to  a  great  deal  of  experience  and  expertise  (Gauthier  & 
Logothetis, 2000). The separate processing store may be reserved for a specialised 
interest, which in typical adults is social stimuli, but in ASD may be an object class 
such as trains or an ability to perform calculations or draw detailed pictures of visual 
scenes. This could explain the obsessive interests and savant abilities that are seen 
within the condition.   183
Chapter 7 – Discussion 
 
As highlighted in chapter two, there are many reports of altered attention as 
part of the behavioural profile of ASD. A review of the existing literature revealed a 
variety of findings concerning autism and selective attention. Studies have proposed 
abnormal levels of arousal (Dawson &  Lewy,  1989; Hutt et al., 1964;  Ornitz  & 
Ritvo, 1968) and deficits in selectivity and filtering (Burack, 1994; Lovaas et al., 
1979; Mann & Walker, 2003; Rincover & Ducharme, 1987). The nature of such 
abnormalities and deficits are, however, diverse and contradictory.    
After studying mainstream attention research literature, the perceptual load 
theory of selective attention was identified as a key area for research. Within this 
thesis,  the  perceptual  load  theory  of  attention  was  applied  to  ASD  in  order  to 
investigate  whether  this  theory  offers  an  explanation  for  the  varying  pattern  of 
attentional behaviour seen in ASD. To date, there is no existing research on this area. 
It was hypothesised that the pattern of distractor processing modulated by 
perceptual load that is seen in typical adults (Lavie, 1995) would be observed in 
ASD, but that within this clinical group, the impact of irrelevant distractors would 
persist at higher levels of perceptual load. 
The first experiment in this thesis applied a response competition paradigm 
(Maylor & Lavie, 1998) to assess selective attention at various levels of perceptual 
load. Participants were required to identify a target letter from within a ring of non-
target elements, while ignoring distractor letters that were presented offset from the 
central  task.  The  results  indicated,  in  line  with  the  initial  prediction,  that  the 
interference effect of the distractor stimuli was evident at higher levels of perceptual 
load in the ASD group.    184
Given that there was no significant difference between the response times and 
accuracy rates of the two groups, it cannot be the case that the differing results are 
due to a general filtering deficit in ASD. An overall deficit of this nature which, 
irrespective  of  perceptual  load  level,  prevents  an  individual  from  effectively 
assigning their attention to the central task would be accompanied by a drop in task 
performance (speed and/or accuracy).  
This  finding  of  increased  distractor  processing  appears,  therefore,  to  be 
evidence of increased perceptual capacity within ASD - i.e. when performing the 
central task the individuals with ASD have spare processing capacity which spills 
over to process the irrelevant distractors. Indeed, the extent of distractor processing 
has previously been used as an index of perceptual capacity in subgroups of the 
general population such as young children and the elderly (Huang-Pollock et al., 
2002; Maylor & Lavie, 1998).  
  This conclusion regarding increased perceptual capacity was based on the 
analysis  of  reaction  time  data  which  suggested  that  individuals  with  ASD  were 
continuing to process flanking distractor stimuli at higher levels of perceptual load 
than control individuals. Measuring reaction times, however, is an indirect method of 
assessing attention and is unable to demonstrate whether the elements in question are 
actually being consciously perceived.  
In order to address this issue, and to replicate the initial findings, the second 
study within this thesis employed a more direct measure to assess the impact of 
perceptual load on selective attention in ASD. In a dual-task paradigm, participants 
were  required to  both  carry  out  a  central  letter-search  task  (of  varying  levels  of 
perceptual load) and also to indicate the presence or absence of an expected critical 
stimulus.  It  was  predicted  that  both  the  ASD  and  control  groups  would  show  a   185
reduction in sensitivity to the critical stimulus as the perceptual load of the central 
task was increased, but that within the ASD group this reduction would occur at 
higher levels of load than for the typical adults. In the first of two experiments, the 
trials were presented in blocks of the same set size (i.e. same level of perceptual 
load).  The  results  demonstrated  that  for  the  typical  group  the  percentage  of  CS 
detection and perceptual sensitivity dropped as the level of perceptual load increased, 
whereas for the individuals with ASD these two measures seemed to remain constant 
across  all  levels  of  perceptual  load.  At  the  high  levels  of  load,  therefore,  the 
individuals with ASD demonstrate a greater perceptual sensitivity to the CS than the 
control individuals – i.e. they have a greater ability to successfully detect the CS.  
While this increased ability was in line with the predictions, it had also been 
hypothesised that the CS detection of the ASD group would also show some degree 
of modulation by perceptual load. This was not evident in the results obtained and 
may be an indication that the highest set size used in the task did not raise perceptual 
load to a high enough level to exhaust perceptual capacity for the individuals with 
ASD. This conclusion is consistent with the observation that the error rates of the 
two groups were equivalent: individuals with ASD were still performing the central 
task efficiently while detecting the CS. 
In Experiment Three within this study, the trials were mixed in an attempt to 
eliminate any effects of strategy differences between high and low load trials (i.e. 
each experimental block contained trials of various perceptual load levels). As in the 
study by MacDonald and Lavie (2008), the effect of perceptual load on CS detection 
in the typical group was reduced, possibly due to carry-over effects. This resulted in 
the  difference  between  the  ASD  and  control  groups  no  longer  being  significant. 
While this finding may suggest that the two groups are carrying out the task in the   186
same way, the potential criticisms of the methodology (see chapter 4) mean that it 
would be unwise to read too much into the loss of the group difference.  
Having used findings from response competition and dual-task paradigms to 
infer that perceptual capacity in ASD is enhanced, the next step was to find a direct 
measure of perceptual capacity that could be used to confirm the accuracy of the 
conclusions that had been drawn. Having examined the literature on visual short term 
memory (VSTM) and the findings by Riggs et al. (Riggs et al., 2006) regarding the 
changes in VSTM across childhood, it was proposed that VSTM may be akin to 
perceptual  capacity.  In  order  to  evaluate  this,  Experiment  four  used  a  change 
detection paradigm that is commonly used to assess VSTM capacity (Luck & Vogel, 
1997; Rouder et al., 2008; Vogel et al., 2001). Participants were shown an array of 
coloured squares (2, 5, 8 or 12) and then indicate whether the colour of a test square 
(presented subsequently) was the same as that of the corresponding square from the 
initial array. It was predicted that, if VSTM did indeed reflect perceptual capacity, 
the individuals with ASD would show enhanced task performance, detecting more of 
the colour changes – particularly at the larger array sizes.  
The  results,  however,  did  not  appear  to  show  any  significant  difference 
between the two groups on either the percentage of changes detected or the VSTM 
capacity values. Inspection of the data also revealed that the trend appeared to be in 
the opposite direction –  with the ASD  group  performing slightly  worse than the 
control group. This was surprising not only as it goes against my own prediction, but 
also because it is not in keeping with the existing data regarding superior change-
detection and reduced change-blindness in ASD (Smith & Milne, 2009). The ASD 
group  also  seemed  to  be  showing  a  higher  number  of  false  alarms  (responding 
‘change’ on no-change trials) and also appear to have different response criteria from   187
the control group. Though the difference in values was only close to significance (p = 
0.058) the trend indicates that the individuals with ASD have a greater tendency to 
respond ‘change’ than the typical adults.  
While  the  results  found  in  this  study  may  indicate  that  there  are  no 
differences in VSTM capacity within ASD, the observation regarding response bias 
may well shed light on an alternative possible explanation for the absence of group 
differences in the measures of VSTM calculated within this task. The paradigm used 
involved a single probe square – rather than displaying the entire array at the test 
phase. As discussed in chapter 5, this is important in order to keep the amount of 
decision-making  constant  across  trials  of  different  array  sizes  and  to  minimise 
grouping strategies that may facilitate memory in the larger array sizes. It is possible, 
however, that the individuals with ASD took the task instructions too literally and, 
when seeing a single square that they were unsure about, would respond ‘change’ 
because, in a sense, every probe display is a change from the initial display (i.e. a 
number of squares have been replaced by one square).   
A  recent  surprising  finding  by  Franklin  and  colleagues  regarding  colour 
perception in ASD may also have implications for the results (Franklin et al., 2008). 
In  contrast  with  anecdotal  reports  and  existing  experimental  data  that  suggests 
enhanced sensitivity and attention to colour in autism (Brian et al., 2003; Greenaway 
& Plaisted, 2005), Franklin et al.’s study demonstrated that children with ASD were 
less  accurate  at  colour  memory,  search  and  chromatic  target-detection  than  the 
controls. Given that colour memory and discrimination was a central requisite of the 
VSTM task used within this thesis, the ASD group may have been disproportionately 
disadvantaged.    188
The large array sizes used may also have masked any potential difference in 
task performance between the two groups. The maximum array size (12) was a great 
deal higher than that of previous studies. Based on the prediction that individuals 
with ASD were likely to outperform the typical adults, this was in order to prevent a 
ceiling effect – where the individuals with ASD were able to detect all the changes 
even  at  the  higher  set  sizes.  Having  now  established  that  no  such  superior 
performance was evident, it may be the case that subtle group differences were lost 
in the leap between array sizes (two to five, five to eight and eight to twelve).  
  In  order  to  more  meaningfully  assess  VSTM  capacity  in  ASD,  a  more 
appropriate procedure for this clinical group should be employed. One such design 
may  be  a  change-detection  paradigm  that  requires  participants  to  discriminate 
between squares based on differing fill patterns (stripes/spots) rather than colour. 
Arrays of two, three, four and six would be used and the entire sample array would 
be presented at the test phase. The results from such a study would help further 
elucidate the magnitude of VSTM capacity in ASD and any relationship between this 
and perceptual capacity. 
  Having examined the impact of perceptual load on selective attention to non-
social letter stimuli, part two of this thesis was devoted to the study of selective 
attention in the presence of distractor faces. Within mainstream attention research, it 
has  been  established  that  irrelevant  face  distractors  are  processed  irrespective  of 
perceptual load levels and, as such, they appear to have a ‘special status’ (Lavie et 
al., 2003). As discussed in chapter one, social impairments form a core part of the 
symptom profile of ASD and it was therefore important to examine whether a similar 
pattern of attention capture by faces is seen for individuals with ASD. Many studies 
have reported a dysfunction of neural regions of face processing in ASD (Baron-  189
Cohen et al., 2000; Dawson et al., 2005) and altered patterns of gaze fixation when 
looking at faces (Pelphrey et al., 2002). It has been suggested that reduced interest in 
social stimuli during early childhood, and therefore a lack of looking at faces, may 
lead  to  the  subsequent  face  processing  and  social  deficits  (Dawson  et  al.,  2005; 
Grelotti et al., 2002; Schultz, 2005).  
  In light of such evidence, it was hypothesised that the capacity for processing 
socially meaningless stimuli would be dissociable from the capacity for processing 
social stimuli such as faces – i.e. the pattern of greater distractor interference at high 
set sizes within the ASD group when compared to the typical adults (as was seen in 
experiments one and two) would not be evident in the task that involved the use of 
face distractors.  
  The initial experiment used to examine selective attention and perceptual load 
in  the  presence  of  social  distractor  stimuli  required  participants  to  search  for  a 
famous name among a list of non-words and indicate whether it was a pop star or 
politician. The use of famous faces assumes that all participants have a certain level 
of world knowledge that will allow them to recognise the identity of the celebrities; 
however this assumption cannot be made when considering a condition such as ASD. 
Furthermore, it may have been the case that the distractor faces used in Lavie’s task 
(Lavie et al., 2003) could not be ignored specifically because they were familiar, 
famous faces. Given that it has been shown that familiarity of a face affects the 
manner in which it is processed (Rossion et al., 1999; Tong & Nakayama, 1999), it 
was important to verify that non-famous faces would also be processed irrespective 
of perceptual load levels. In order to resolve both these issues, a modified version of 
Lavie’s task was developed. Participants were instructed to classify an anonymous 
name based on gender while ignoring anonymous male and female distractor faces.     190
  Results from a group of typical adults (experiment five) demonstrated that the 
anonymous distractor faces affected task performance even at very high levels of 
perceptual load; a distractor congruency effect was evident across all the set sizes. 
This is consistent with Lavie et al’s findings regarding attention to famous faces and 
confirms that the pattern of results they observed was not simply an artefact of the 
familiar nature of the faces.  
  Given that the paradigm no longer contained an element of world knowledge, 
and is therefore suitable for use with a clinical population, it was used to examine 
selective attention in a group of individuals with ASD. The results from experiment 
six showed that there was an effect of the irrelevant distractor faces at the lower set 
sizes but not as the perceptual load of the central task increased. Conversely, as in 
experiment five, the control individuals showed an effect of distractor type across all 
the set sizes. It seems that individuals with ASD show the same pattern with face 
distractors as they did with the non-social letter stimuli (experiments 1-3). However, 
the  task  demands  of  experiments  one,  two  and  three  (letter  stimuli)  were  very 
different from those of experiments five and six (face stimuli). In order to more 
accurately determine whether any ‘special’ behaviour is seen in response to face 
distractor stimuli, a task that had identical structure to experiment five and six, but 
with musical instrument names and pictures was used (experiment seven). By using 
photographs of instruments and asking participants to classify instrument names into 
‘wind’ or ‘string’ categories, both tasks involved subordinate category discrimination 
and a similar level of visual complexity.  
  Both the ASD and control groups showed a distractor congruency effect at 
the lower levels of perceptual load that was then eliminated as the perceptual load of 
the central task increased. By comparing the results from experiments six and seven,   191
it could be clearly seen that while the behaviour of the typical adults was markedly 
different on the two tasks, the individuals with ASD seemed to treat both distractor 
types in  the  same way. It appears that for  the ASD  group,  faces do not capture 
attention in the same way that they do for typical adults. Interestingly, the faces were 
not completely ignored by individuals with ASD (a congruency effect was seen at the 
lower set sizes) which suggests that they are not averse to looking at faces entirely. 
However, the ability to disregard the faces at higher set sizes – something which can 
be socially detrimental in real-life situations, clearly shows the lack of importance 
that is placed on such stimuli. 
 
Implications of increased perceptual capacity 
  The  findings  presented  within  this  thesis  fit  well  with  the  anecdotal  and 
clinical  reports  of  ASD  symptomatology,  and  may  well  map  onto  the  observed 
behaviours.  Indeed,  the  prediction  concerning  increased  perceptual  capacity 
originated from an observation of increased distractibility (Burack, 1994; Ciesielski 
et al., 1990). Though the increased perceptual capacity demonstrated in experiments 
one, two and three seems to be an ability rather than a disability, and confers an 
advantage on the tasks within this thesis, in the real world it may well be detrimental.  
 Being able to take in more information at any one time may lead to over arousal in 
certain situations. Temple Grandin, an author with autism, reports that “when two 
people are talking at once, it is difficult for me to screen out one voice and listen to 
the other. My ears are like microphones picking up all sounds with equal intensity. In 
a noisy place I can’t understand speech, because I can’t screen out the background 
noise”  (Grandin,  1995).  This  over-arousal  has  previously  been  reported  in  ASD 
(Hermelin & O'Connor, 1970; e.g. Hutt et al., 1964; Hutt et al., 1965; Raymaekers et   192
al., 2004). Many of those reporting over-arousal in ASD attributed it to an inability to 
effectively filter out irrelevant information. The work within this thesis suggests that 
it may instead be due to the increased perceptual capacity, which results in far more 
visual information being processed simultaneously before the capacity is saturated.  
This finding has important practical implications for individuals with ASD. 
Forster  and  Lavie  (2007)  showed  that  individual  differences  in  perceptual  load 
effects are correlated with day-to-day distractibility levels. Individuals who scored 
highly  on  the  Cognitive  Failures  Questionnaire  (CFQ,  Broadbent  et  al.,  1982) 
showed greater distractor interference effects at the low set sizes than those who 
obtained a low score on the CFQ. Interestingly, Forster and Lavie showed that at the 
high levels of perceptual load the distraction from irrelevant stimuli was eliminated 
for both the high and low scoring CFQ groups. They conclude that high levels of 
perceptual load make everyone equal and suggest that increasing perceptual load 
may be a useful tool in the quest to reduce the level of distractibility in everyday 
tasks such as driving and computer work. In the experiment presented within this 
chapter,  the  highest  set  size  did  not  equate  the  groups,  but  it  is  possible  that 
introducing  a  higher  level  of  perceptual  load  would  lead  to  elimination  of  CS 
processing  in  both  groups.  Finding  this  level,  above  which  early  selection  is 
exhibited  in  both  groups,  would  be  clinically  beneficial.  Though  the  increased 
perceptual capacity seems to offer an advantage in the dual-task paradigm, it is clear 
that in real-world situations processing a great deal of visual stimuli simultaneously 
could be overwhelming and debilitating. Perceptual load levels may be manipulated 
in  order  to  help  individuals  with  ASD  perform  more  effectively  on  tasks  where 
distractibility is a hindering factor.   193
Increased  perceptual  capacity  may  also  go  some  way  to  explain  savant 
abilities in ASD: where individuals seem to be able to process an extremely large 
amount of information at any one time. For example, the artist Stephen Wiltshire can 
look at a complex visual scene and then draw it from memory – with an extremely 
high level of detail (i.e. the correct number of windows in each building, the correct 
layout of buildings etc). It is definitely tempting to conclude that such artists have an 
increased perceptual capacity. Indeed in a future study it would be interesting to test 
an individual with savant abilities on a task of selective attention and perceptual load.  
It is important to mention that neither savant abilities, nor reports of over-arousal, 
seem restricted to the visual domain. There is evidence of auditory hyperacuity in 
ASD (Ney, 1979; Talay-Ongan & Wood, 2000) which may indicate over arousal in 
the auditory domain and there are also a number of musical savants with ASD. This 
raises the question: to what extent can the visual abnormalities that have been found 
within this thesis be generalised to the auditory domain? While hyperacuity could be 
related to the frequency of the sound, it may also be due to an increased amount of 
auditory information being processed, or an inability to ignore distracting sounds. It 
would be interesting, therefore, to explore selective attention and perceptual load in 
the  auditory  domain.  A  set  of  experiments  have  been  carried  out  on  selective 
attention in the auditory domain within ASD (Hismjatullina, 2006). On a dichotic 
listening  task,  she  found  that  while  the  overall  response  times  were  equivalent 
between the two groups, the ASD group made more errors- i.e. they were distracted 
by, and processed, the unattended stream to a greater extent. The authors mention 
that they are unsure as to how the reaction times can be unaffected while the error 
rates are higher in the ASD group. The idea of increased perceptual capacity would 
offer a  plausible  explanation  for  this finding.  Hismjatullina also looked  at  social   194
aspects of auditory selective attention by examining whether individuals with ASD 
would orient as much to their own name as typical adults. She found that, as with the 
typical group, the ASD individuals were distracted by their own names and personal 
items. This was taken as evidence for intact covert social orienting, but it is possible 
that this was only seen due to the low perceptual load of the task as Hismjatullina 
mentions  that her task is similar to  the  ‘easy-condition’ of  Teder-Salejarvi  et  al. 
(Teder-Salejarvi et al., 2005). It would be meaningful to take this research one step 
further by introducing the issue of perceptual load. In the dichotic listening task, 
conditions with different levels of load should be created to examine the effect on 
task performance of both groups. On the social task, it would be predicted that one 
could raise the perceptual load of the task to levels where the individuals with ASD 
are ignoring their own name but the typical individuals are not.  
  Aside from the relevance to everyday behaviour seen in ASD, how do the 
findings from the experiments in this thesis fit with current theories of cognition in 
ASD such as weak central coherence (WCC), enhanced perceptual functioning (EPF) 
and visual search behaviour? As discussed in chapter 1, the theory of WCC suggests 
that individuals with ASD either have a deficit in extracting the overall meaning of a 
stimulus or visual scene, or have a cognitive style that tends towards processing the 
local, rather than global, aspects of stimuli (Frith, 1989; Happe, 1999). The superior 
performance on tasks such as the Embedded Figures Task and IQ subtests involving 
block design and pattern construction has been used as evidence for WCC. Following 
the demonstration that global processing is not always altered in ASD (e.g. Plaisted 
et al., 1999), the EPF model was put forward as an alternative to WCC (Mottron & 
Burack, 2001). This framework suggests an enhanced perceptual flow of information 
in ASD, leading to positive symptoms such as enhanced memory for visual patterns   195
and  negative  impacts  such  as  a  difficulty  in  controlling  perceptual  processes 
(Mottron et al., 2006). The observations upon which these two theories are based 
may,  however, also  be explained  by  enhanced  perceptual  capacity.  An  increased 
capacity would allow an individual to take in more information from the visual field 
at any given time. While this cannot explain why individuals with ASD may prefer to 
process  the  local aspects  of  stimuli,  it  suggests  that such  individuals are  able  to 
process additional details that typical individuals ignore due to capacity limits. In 
addition, if an individual can process a greater number of elements within a visual 
search task, then they will be able to detect the target faster than those who can only 
detect a small number of items simultaneously. Increased perceptual capacity would 
also offer an explanation for the reduced change-blindness that has been reported in 
ASD (Smith & Milne, 2009). The authors suggest that the enhanced sensitivity to 
change that was seen in their ASD group, when compared to a control group, was 
due  to  a  greater  number  of  items  entering  visual  awareness.  Though  they  then 
attribute this to a deficit in attentional gating, it may be that increased perceptual 
capacity  is  responsible.  Furthermore,  the  conflicting  reports  regarding  unaltered 
change-detection abilities (Burack et al., 2009b; Fletcher-Watson et al., 2006) may 
be  explained  within  the  perceptual  load  framework.  These  two  studies  used 
paradigms  that  involved  participants  detecting  changes  within  pairs  of  pictures, 
whereas Smith and Milne required participants to detect continuity errors in film 
clips. The latter is arguably a more difficult task with a higher level of perceptual 
load.  It  is  therefore  in  keeping  with  the  findings  of  this  thesis  that  a  difference 
between  the  abilities  of  individuals  with  ASD  and  control  individuals  was  only 
evident under this higher level of perceptual load    196
While the findings of this thesis do not indicate whether increased perceptual 
capacity causes the observed behaviours mentioned above, it is clearly a concept that 
may well be related and should be further explored.  
  While these models of WCC and EPF suggest that greater perceptual capacity 
may be linked to enhanced attention to detail, it is also possible that a lack of top-
down control of attention is responsible for the pattern of results seen in part one of 
this thesis. Attention can be split into top-down and bottom-up processing. Top-down 
attention  refers  to  a  situation  where  higher-cognitive  processes  such  as  working 
memory, context and expectation influence the attentional set and therefore affect 
what stimuli are attended to. For example, if you are searching for a flower then the 
flowers in the visual field will be attended to in preference to other available stimuli. 
Conversely,  bottom-up  processing  is  driven  by  the  salience  of  the  stimuli.  For 
example, if a flower in a field is very distinctive then it will draw ones attention to it, 
regardless of whether it was important to the current situation. Lavie and colleagues 
have  extended  load  theory  to  include  the  impact  of  working  memory  load  and 
cognitive control on selective attention. They suggest that in order to direct attention 
appropriately, individuals must maintain stimulus priorities in working memory – i.e. 
to  remember  which  stimuli  are  relevant.  Therefore,  loading  working  memory 
processes  should  result  in  reduced  differentiation  between  high-  and  low-priority 
stimuli (targets and distractors) and lead to the opposite effect from that of perceptual 
load; as working memory load increases, the extent of distractor processing will also 
increase  (Lavie,  2000;  Lavie  et  al.,  2004b).  This  was  investigated  by  presenting 
participants with a selective attention task that was preceded by a memory set (a 
string of digits) and followed by a memory probe digit (participants must indicate 
whether the digit was part of the memory set). The working memory of the task was   197
manipulated  by  altering  the  number  of  digits  in  the  memory  set.  The  results 
demonstrated that, in line with their original prediction, the influence of distractors in 
the selective attention task was greater under conditions of high working memory 
load (Lavie et al., 2004a). It could therefore be suggested that the increased effect of 
distractors, seen in experiments one and two, was a result of the working memory 
load of the task disproportionately affecting the individuals with ASD, resulting in a 
lack of the top-down control that is necessary to prevent distractor interference. If 
this was the case, however, then you would expect to see an effect of increased 
working  memory  load  across  all  set  sizes  and  conditions  (given  that  the  task 
instructions remain constant for the entire experiment). This would be manifest as an 
increased distractor effect at all levels of perceptual load. Furthermore, it can be seen 
from the results of Lavie’s experiments that the loading of working memory also 
detrimentally affected task performance. As mentioned above, the distractor effect 
(i.e. the difference between the compatible and incompatible trials) in Lavie et al. 
(2004a) was greater for the high working memory load condition. The response times 
to both the compatible and incompatible trials were also both slower for the high 
working memory load condition. If the pattern of results in my experiments was due 
to high working memory load demands on the individuals with ASD then you would 
expect to see a general difference in the response times between the two groups – 
something which is not seen. Though it seems that the idea of an attentional-control 
deficit does not underlie the results observed within this thesis, it will be important in 
future research to explore the issue of working memory and perceptual load in ASD. 
Since  ASD  is  known  to  involve  impaired  executive  functioning  (Ozonoff  et  al., 
1991) which may include a deficit in working memory (Bennetto et al., 1996; Russell 
et al., 1996), it is hypothesised that lower levels of working memory load would be   198
sufficient to result in increased distractor processing in ASD. I propose to investigate 
this predicted dissociation between superior performance on selective attention tasks 
with high perceptual load and inferior performance with high working memory load 
in a subsequent study. 
  This  proposed  reduction  in  working  memory  capacity  may  also  offer  an 
alternative  explanation  for  the  differing  reports  of  change-blindness  in  ASD.  In 
Smith and Milne’s task (2009), participants were asked to watch a video clip of a 
chef  baking  buns,  and  were  then  questioned  about  the  clip:  both  regarding  any 
continuity errors that were observed, but also regarding the scene itself (e.g. how 
many eggs were used). This places a much higher demand on working memory (the 
details  of  the  clip  must  be  retained  while  searching  for  errors)  than  the  picture 
comparison tasks used in the other two studies of change detection in ASD (Burack 
et al., 2009b; Fletcher-Watson et al., 2006). The higher working memory load may 
make  the  individuals  with  ASD  more  susceptible  to  distraction  from  the  details 
within the scene which, on this task, facilitates detection of the continuity errors and 
results in superior task performance.  
Finally, before moving on to discuss the implications of the experiments with 
social  distractors,  I  will  explore  whether  the  concept  of  increased  perceptual 
capacity, and resulting pattern of increased distractibility at high levels of load, can 
account for the varying attentional abnormalities in ASD. The findings regarding 
increased perceptual capacity and the perceptual load model would predict that cases 
where individuals with ASD were seen to show a greater influence of distractors 
(previously taken as evidence of poor filtering ability) would involve tasks with a 
moderately high perceptual load – such that only the individuals with ASD would 
have spare processing capacity left over for distractor processing.    199
Conversely,  it  would  be  predicted  that  the  studies  where  no  difference 
between groups was detected would involve either very high or very low levels of 
load.  At  very  high  levels  of  load,  the  central  task  would  exhaust  the  perceptual 
capacity of both groups; therefore eliminating distractor interference, while at very 
low  levels  of  load  (likely  to  be  indexed  by  ceiling  effects  in  both  groups)  all 
individuals would show an effect of distractors.    
The study by Burack (1994) is an example of a study that reports under-
selectivity  and  filtering  deficits  i.e.  increased  distractibility  in  ASD.  His  task 
involved target detection (O or +) in the presence of two or four non-target shapes (# 
* ∆ or ^). The target was presented with either zero, two or four distractors – and 
these distractors were either 2˚ visual angles (close condition) or 6˚ visual angles (far 
condition) away from the target. This would be around the level of perceptual load 
for which we would expect ASD individuals to show a greater interference effect. In 
line with this, the results indicated that the individuals with ASD do show a greater 
interference effect of the distractor shapes but do not show increased error rates. 
Ciesielski  et  al.(1990)  also  suggest  filtering  deficits  in  ASD.  Participants  were 
presented with stimuli that had both a visual and auditory component and were told 
to selectively attend to only one domain. Within each domain there were rare events 
embedded among a stream of more frequent events (a high tone among low tones 
and a green flash among red flashes). Participants were told which modality they 
should attend to and were required to indicate, with a key-press, when they observed 
the rare event. Though the paradigm is not entirely analogous to those used within 
this thesis, the results from the visual domain may be relevant. Though the sensitivity 
to the rare target (d’), response criteria (β) and percentage of correct target detections 
were not significantly different from those of the control group, the individuals with   200
ASD responded more often to the rare events in the unattended modality (a striking 
increase from 4.5% in controls to 32% in the ASD group). This finding is very much 
in line with the idea of increased perceptual capacity in ASD. 
  In  contrast,  Iarocci  &  Burack  (2004)  found  no  difference  between  the 
behaviour  of  children  with  ASD  and  typical  children  on  a  detection  task  in  the 
presence and absence of distractors. In this paradigm, the perceptual load of the task 
seemed to be very low; i.e. in the distractor-present condition the target was flanked 
by two unrelated distractor symbols such that the three symbols were in a line with 
the target always presented in the middle. The task performance was at ceiling for 
both the ASD and control groups (error rates of 0.5% and 0.8% respectively). At this 
level of load, one would expect that the perceptual capacity of the typical participants 
would  not  have  been  filled  and  therefore  both  groups  would  show  equivalent 
distractor  interference  effects.  This  was  indeed  the  case:  the  difference  in  RTs 
between the two distractor conditions was investigated and the authors found that 
both groups showed equivalent increase of RT in the distractor-present condition. 
When it comes to looking at reports of over-selectivity in ASD within the 
context of perceptual load, the issue is slightly more complex. Load theory and the 
idea of increased perceptual capacity in ASD would not predict over-selectivity at 
any level of load. Within this thesis, however, there was evidence of over-selectivity 
with respect to social stimuli and it seems that many of the studies suggesting over-
selectivity in ASD involve a social component. Moreover, the anecdotal accounts of 
over-focussed  behaviour  in  ASD  most  commonly  refer  to  situations  where 
individuals have fixated on a random aspect of the environment to such an extent that 
there is no response to social attention bids such as own name calling.    201
The early studies of overly focussed attention (Schriebman & Lovaas, 1973) 
involved social cues. More recently Garretson, Fein and Waterhouse (1990) only 
found differences in selectivity between the groups in the social reward condition, 
and Pierce et al.(Pierce et al., 1997) presented evidence of over-selectivity in ASD 
but used a task that involved one to four social cues.  
The other studies concerning over-selectivity in ASD that were mentioned in 
chapters two and three did not contain a social aspect, but they also did not involve 
the blocking out of distractor stimuli. Such studies (Lovaas et al., 1971; Lovaas et al., 
1979;  Rincover  &  Ducharme,  1987)  drew  findings  based  on  the  behaviour  in 
response to multi-componential stimuli and a failure to integrate these components. It 
seems that tasks of this type have different demands and results may reflect different 
abilities from those tested on more classic filtering tasks.   
While not all studies fit the pattern, there does seem to be an interesting trend 
whereby many reports of over selectivity involve social stimuli, those reporting no 
difference between control and ASD groups involve tasks with low load and those 
that demonstrate reduced filtering use high load paradigms. 
 
Implications of reduced interference by social distractors  
  There are a number of implications of the finding that individuals with ASD 
do not appear to assign special salience to face distractors and are therefore able to 
ignore them under high levels of perceptual load. The tasks used within this thesis 
offer an alternative to experimental paradigms which require participants to actively 
attend to faces. While results from the latter have given rise to evidence for a variety 
of impairments in face processing, the set-up used here in experiments four and five 
creates a situation that exposes whether faces naturally capture attention in ASD –   202
even when participants are explicitly instructed to ignore them. As mentioned above, 
it was clear from the results that only the typical group processed these social stimuli 
in a mandatory and automatic fashion. 
  This finding may help to elucidate the reasons underlying the abnormal social 
interaction and altered face processing abilities seen in the condition. Studies of early 
behaviours report that, when compared to  typically developing children, children 
with ASD spend less time looking at faces (see Riby & Hancock, 2008). The absence 
of special salience to faces and evidence that faces do not have preferential access to 
attention in ASD (as observed in experiment five) may be the cause of these altered 
early behaviours. Alternatively, the reduced salience may be a consequence of the 
lack of experience processing faces at a young age. Certainly, a lack of attention to 
faces would have serious consequences for social communicative development. As 
discussed in chapter 6, the subsequent specialization of the face-processing network 
may well rely on adequate social input during the critical period of early infancy. To 
investigate this possible causal relationship, it is important to now devise studies 
which  can  assess  attention  with  respect  to  social  stimuli  in  children  with  ASD; 
allowing the developmental trajectories of any altered attentional behaviour to be 
explored.  Such  tasks  could  employ  eye-tracking  procedures  which,  though  not 
equivalent to attention, may well map on to similar processes. This would render 
them accessible to a much younger population by removing task demands.    
  The findings from this research on social attention may also have practical 
application  for  the  treatment  of  individuals  with  ASD.  The  results  suggest  the 
importance of interventions which simply promote looking/orienting to faces. This 
would be particularly important early in development - with the logic that, given the   203
relevant input, the face-processing system would then become specialised without 
further intervention. 
 
Further study 
  There are a number of potential studies  that have been mentioned in this 
thesis  which  should  be performed  in  order  to  allow  the  field  to  move  forwards. 
Firstly, following on from the idea of increased perceptual capacity in ASD, the issue 
of  selective  attention  and  working  memory  load  should  be  explored.  Working 
memory is used to maintain current stimulus processing priorities thus minimizing 
the processing of irrelevant stimuli. Therefore, in contrast with perceptual load, high 
working  memory  load  increases  distractor  processing.  Since  ASD  is  known  to 
involve  impaired  executive  functioning  it  is  hypothesised  that  lower  levels  of 
working memory load would be sufficient to result in increased distractor processing. 
This predicted dissociation between superior performance on selective attention tasks 
with high perceptual load and inferior performance with high working memory load 
should be investigated by carrying out a selective attention task under various levels 
of working memory load. 
Secondly, a more appropriate test of VSTM should be employed to directly assess 
the  proposed  increased  perceptual  capacity  in  ASD.  Rather  than  using  coloured 
squares, a version that used a set of lines – defined by orientation – would overcome 
the potential issue of abnormal colour processing. Using array sizes of two, three, 
four and six (rather than two, five, eight and 12) would also allow more detailed 
information regarding the capacity of each group to be ascertained. 
Thirdly,  it  would  be  interesting  to  explore  the  issue  of  selective  attention  and 
perceptual load in the auditory domain. Dichotic listening tasks with varying levels   204
of  load  could  begin  to  investigate  whether  an  enhanced  perceptual  capacity  is 
specific to the visual domain or extends across modalities.  
  Fourthly, neuroimaging techniques should be used to advance the findings of 
this thesis. Signals in the inferior parietal sulcus (implicated in selective attention) 
could be used to gain further insight into the nature of perceptual capacity in ASD, 
while FFA activation could be used to more conclusively establish to what extent 
the face distractors are processed on tasks of selective attention and perceptual load.  
Lastly, it should be highlighted that all the experiments in this thesis were 
performed  with an adult population. It is currently  not known whether the same 
pattern  of  increased  distractor  processing  at  high  levels  of  perceptual  load,  and 
reduced attention to faces is seen within childhood or whether this develops later in 
life. It is therefore important to also consider this issue developmentally. 
   
Conclusion 
  The work presented here has, for the first time, used the Load Theory of 
Attention  and  Cognitive  Control  to  investigate  selective  attention  in  ASD.  The 
findings offer preliminary evidence for increased perceptual capacity in ASD – with 
respect to both unconscious and conscious processes. This has implications for our 
understanding of some of the non-social abnormalities in ASD such as savant-like 
abilities (in some individuals), and the ability to notice seemingly irrelevant details in 
the environment.  The thesis also presents new evidence that attention to faces differs 
in ASD.  Most previous work on face processing in ASD has highlighted differences 
in recognition of emotion and/or feature processing of faces; the work in this thesis 
shows that regardless of face processing skills, faces are less salient for individuals 
with ASD and therefore are not assigned the high priority that is seen in typical   205
adults.  This second part of the thesis brings together findings on selective attention 
with  work  on  social  processing,  in an  attempt  to  find  basic abnormalities  which 
might be fundamental in explaining the disorder.  
While the majority of findings regarding ASD focus on deficits within the 
condition,  the  research  presented  here  suggests  that  in  some circumstances  these 
altered behaviours can be usefully employed to reduce distraction while focusing 
attention on tasks (experiment five) and increase detection of necessary details within 
a visual scene (experiment two). The findings of this work could also potentially 
provide individuals with ASD an important insight, which would enable them to 
maximise their potential by exploiting these strengths and minimising the impact of 
any weaknesses, as well as explaining their condition to others. Finally, it is hoped 
that  a  greater  understanding  of  what  characterizes  ASD  individuals’  unusual 
attentional and perceptual profile may ultimately help in the design of educational 
and therapeutic programs, which capitalize on their unique cognitive profile. 
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Appendix I 
 
Participant involvement across all studies - ASD group 
 
 
Participant ID  Exp 1     Exp 2     Exp 3     Exp 4  Exp5     Exp6        Exp7 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
51      ✓    ✓      ✓        ✓       ✓       ✓ 
52      ✓    ✓      ✓        ✓       ✓       ✓ 
53      ✓    ✓      ✓        ✓       ✓       ✓ 
54      ✓ 
55      ✓    ✓      ✓        ✓       ✓       ✓ 
56      ✓                            ✓         
57      ✓    ✓      ✓        ✓       ✓       ✓ 
58      ✓    ✓      ✓        ✓       ✓       ✓ 
59      ✓    ✓      ✓        ✓       ✓       ✓ 
60      ✓               ✓ 
61      ✓               ✓ 
62      ✓    ✓      ✓        ✓       ✓       ✓ 
63      ✓    ✓      ✓        ✓       ✓       ✓ 
64      ✓ 
65      ✓               ✓ 
66      ✓ 
67      ✓               ✓ 
68      ✓    ✓      ✓        ✓       ✓       ✓ 
69      ✓    ✓      ✓        ✓       ✓       ✓ 
70            ✓      ✓        ✓           ✓ 
71 
72            ✓      ✓        ✓           ✓ 
73            ✓      ✓        ✓           ✓ 
74            ✓      ✓        ✓           ✓ 
75            ✓      ✓        ✓           ✓ 
76            ✓      ✓        ✓           ✓ 
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Participant involvement across all studies - control group 
 
Participant ID  Exp 1     Exp 2     Exp 3     Exp 4  Exp5     Exp6        Exp7 
____________________________________________________________________ 
1                 ✓   ✓     ✓      ✓ 
2         ✓        ✓   ✓     ✓      ✓ 
3                  ✓      ✓ 
4         ✓        ✓   ✓     ✓      ✓ 
5         ✓        ✓                ✓ 
6         ✓ 
7         ✓     ✓       ✓     ✓     ✓ 
8         ✓     ✓       ✓  ✓   ✓     ✓      ✓ 
9         ✓           ✓     ✓ 
10         ✓           ✓     ✓ 
11                     ✓     ✓   
12         ✓           ✓     ✓ 
13                ✓       ✓  ✓   ✓     ✓      ✓ 
14                      ✓     ✓ 
16         ✓        ✓          ✓ 
17          
18         ✓ 
19                  ✓     ✓ 
20         ✓           ✓     ✓ 
21         ✓     ✓       ✓  ✓   ✓     ✓      ✓ 
23         ✓        ✓          ✓ 
24              ✓   ✓     ✓      ✓ 
25                           ✓ 
26              ✓             ✓ 
27         ✓     ✓       ✓  ✓            ✓ 
28         ✓                  ✓ 
29               ✓       ✓  ✓          ✓ 
30                           ✓ 
31              ✓          ✓ 
32              ✓          ✓ 
33              ✓      ✓            ✓ 
34              ✓          ✓ 
35              ✓          ✓ 
36              ✓      ✓  ✓ 
37              ✓      ✓ 
38              ✓      ✓ 
39              ✓      ✓ 
40              ✓         
41              ✓      ✓ 
42              ✓      ✓ 
43              ✓      ✓ 
44              ✓      ✓ 
45              ✓      ✓ 
46              ✓      ✓   208
Appendix II 
 
Materials used for experiments five and six: selective attention and perceptual 
load in the presence of face distractor stimuli 
 
Face Distractors: 
 
 
 
 
Names used:          Non-words: 
 
Male    Female         
 
John    Lucy        Gydhs   Zlhdp 
James    Mary        Sxfdret   Pgcvlsr 
David    Sarah        Blkp    Jfpgxw 
Henry    Jane        Dmhso   Blwcy 
Thomas  Katie        Ifgbter   Mjgtpf 
Michael  Sophie       Kpsigk   Idnhl   209
Appendix III 
 
Materials used for experiment seven: selective attention and perceptual load in 
the presence of musical instrument distractor stimuli 
 
Face Distractors: 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
Names used:          Non-words: 
 
String   Wind 
 
Cello    Trumpet      Gydhs   Zlhdp 
Violin   Clarinet      Sxfdret   Pgcvlsr 
Bass    Trombone      Blkp    Jfpgxw 
Harp    Tuba        Dmhso   Blwcy 
Guitar   Saxophone      Ifgbter   Mjgtpf 
Banjo    Horn        Kpsigk   Idnhl   210
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